Prior to People v Sinclair, 387 Mich 91 (1972), and People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167 (1972), we would have affirmed defendant’s conviction of possession of marijuana by a memorandum opinion. The original information was filed February 11, 1970 and charged defendant with sale of marijuana, MCLA 335.152; MSA 18.1122. The trial date was set for March 15, 1971. On the latter *279date an amended information was filed, adding count II which charged defendant with unlawful possession of marijuana, MCLA 335.153; MSA 18.1123. The same day, defendant pleaded guilty to count II, and the transcript of the plea taking is practically a model of propriety. It is apparent that the plea resulted from negotiations, a procedure approved by Santobello v New York, 404 US 257; 92 S Ct 495; 30 L Ed 2d 427 (1971), and by the ABA standards of criminal justice (see standards relating to pleas of guilty part III).
Defendant’s only attack on the plea arises from his argument that the plea to possession was not a free choice when the only alternative was to stand trial for sale and risk a minimum sentence of 20 years. North Carolina v Alford, 400 US 25; 91 S Ct 160; 27 L Ed 2d 162 (1970), and People v Sumlin, 32 Mich App 1 (1971), dispose of this contention contrary to defendant’s position.
In determining defendant’s contention that the statute under which he was convicted is unconstitutional as violative of his right of equal protection, due process of law and right of privacy, we face squarely the question of the effect of Sinclair, supra, on the law as it existed prior to that decision.
Of the four opinions in Sinclair, supra, two were signed by two justices and two were signed by the writer only; one justice did not participate. In order to be controlling precedent, an opinion must be concurred in by a majority of the court, Groening v McCambridge, 282 Mich 135, 140 (1937), People v Gonzales, 356 Mich 247, 262, 263 (1959), Corporation & Securities Commission v American Motors Corporation, 4 Mich App 65, 67 (1966), People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167 (1972). Concurrence requires the signature of those justices con*280curring, MCLA 600.229; MSA 27A.229. Only one conclusion is possible, Sinclair, supra, decides Sinclair.
This conclusion was reached by the Supreme Court in Lorentzen, supra, at p 171:
"In People v Sinclair, 387 Mich 91 (1972), decided this same day, the equal protection, due process and right to privacy issues raised by defendant are considered. None of these issues are decided by a majority of this Court favorably to defendant.”
This language was approved by the signatures of five of the six justices participating in Sinclair. Having determined that Sinclair, supra, is not controlling, we adopt as controlling the opinion of Chief Judge Lesinski in People v Sinclair, 30 Mich App 473 (1971), as to the foregoing constitutional issues raised by defendant. This well-reasoned opinion is supported by equally well-reasoned, legally recognized authority. Judge Lesinski’s opinion adequately disposes of all the constitutional attacks raised by defendant contrary to his contentions, except as to sentence.
We recognize that this opinion is contrary to a prior opinion by another panel of this Court, see People v Griffin, 39 Mich App 464 (1972). Although one panel of this Court is not bound to follow the opinion of another panel of this Court on any question of law, the normal practice has been to do so, unless cogent reason appears for not doing so. Griffin, supra, adopts Sinclair, supra, as controlling precedent without any analysis of what constitutes controlling precedent, and in spite of the fact that the Supreme Court in Lorentzen, supra, acknowledged that Sinclair is not controlling on the constitutional issues of equal protection, due proc*281ess and right to privacy. We find this to be cogent reason for not following Griffin, supra.
While we do not question the right of an appellate court to review sentences alleged to be excessive and to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, the sentence in this case does not fit that category. At sentencing, defendant volunteered the information concerning his bad record. The trial court deliberately set a lower minimum sentence than the judge felt defendant should receive because defendant’s wife was pregnant. On the facts and defendant’s record, the five-year minimum sentence was reasonable.
Affirmed.
V. J. Brennan, J., concurred.