Plaintiff Rosso (respondent here) is the manager of a state owned liquor store in West Seattle. As such, he is an employee of the Washington State Liquor Control Board. On April 22, 1963, pursuant to Article 20, § 2, of the Merit System Rules1 as promulgated by the State Personnel Board, the Retail Liquor Clerks’ Union No. 1640 filed a request with the personnel board for a determination of an appropriate bargaining unit for employees of the liquor board. The personnel board scheduled a public hearing upon the request for May 28,1963. On May 21,1963, plaintiff, who is not a member of the Retail Liquor Clerks’ Union No. 1640, commenced this action in the Superior Court for Thurston County against the personnel board to enjoin it from proceeding with the hearing scheduled for May 28, 1963, and to obtain a judgment declaring Article 20 of the Merit System Rules unconstitutional and void. At or about the time plaintiff commenced his action, the petitioning union requested a postponement of the scheduled hearing before the personnel board. A temporary restraining order was then issued by the superior court, and no hearing for the purpose of determining a bargaining unit has been held.
*18Motions to dismiss plaintiff’s complaint, upon the grounds of lack of a justiciable issue, were made on behalf of the personnel board, at appropriate stages of the proceedings, and denied by the superior court. At the conclusion of the hearing on the merits, the superior court entered an injunction permanently enjoining the personnel board from entertaining the petition for determination of a bargaining unit for the liquor board employees. This was predicated upon the trial court’s conclusion that the personnel board had no jurisdiction over employees of the liquor board.
Initially, it must be observed that the superior court entered the injunction upon an erroneous premise. The rationale of the trial judge’s conclusion that the personnel board did not have jurisdiction over employees of the liquor board is revealed by the following excerpt from his oral decision:
Now, the statute creating the Liquor Control Board is RCW 43.66 and following; and the particular section that I call your attention to is RCW 43.66.030 and that reads as follows: “The Board may employ such employees as in its judgment are required from time to time, at such rates of salaries or wages as are fixed by the regulations; and any employee may be dismissed or removed by the Board at its pleasure.”
RCW 43.66.030, as quoted and relied upon by the trial judge, was amended by the state civil service law, adopted by the people in 1960 as Initiative 207, § 30 (Laws of 1961, ch. 1, § 30, codified as RCW 66.08.016). As amended, the pertinent statute now reads:
The Board may employ such employees as in its judgment are required from time to time.
Initiative 207, § 4(2) (Laws of 1961, ch. 1, § 4(2), codified as RCW 41.06.040 (2)) extended its application to
Each agency, and each employee and position therein, not expressly excluded or exempted under the provisions of section 7 of this act.
Section 7 of the Initiative (Laws of 1961, ch. 1, § 7, as amended by Laws of 1961, ch. 179, § 1, codified as RCW 41.06.070) does not exclude or exempt liquor board employ*19ees from the civil service law. The purpose, therefore, of amending RCW 43.66.030 was to render it consistent with the state civil service law and to extend the coverage of that law to employees of the liquor board.
Because the trial judge proceeded from a faulty premise, he did not reach the issue which plaintiff sought to have determined — the validity of Article 20 of the Merit System Rules. On appeal, plaintiff renews his arguments upon this issue, whereas the counsel for the personnel board again urges that the complaint be dismissed for lack of a justicia-ble controversy.
This case was consolidated on the appeal with Donaldson v. State Personnel Bd., 64 Wn.2d 368, 391 P.2d 970 (1964). That case likewise involved a challenge to the validity of Article 20 of the Merit System Rules, but had been dismissed by the superior court for lack of a justiciable controversy. In affirming the dismissal, we stated at 369:
Plaintiff has failed to establish facts sufficient to support a conclusion that any right or privilege of his has been interfered with or impaired, or is immediately threatened to be interfered with or impaired as required by RCW 34.04.070. The touchstone of justiciability is injury to a legally protected right.
A careful perusal of the pleadings and the statement of facts in the instant case force us to the same conclusion as that reached in the Donaldson case.
The sole distinction between this case and the Donaldson case is the pendency of a request before the personnel board for determination of an appropriate bargaining unit for retail liquor store clerks. Plaintiff has cited no authority, and we have found none, which holds that determination of a bargaining unit among public employees is, per se, unconstitutional or violative of the merit system as created by Initiative 207 (Laws of 1961, ch. 1, codified as RCW 41.06). Neither has plaintiff furnished sufficient substantive facts upon which to base a conclusion that (a) plaintiff, as a liquor store manager, would be included within the constituency of any prospective bargaining unit of re*20tail liquor store clerks or other liquor board employees,2 (b) any particular employee organization would be elected by the employees of the prospective bargaining unit and/or be certified by the personnel board as an exclusive bargaining agent for the employees of such bargaining unit, or (c) any prospective negotiations or agreements, which might be undertaken by any bargaining agent or be approved by plaintiff’s employer, would contravene pertinent statutes, the constitution, or plaintiff’s rights under the merit system.
