(dissenting).
I respectfully dissent. I conclude the trial court applied the appropriate legal standard to appellants’ claim. I would uphold the trial *896court’s finding that appellants’ discharge was not pretextual, but was for bona fide reasons.
The majority considers the trial court’s reliance on St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, — U.S. -, 113 S.Ct. 2742, 125 L.Ed.2d 407 (1992), erroneous and indicative of a “mixed motive” analysis. I cannot agree. Hicks did not involve a “mixed motive” analysis. Hicks discussed a plaintiffs burden to prove defendant’s proffered reason was a pretext:
The dissent takes this to mean that if the plaintiff proves the [employer’s] asserted reason to be false, the plaintiff wins. But a reason cannot be proved to be “a pretext for discrimination” unless it is shown both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.
Hicks, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2752 (emphasis in original). Hicks simply elaborated on the third step of McDonnell Douglas, which emphasized plaintiff’s burden was to prove employer’s conduct was intentionally discriminatory.
The federal standard found in Hicks is not, as the majority suggests, more rigid than the Anderson analysis. In Anderson, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated:
Once a legitimate reason has been offered, the employee has the final burden of demonstrating that the proffered reason was not the true reason for [the] employer’s actions. The trial court’s task is to determine whether the employee has met this burden. The court’s characterization of the employer’s motives is immaterial at the third stage of the analysis. The question is solely whether or not the court is persuaded that the employee has been the victim of intentional discrimination.
Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 417 N.W.2d 619, 626 (Minn.1988) (quoting Anderson v. Hunter, Keith, Marshall & Co., 401 N.W.2d 75, 81 (Minn.App.1987) (emphasis added)).
Hicks and Anderson both require plaintiff show employer’s asserted reason is not a pretext and require the trier of fact be convinced there was intentional discrimination on the part of the employer. Hicks was responding to the claim that, in order to satisfy the third part of McDonnell Douglas, plaintiff need only show employer’s asserted reason was false. Hicks emphasized plaintiffs burden in a discriminatory discharge claim is to prove that discrimination was the real reason for plaintiffs discharge.
Similarly, Anderson discussed how a plaintiff demonstrates that an employer’s asserted reason for plaintiff’s discharge is false. Anderson emphasized the essential question is whether the employee had been the victim of intentional discrimination. Thus, both the federal and Anderson standards require the trier of fact be convinced plaintiffs discharge was the result of intentional discrimination.
The majority believes the trial court was clearly erroneous in finding appellants were not the victims of intentional discrimination. I cannot agree. Although the trial court did find that appellants were subjected to derogatory comments, at various times by co-employees, the trial court still concluded their discharge was for legitimate reasons. The trial court is entitled to deference on a factual finding. The majority asserts the trial court reached its conclusion because it found respondent also had a non-discriminatory reason for discharging appellants. Like the trial court, I conclude the only reason for appellants’ discharge was the legitimate one, and that discrimination was not a co-reason.
Discrimination by co-employees in the workplace does not, per se, satisfy the third part of McDonnell Douglas for a “discriminatory discharge” claim. Discrimination must be the causative factor in the discharge. See Hicks, — U.S. at-, 113 S.Ct. at 2752 (holding must show discrimination was real reason for discharge); Feges v. Perkins Restaurants, Inc., 483 N.W.2d 701, 711 (Minn. 1992) (plaintiff failed to prove her age was real reason for termination).
If employees are required to show only that they suffered some discrimination at the hands of co-employees during their employment, employers will be prevented from ever discharging an employee who has ever experienced discrimination. Unless the employee is required to tie the discharge to the discrimination, simply pointing out past discrim*897ination would always satisfy a discriminatory discharge claim.
The trial court determined the fighting incident and appellants’ attempt to lie about it were bona fide reasons for termination. I find the trial court’s conclusion is supported by the record.
I would affirm.