(dissenting). The statement of the facts in the case as set forth in the majority opinion is adopted. We have no argument with the position set forth in that opinion with reference to the propriety of the plea taking, the voluntariness of the plea or the reasonableness of the sentence imposed by the trial court.
We come to a parting of the ways, however, with the majority as to the applicability of People v Sinclair, 387 Mich 91 (1972), No 53,550. Nor do we dispute the quotation by the majority from the opinion in People v Lorentzen, 387 Mich 167 (1972), No 53,200 (released March 9, 1972, as was the Sinclair case). It is true that in Lorentzen, supra, the Supreme Court stated, at p 171:
"In People v Sinclair, 387 Mich 91 (1972), decided this same day, the equal protection, due process and right to privacy issues raised by defendant are considered. None of these issues are decided by a majority of this Court favorably to defendant.”
*282There was no majority on any one of the three issues. However, the Supreme Court in Sinclair did rule the statute unconstitutional as evidenced by their subsequent order entered April 7, 1972 "in the matter of an application for habeas corpus in behalf of the People” No 54,041:
" * * * The restraint of these 128 persons pursuant to convictions for possession or attempted possession of marijuana is unlawful in light of this Court’s decision in People v Sinclair, 387 Mich 91, by which a majority of this Court held unconstitutional the possession provisions of MCLA 335.153, MSA 18.1123.” (Emphasis applied.)
This order was entered pursuant to a determination by five justices, four of whom participated in the prevailing ruling in Sinclair, supra. One of the dissenters also concurred in that order indicating that in his opinion, together with that of the four signers, the Per Curiam order in Sinclair, supra, did, in fact, rule the statute unconstitutional on the questions of possession or attempted possession of marijuana. It is the inclination of the writer that those who made the ruling and authored the several opinions and orders can more properly interpret the purport and intent of their rulings than third parties.
In People v Griffin, 39 Mich App 464 (1972), the panel reached this same conclusion on the question of law as we reached in this dissent on the authority of Sinclair, supra. This effectively disposes, in our opinion, of the question of the propriety of the plea on what is now by directive of the Supreme Court, an unconstitutional statute. However, this leaves open the question of Count I charged against the defendant in the information. Examination of the record below discloses that the *283motion to dismiss Count I was taken under advisement and never disposed of.
Under the circumstances, the defendant should be discharged from the conviction under Count II and the matter should be remanded to the trial court for disposition under Count I.
Reversed and remanded.