In the latter vein (subdivision (c)), it is appropriate to point out that we have long and consistently indulged the presumption that public officers will properly and legally perform their duties until the contrary is shown. Cawsey v. Brickey, 82 Wash. 653, 144 Pac. 938 (1914); Smith v. Hollenbeck, 48 Wn.2d 461, 294 P.2d 921 (1956). We should not, therefore, undertake to forecast that state officials will permit and enter into negotiations and agreements which will contravene legislative prerogatives, the civil service law, budget exigencies, or public employment concepts. To do this simply amounts to piling one adverse assumption upon another.
Thus, at this point, we are left to speculate and theorize as to what right or privilege of plaintiff’s, under the constitution or the merit system, has been interfered with or impaired, or is immediately threatened to be inter*21fered with or impaired by the determination of a bargaining unit.
This court has, as recently as Nostrand v. Little, 58 Wn.2d 111, 361 P.2d 551 (1961), and Hubbard v. Medical Serv. Corp., 59 Wn.2d 449, 367 P.2d 1003 (1962), adverted to the earlier case of Washington Beauty College, Inc. v. Huse, 195 Wash. 160, 164, 80 P.2d 403 (1938), wherein we stated the limitations upon declaratory relief as follows:
It should be remembered that this court is not authorized to render advisory opinions or pronouncements upon abstract or speculative questions under the declaratory judgment act. The action still must be adversary in character between real parties and upon real issues, that is, between a plaintiff and defendant having opposing interests, and the interests must be direct and substantial and involve an actual as distinguished from a possible or potential dispute, to meet the requirements of justiciability.
Furthermore, RCW 34.04.070, the statute under which this action is brought, provides:
(1) The validity of any rule may be determined upon petition for a declaratory judgment thereon addressed to the superior court of Thurston county, when it appears that the rule, or its threatened application, interferes with or impairs or immediately threatens to interfere with or impair, the legal rights or privileges of the petitioner. The agency shall be made a party to the proceeding. The declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the petitioner has first requested the agency to pass upon the validity of the rule in question.
(2) In a proceeding under subsection (1) of this section the court shall declare the rule invalid only if it finds that it violates constitutional provisions or exceeds the statutory authority of the agency or was adopted without compliance with statutory rule-making procedures.
Applying, then, these precedental and statutory guidelines to the limited circumstances before us, we are unable to perceive the present existence of an actual, as distinguished from a possible or potential, dispute, or the threat of an immediate impairment or interference with the legal rights or privileges of plaintiff. Neither can we say that *22determination of a bargaining unit ipso facto violates any constitutional provisions.
The outstanding injunction is accordingly dissolved and plaintiff’s action dismissed.
Rosellini, C. J., Finley, Hunter, and Hale, JJ., concur.
The text of Article 20, § 2, óf the Merit System Rules, reads:
“Determination, alteration, modification or combination of an appropriate bargaining unit shall be made by the Personnel Board, upon request from the appointing authority, the employee organization, or upon the Board’s own motion, after twenty (20) days notice has been given to the appointing authority, the petitioning employee organization and the representatives of other affected employees.
“In determining a bargaining unit, the Board shall consider the following factors:
“A. Duties, skills and working conditions of the employees;
“B. History of collective bargaining by the employees and their representatives;
“C. Extent of Union organization among the employees;
“D. Desire of the employees.” .
Parenthetically, It should be observed that a bargaining unit of employees need not necessarily coincide or equate with a state agency, nor embrace within it every category of employee within a given agency or department. For example: It would seem reasonable to draw a distinction, for bargaining unit purposes, between janitorial and clerical employees, between professional and nonprofessional personnel, or between clerks and supervisors. The complexities inherent in the determination of an appropriate bargaining unit of employees may be gleaned from a reference to the experiences of the National Labor Relations Board which, though not particularly analogous, do illustrate the possible problems. See: Rothenberg, Labor Relations, ch. 7, 475-512; Beal and Wickersham, The Practice of Collective Bargaining 600-22 (rev. ed. 1963); Lien', Labor Law and Relations, ch. 8, 294; Slovenko, Symposium on Labor Relations Law 151-85.