concurring in part and dissenting in part.
*369Because the majority opinion interprets the discovery act as repealing by implication the defendant’s right to the state’s trial witness lists, scientific reports, and scientific work product, I dissent to division four.
1. The majority construes too narrowly the constitutional requirement that the defendant shall be furnished “a list of witnesses on whose testimony such charge is founded.” In Sutton v. State,4 we held that the constitutional right to be furnished a list of witnesses “is the right, on demand, to be furnished by the district attorney’s office, prior to arraignment, with the list of witnesses who will testify for the state on the trial.”
As a matter of due process and fundamental fairness, I would continue to interpret the constitutional provision as requiring the state to provide a list of its trial witnesses despite the repeal of the statute.5 The requirement enables the defendant to prepare a defense by interviewing potential trial witnesses; it aids judicial economy by requiring defense counsel to investigate and interview the witnesses before trial, thus avoiding the need for a continuance; and it places no undue burden on the prosecutor, as shown by the attorney general office’s practice of furnishing a list of potential trial witnesses in all criminal cases.
Even in the absence of a constitutional right, the better policy and practice is for prosecutors to furnish a list of potential trial witnesses to avoid unfair surprise and make trials more efficient. The discovery act repealed former OCGA § 17-7-110, which required disclosure of witness lists and the indictment, but reenacted that provision to apply in misdemeanor cases.6 Because persons charged with less serious offenses are entitled to the names of trial witnesses, persons charged with felonies should receive the same information from the state.
2. The due process clause of the United States Constitution guarantees a defendant the right to an independent examination of critical evidence.7 Depending on the case, this right may include the state’s scientific reports and data on which its experts will rely at trial. Despite the majority’s unsupported assertion, the repeal of OCGA § 17-7-211 cannot eliminate the defendant’s due process right to scientific reports and work product when they are critical evidence. Any doubts about the importance of the evidence should weigh *370in favor of disclosure towards the defendant.
3. Both the Georgia Attorney General and the Georgia Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers agree that a defendant preparing for trial is entitled to a significant amount of information under the United States Constitution and the Georgia Constitution, statutes, court rules, and court decisions. Specifically, they agree that a defendant is entitled to the following:
A. Exculpatory material as set forth in Brady v. Maryland.8
B. Evidence of an understanding, agreement, or promise of leniency under Giglio v. United States9 and Patillo v. State.10
C. Evidence in aggravation that the state intends to rely on at presentence hearings and victim impact evidence under OCGA § 17-10-1.2 and Livingston v. State.11
D. Independent examination of critical evidence under the due process clause of the United States Constitution.12
E. Materials used by a witness to refresh memory as set forth in Sterling v. State13 and Johnson v. State.14
F. Notice of state’s intent to introduce evidence of similar transactions that do not involve prior difficulties between the defendant and victim under Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.3 and Wall v. State15
G. Certain information from the Georgia Crime Information Center under OCGA § 35-3-34.
H. Notice of the state’s intention to rebut evidence of specific acts of violence by the victim against third persons under Chandler v. State16 and Uniform Superior Court Rule 31.6.
I. Pre-trial examination of known handwriting samples under OCGA § 24-7-7.
J. Disclosure of the name of an informant in certain circumstances under Roviaro v. United States17 and Wilson v. State.18
K. Examination of any report prepared under OCGA § 17-4-20.1 about an act of family violence for which the defendant has been arrested.
L. Presentation of evidence at a court proceeding by way of a notice *371to produce, if the matter would be admissible and the defendant needs it for use as evidence on his own behalf.19
Decided June 14, 1999 Reconsideration denied July 30, 1999. Robert E. Keller, District Attorney, David B. Hornsby, Assistant District Attorney, for appellant. Michael Mears, David J. Walker, Sr, Kenneth D. Driggs, for appellee. John C. Pridgen, District Attorney, Cordele Circuit, Peter J. Skandalakis, District Attorney, Coweta Circuit, Thurbert E. Baker, Attorney General, Mary' Beth Westmoreland, Deputy Attorney General, Joseph L. Chambers, Sr, John R. Martin, Donald F. Samuel, amici curiae.M. Access to records under the Open Records Act.20
These rights remain available despite a defendant’s decision not to have the criminal discovery statute apply.
I am authorized to state that Chief Justice Benham and Justice Sears join in this dissent.
237 Ga. 423 (228 SE2d 820) (1976).
See Loggins v. State, 260 Ga. 1 (388 SE2d 675) (1990) (purpose of notice to defendant of similar transaction evidence is fundamental fairness).
See OCGA § 17-16-21 (1997).
See Sabel v. State, 248 Ga. 10, 17-18 (282 SE2d 61) (1981), overruled on other grounds in Rower v. State, 264 Ga. 323, 325 (443 SE2d 839) (1994).
373 U.S. 83 (83 SC 1194, 10 LE2d 215) (1963).
405 U.S. 150 (92 SC 763, 31 LE2d 104) (1972).
258 Ga. 255 (368 SE2d 493) (1988).
264 Ga. 402 (444 SE2d 748) (1994).
See Sabel, 248 Ga. 17-18.
267 Ga. 209 (477 SE2d 807) (1996).
259 Ga. 403 (383 SE2d 118) (1989).
269 Ga. 506 (500 SE2d 904) (1998).
261 Ga. 402 (405 SE2d 669) (1991).
353 U.S. 53 (77 SC 623, 1 LE2d 639) (1957).
209 Ga. App. 436 (433 SE2d 703) (1993)
See OCGA § 24-10-26; Brown v. State, 238 Ga. 98 (231 SE2d 65) (1976).
OCGA § 50-18-70.