(dissenting). I respectfully dissent and would reverse and remand for further proceedings.
I
I agree with the recitation of facts in the majority opinion except to add that when plaintiff went before the parole board in July 1984, it was his first appearance before the board and it was then that he was *325first told that it was unlikely he would ever be paroled. Plaintiff filed the instant suit in March 1994.
n
Plaintiff first argues that the lower court erred in granting summary disposition to defendant on the basis of the statute of limitations. I agree.
In reviewing a motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(7), this Court accepts the plaintiffs well-pleaded allegations as true and construes them in the plaintiffs favor. Huron Tool & Engineering Co v Precision Consulting Services, Inc, 209 Mich App 365, 376-377; 532 NW2d 541 (1995).
A
This case involves the application of the disability rule to both the running of the applicable limitation period and the discovery of plaintiffs cause of action. The period of limitation for a malpractice cause of action is two years. MCL 600.5805(4); MSA 27A.5805(4). The claim accrues on the last date of service, which in this case was the date of plaintiffs sentencing hearing. MCL 600.5838(1); MSA 27A.5838(1). The time of accrual may be tolled, however, when a statutory disability exists. MCL 600.5838(2); MSA 27A.5838(2), MCL 600.5851; MSA 27A.5851. Regardless of the running of the limitation period, a plaintiff may file suit six months after he discovered or should have discovered the claim. MCL 600.5838(2); MSA 27A.5838(2).
Under the statute as it existed in 1977 when plaintiffs cause of action accrued, imprisonment was a disability that tolled the running of the period of limitation. MCL 600.5851; MSA 27A.5851. Plaintiff was not *326entitled to claim the benefit of statutory disability for purposes of tolling the accrual of his cause of action, however, because he was in jail, instead of prison, when his cause of action accrued. Mino v McCarthy, 209 Mich App 302; 530 NW2d 779 (1995).
During the applicable period, MCL 600.5851(3); MSA 27A.5851(3) provided that “ [i]f [the disability] comes into existence after the claim has accrued it shall not be recognized under this section for the purpose of modifying the period of limitations.” Subsection 5851(3) stands for the proposition that once the claim has accrued, the statutory period will not be tolled because of the disability. In other words, because plaintiff was not disabled (he was not in prison) at the time his cause of action accrued, the fact that he became disabled (he was sentenced to prison) shortly thereafter does not toll the running of the two-year statutory period. That conclusion, however, is not dispositive of the issue in this case; subsection 5851(3) does not control whether the statutory disability affects the discovery provision of the statute.
B
We must decide whether plaintiff can claim the benefit of the statutory disability in relation to the discovery of the claim in 1984, seven years after his claim accrued and ten years before he initiated this cause of action. That is, although the disability does not act to extend the two-year limitation period on the facts of this case, does it operate with regard to the discovery period and, if so, to what effect?
Here, by the time plaintiff discovered his claim, he was in prison and under statutory disability. In Evans *327v Hebert, 203 Mich App 392, 395; 513 NW2d 164 (1994), this Court noted that the purpose of the disability statute is to recognize that prisoners’ freedom and access to the judicial process have been impaired, entitling them to additional time to assert their legal rights. As plaintiff has alleged the facts, he could not have discovered his claim until the 1984 parole hearing, after his disability arose. I believe that under those circumstances, the benefit of the disability rule applies to the discovery rule in the same manner as to the accrual rule. The inability to gain access to the courts in order to save a limitation period from running is the same whether the issue is the accrual of the cause of action or the discovery of the claim. In other words, because plaintiff alleges that he did not and could not discover his claim until after he became disabled, he is entitled to claim the grace of the discovery rule.
Plaintiff is still disabled, and he brought this action within one year of the 1993 amendments of MCL 600.5851; MSA 27A.5851, see 1993 PA 78, 1993 PA 283. Accordingly, I conclude that the trial court erred in finding that plaintiff’s claim was time-barred.
in
The statute of limitations question, however, was not the only basis for the trial court’s ruling. The court also determined that no factual situation would support a recovery by plaintiff in this case. MCR 2.116(I)(1). I would find this holding also to have been in error.
In order for plaintiff to prove that defendant’s negligence caused him to serve a greater prison sentence, plaintiff must prove that, but for defendant’s negli*328gence, he would have received a better result. See Radtke v Miller, Canfield, Paddock & Stone, 209 Mich App 606, 612; 532 NW2d 547 (1995), rev’d on other grounds 453 Mich 413; 551 NW2d 698 (1996). Here, although plaintiff acknowledges that defendant informed him he would receive a sentence of life in prison if he did not accept an offered plea bargain, he claims that defendant also informed him that, because he would be eligible for parole, he would ultimately serve no more than twelve years in prison. Plaintiff alleges that he relied on that advice in rejecting the plea offer. That alleged advice did not prove to be correct; he received a life sentence as predicted, but has not been paroled after nineteen years in prison and, according to his account, has been told that he probably will never be paroled. Accordingly, plaintiff did create an issue of fact with regard to whether, but for defendant’s representation, he would have received a better result.
Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order granting summary disposition to defendant and remand for further proceedings. I express no opinion regarding the merits of plaintiff’s claim against defendant.