(concurring in part, concurring in result in part, and dissenting in part):
I concur in the main opinion as to (1) the nuisance per se analysis found in part I.B.; (2) part H.A., affirming Judge Brian’s denial of plaintiffs’ motion to file a third amended complaint; and (3) part II.C., which affirms Judge Iwasaki’s protective order, affirms Judge Noel’s order allowing the jury to view the Utelite facility, rejects plaintiffs’ attack on Judge Noel’s adoption of findings of fact and conclusions of law on equitable relief prepared by Utelite, and affirms plaintiffs’ other arguments on cross-appeal because they are either meritless or disposed of based on the results on other issues in the ease. I concur in the result regarding parts I.A.1. and I.A.4, which affirm Judge Wilkinson’s conclusion that Summit County violated its Development Code and his order of in-junctive relief. Finally, I dissent concerning part I.A.2, which reverses Judge Wilkinson’s conclusion that Summit County violated the Utah Open and Public Meetings Law (open meetings law), see Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-4-1 to -9 (1994); part I.A.3., which reverses Judge Wilkinson’s conclusion that Summit County violated plaintiffs’ due process rights; and H.B., which affirms Judge Noel’s denial of section 1983 attorney fees to plaintiffs.
*782ANALYSIS
I. Appeal
I would wholly affirm Judge Wilkinson’s order granting plaintiffs’ motion for partial summary judgment. Specifically, I would hold, because defendants did not include a transcript of the summary judgment hearing in the record, that Judge Wilkinson correctly concluded that Summit County violated (1) its own Development Code, requiring Summit County to ensure the removal of Utelite’s facility; (2) plaintiffs’ due process rights; and (3) the open meetings law, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 52-i-l to -9 (1994). As to the Development Code violation, then, I reach the same conclusion as the main opinion, but based on a different analysis, while as to the due process and open meetings law issues, I reach a different conclusion from the main opinion.
Regardless of whether the documentary evidence on file adequately supports the partial summary judgment for plaintiffs, defendants have not included in the record a tape or transcript of the arguments and possible admissions — which may include proffers, stipulations, or representations — made in the summary judgment hearings.1 “[A] record should be made of all proceedings of courts of record. That precept applies to conferences in chambers as well as more formal proceedings.” Birch v. Birch, 771 P.2d 1114, 1116 (Utah Ct.App.1989) (citations omitted). I believe a summary judgment hearing would fall under the category of “more formal proceedings.” Id. Defendants had the burden “ ‘to make certain that the record they eom-pile[d would] adequately preserve their arguments for review in the event of an appeal.’ ” Id. (quoting Franklin Fin. v. New Empire Dev. Co., 659 P.2d 1040, 1045 (Utah 1983)); see Utah R.App. P. 11(e); State v. Theison, 709 P.2d 307, 309 (Utah 1985); Tucker Realty, Inc. v. Nunley, 16 Utah 2d 97, 396 P.2d 410, 412-13 (Utah 1964); State v. Christofferson, 793 P.2d 944, 946-47 (Utah Ct.App.1990); State v. $9,199 United States Currency, 791 P.2d 213, 217 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Intermountain Power Agency v. Bowers-Irons Rec. Land & Cattle Co., 786 P.2d 250, 252 (Utah Ct.App.1990); Birch, 771 P.2d at 1116; see also Whatcott v. Whatcott, 790 P.2d 578, 581 n. 5 (Utah Ct.App.1990) (“[T]he summary judgment hearing was not included as part of the appellate court record_ ‘Therefore, we presume the trial judge acted correctly....’” (Citation omitted.)); 10A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller & Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2722, at 375-76 (3d ed.1998) (stating “admissions on file” include admissions that “occurred during the oral argument on the motion”); 11 James W. Moore, Moore’s Federal Practice § 56.14[2][d][i] (3d ed. 1997) (“Statements made in open court on the record ... may qualify as admissions on file for purposes of seeking summary judgment.”).
“ ‘We cannot speculate on the existence of facts that do not appear in the record. When crucial matters are not included in the record, the missing portions are presumed to support the action of the trial court.’ ” Christofferson, 793 P.2d at 947 (quoting Theison, 709 P.2d at 309). My hands are tied, and I therefore have no choice but to conclude that the trial court correctly granted partial summary judgment supported by admissions and/or other information presented in the oral arguments on the partial summary judgment. Accordingly, I would affirm that judgment.2
Regarding Judge Wilkinson’s denial of defendant’s motion to dismiss this case for non-joinder of Union Pacific Railroad under Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 19(c), I would affirm. *783This motion was argued and decided in the same proceeding as the above summary judgment motion. Again, because defendants did not supply us with a transcript of the arguments and possible admissions submitted to the trial court, I must presume the trial court’s determination was supported by the missing portions of the record and would affirm his denial of defendants’ motion. See Christofferson, 793 P.2d at 947.
II. Cross-appeal — attorney fees
On cross-appeal, Judge Noel ruled that plaintiffs “failed to adequately plead, prior to Judge Wilkinson’s [partial summary judgment] ruling, a cause of action under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and accordingly are not entitled to attorney’s fees” under 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Because I would reverse Judge Noel’s ruling on attorney fees, I dissent from part II.B. of the main opinion.
