(concurring in part; dissenting in part). I agree that Kruzycki was not subjected to double jeopardy, that the trial court properly exercised its discretion in admitting evidence of Kruzycki's 1979 convictions, and that we should not order a new trial *529for plain error or in the interest of justice. However, I would not reach Kruzycki's attack on the trial court's application of the repeater statute, § 939.62, Stats. In the trial court, Kruzycki withdrew a motion in which he asserted that he was not subject to the repeater statute. The relevant portions of the Sex Crimes Law1 were repealed effective July 1, 1980, nearly fifteen years ago. There will be very few future cases in which the application of Sex Crimes Law incarcerations to repeater sentences will be significant. We have held that where a defendant withdraws a motion, he has waived an attack based on the contents of that motion. State v. Meado, 163 Wis. 2d 789, 794 n.1, 472 N.W.2d 567, 569 (Ct. App. 1991). I see no difference between this case and the myriad of cases in which we have concluded that because a party has failed to raise an issue in the trial court he was precluded from asserting error as to that issue on appeal.
See majority op. at 515 n.2.