dissenting.
I disagree with the majority’s characterization of the issue in this CclSG clSj
whether the Form 26 agreement between Plaintiff and Defendants gave Plaintiff the most favorable disability benefits to which he was entitled at the time the agreement was approved by the Commission.
The determination of that issue is the function of the Industrial Commission, not this Court. Rather, the proper inquiry for this Court to determine on appeal is whether there is any competent evidence in the record to support the Commission’s finding that the claimant was incapable of earning wages with Craven Regional Medical Center or *444in any other employment at the time the Form 26 agreement was approved. I further disagree with the majority’s finding that, even if there was competent evidence to support the Commission’s finding, the Commission was barred by the principles of collateral estoppel and res judicata from determining that the claimant was unable to work.
It is well settled that the Industrial Commission’s findings of fact are conclusive on appeal if supported by any competent evidence, even though there may be evidence that would support findings to the contrary. See Adams v. AVX Corp., 349 N.C. 676, 681, 509 S.E.2d 411, 414 (1998). Competent evidence is evidence “that a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support the finding[s].” Andrews v. Fulcher Tire Sales and Serv., 120 N.C. App. 602, 605, 463 S.E.2d 425, 427 (1995).
Here, the Commission found that:
[a]s a result of plaintiff’s injury by accident, he has been incapable of earning wages with defendant-employer or in any other employment from 23 February 1990 through the date of the hearing and continuing.
The majority asserts that Dr. Pelletier’s notations — “I placed him back on Prednisone, Flexeril, Lorcet, light activity, no work” on 4 April 1991 and “[n]o work” on 16 April 1991 — are not competent evidence to support this finding. I, however, believe the physician’s orders are adequate to support the aforementioned finding that the claimant was unable to work, even if there was evidence to support a different finding. Therefore, the Commission’s finding on the claimant’s inability to work is conclusive on appeal. See Adams, 349 N.C. at 681, 509 S.E.2d at 414.
Moreover, contrary to the majority’s position, the doctrines of collateral estoppel and res judicata do not apply to the case sub judice. Although our Court in Lewis I affirmed the Commission’s finding that the claimant “had wage earning capacity” for a claim of a change in condition pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-47, we did not litigate the claimant’s earning capacity as it relates to the issue of whether the Form 26 agreement was improvidently approved by the Commission. See Lewis v. Craven Regional Medical Center, 122 N.C. App. 143, 468 S.E.2d 269 (1996); Brooks v. Stroh Brewery Co., 95 N.C. App. 226, 382 S.E.2d 874 (1989) (holding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel bars re-adjudication of issues when (1) the prior suit *445resulted in judgment on the merits; (2) identical issues are involved; (3) the issue was actually litigated; (4) the issue was actually determined; and (5) the determination was necessary to the resulting judgment); King v. Grindstaff, 284 N.C. 348, 200 S.E.2d 799 (1973) (stating that where the second action between the same parties is upon a different claim or demand, the judgment in the prior action operates as an estoppel only as to those matters in issue or points controverted, upon determination of which finding or verdict was rendered).
In fact, this Court in Lewis I refused to determine the issue at bar and stated that:
We do not, however, address [the claimant’s argument that the Form 26 Agreement was improvidently improved by the Commission and must therefore be set aside as not being ‘fair and just’] because there has been no motion to set aside the Form 26 agreement before the Commission.
Id. at 148, 468 S.E.2d at 274. Instead, this Court left that particular issue to the Commission “upon the filing of a proper and timely motion.” Id. at 149, 468 S.E.2d at 274. Thus, Lewis I and the instant case involve the adjudication of different issues.
Respectfully, I dissent.