The Civil Rights Attorney’s Fees Awards Act of 1976, 42 U.S.C.A. § 1988 (1981), allows “an award of attorney fees to the prevailing party in any proceeding brought under 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983 and other sections of the civil rights title.” Lorenc v. Call, 789 P.2d 46, 49 (Utah Ct.App.), cert. denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). Although claims under this Act are not confined to cases litigated in the federal courts, “a party must plead a federal civil rights claim to qualify for an award of attorney fees.” Id.
The issue of “[w]hether plaintiffs complaint states a claim for relief under section 1983 is a question of law.” Id. A plaintiff adequately states a claim for relief pursuant to section 1983 by alleging simply “ ‘(1) that some person deprived [the plaintiff] of a right, privilege or immunity secured by the federal constitution; and (2) that such person acted under color of state law.’ ” Id. at 49-50 (quoting International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Colorado State Fair, 673 P.2d 368, 373 (Colo.1983) (en bane)). Further, “it is well-settled that complaints filed under the Civil Rights Act are to be construed liberally.” Krishna Consciousness, 673 P.2d at 373; see also Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah Ct.App.) (stating in section 1983 case that “ ‘pleadings are generously interpreted’ ’ (quoting James v. Preston, 746 P.2d 799, 801 (Utah Ct.App.1987))), cert. denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
The original complaint in this case effectively alleges that the defendant (Summit County) is a local government entity within Utah, acting in its official capacity. See Krishna Consciousness, 673 P.2d at 373. The complaint contains the following relevant “General Allegations”:
8. The posted agenda for the Planning Commission meeting dated December 13, 1988 provides no notice to the public that there would be a discussion concerning the proposed relocation of the Utelite facility....
9. The minutes of the December 13, 1988 meeting of the Planning Commission contain no reference to a discussion concerning the proposed relocation of the Utelite facility....
The complaint further alleges specific ways in which the facility does not comply with zoning ordinances. Then, under the “First Cause of Action,” the complaint outlines the following “Due Process Violations”:
28. The acts and omissions of Defendants resulted in the illegal issuance of a building permit and the illegal defacto rezoning of the property occupied by the Utelite facility without legal notice to the public and without public hearing.
29. By allowing the issuance of a building permit and the illegal defacto rezoning of the Utelite facility without notice to the public or a public heating, Defendants have harmed Plaintiffs without providing them due process of law.
Finally, the complaint prays for “attorneys’ fees ... including but not limited to those available pursuant to the terms of Utah Code Ann. § 52-4-1 et seq.”
This language asserts that Summit County violated the plaintiffs’ due process rights — “a plain reference to an abridgement of a right protected by ... the United States Constitution.” Krishna Consciousness, 673 P.2d at 373-74.3 To recoup attorney fees pursuant *784to section 1988, “express reference to conduct as violative of section 1983 is not required; section 1988 is applicable to any action for which section 1983 provides a remedy.” Id. at 374 (citing Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 100 S.Ct. 2502, 65 L.Ed.2d 555 (1980); Maher v. Gagne, 448 U.S. 122, 129 n. 11, 100 S.Ct. 2570, 2574 n. 11, 65 L.Ed.2d 653 (1980); Founding Church of Scientology v. Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation, 459 F.Supp. 748 (D.D.C.1978)).
I would therefore conclude that plaintiffs’ original complaint adequately states a claim for relief pursuant to section 1983. See id. Thus, because I would hold plaintiffs prevailed on their due process claims on partial summary judgment, I would also hold they should be awarded reasonable attorney fees here. See id. Accordingly, I would reverse the trial court’s order regarding this issue.
CONCLUSION
I dissent in part and concur in the result in part as I would wholly affirm Judge Wilkinson’s partial summary judgment order. Further, I agree with the main opinion’s result affirming his denial of defendants’ motion to dismiss this case for nonjoinder of Union Pacific Railroad. I also agree with the main opinion in reversing Judge Noel’s determination that Utelite is liable under a nuisance per se theory solely as a result of violating the Summit County Development Code. Finally, I concur in the main opinion as to all issues raised in plaintiffs’ cross-appeal, except that I would reverse Judge Noel’s order denying plaintiffs their attorney fees under 42 U.S.C. sections 1983 and 1988.
. Although hearings are not always held regarding summary judgment motions, in this case a hearing was held on July 8, 1991. The applicable minute entry states, "Plaintiffs’ motion for Summary Judgment is ... presented, argued and submitted.” Further, a hearing on the motion to set aside summary judgment was held on May 24, 1994. The applicable minute entry states that the court heard oral arguments during this hearing.
. My implicit conclusion here that Summit County violated the open meetings law would dispose of the County's appeal from Judge Noel’s order granting plaintiffs their attorney fees under that statute, because the County’s only argument is based on its assertion that it did not violate the statute. Thus, I would hold, contrary to the main opinion, that plaintiffs are due attorney fees under the open meetings law.
. Like the case at bar, in which the Utah Constitution contains a due process clause mirroring *784the one found in the Federal Constitution, the Colorado Constitution has a free exercise clause mirroring the one found in the Federal Constitution. See Colorado Const, art. II, § 4. Still, the Colorado Supreme Court implicitly concluded that, although the language in the complaint in Krishna Consciousness did not specify the constitutional cause of action derived from the Federal Constitution, it was sufficient to implicate the Federal Constitution. See International Soc’y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Colorado State Fair, 673 P.2d 368, 373 (Colo.1983) (cn banc).