(concurring in the result):
I concur in the majority’s result to the extent that defendants should be estopped to assert defenses of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel because of the representations of their counsel in the prior trial, and not because res judicata and/or collateral estop-pel would not otherwise apply to the facts of this case.
It is well-settled in this jurisdiction that “ ‘ “[ejstoppel is an equitable doctrine which precludes parties from asserting their rights where their actions render it inequitable to allow them to assert those rights.” ’ ” Dansie v. Anderson Lumber Co., 878 P.2d 1155, 1159 n. 10 (Utah App.1994) (quoting Burrow v. Vrontikis, 788 P.2d 1046, 1048 (Utah App.1990) (quotation omitted)). The test for determining whether estoppel is present “is whether there is conduct, by act or omission, by which one party knowingly leads another party, reasonably acting thereon, to take *680some course of action, which will result in his detriment or damage if the first party is permitted to repudiate or deny his conduct or representation.” J.P. Koch, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 534 P.2d 903, 905 (Utah 1975) (footnote omitted); accord Triple I Supply, Inc. v. Sunset Rail, Inc., 652 P.2d 1298, 1301-02 (Utah 1982). Moreover,
“[wjhere, as here, the delay in commencing action was induced by the conduct of the party sought to be charged the latter may not invoke such conduct to defeat recovery. An estoppel may arise although there was no designed fraud on the part of the person sought to be estopped. To create an equitable estoppel, ‘it is enough if the party has been induced to refrain from using-such means or taking such action as lay in his power, by which he might have retrieved his position and saved himself from loss’_ ‘It is well-settled that a person by his conduct may be estopped to rely upon these defenses. Where the delay in commencing action is induced by the conduct of the defendant it cannot be availed of by him as a defense.’ ”
Rice v. Granite Sch. Dist., 23 Utah 2d 22, 456 P.2d 159, 162 (1969) (quotation and footnote omitted).
Although the court’s opinion does not contain an estoppel analysis, it correctly concludes that, based upon undisputed affidavits, representations were made by defendants to plaintiffs either prior to or during trial to the effect that defendants would pay any taxes and assessments regarding the property. In reasonable reliance on those representations, the Estate would have no reason to assert a counterclaim for the taxes or assessments in the prior action. Having induced the Estate to refrain from pursuing a counterclaim for taxes and assessments, defendants cannot now rely upon the defenses of res judicata and/or collateral estoppel.
In my view, the requirements for res judi-cata and collateral estoppel set out in the court’s opinion are present here and, but for the equitable estoppel created by defendants, would be valid defenses to plaintiffs claim.
Having determined that those defenses are not available to defendant, there is no need to consider the issues of whether the court in the prior proceeding determined that the contract was terminated or whether plaintiffs claims were ripe for adjudication.