concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. I concur with the holding in Division 1 of the majority opinion Ithat the decedent’s statement to his wife in the ambulance was not [sufficiently connected to the actual occurrence of the accident to be [admissible as part of the res gestae. However, I would hold that his itatements to the admitting physician concerning the cause of his in*196jury, as contained in the hospital records, were admissible under OCGA § 24-3-4, which provides, in pertinent part, as follows: “Statements made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment and describing . . . symptoms, pain, or sensations, or the inception or general character of the cause or external source thereof insofar as reasonably pertinent to diagnosis or treatment shall be admissible in evidence.” (Emphasis supplied.)
“The theory behind this exception to the hearsay rule is that information given to medical personnel for the purpose of securing diagnosis or treatment may be deemed inherently trustworthy.” Dunn v. McIntyre, 146 Ga. App. 362, 363 (246 SE2d 398) (1978). See also Allen v. State, 174 Ga. App. 206 (2) (329 SE2d 586) (1985); Davis v. State, 168 Ga. App. 272 (5) (308 SE2d 602) (1983). The majority appears to contradict itself in asserting, on the one hand, that the manner in which the decedent sustained his injury had “no medical significance for diagnostic or other purposes,” and on the other hand that the injury may well have resulted from a seizure or some other physical infirmity. Clearly, the nature and circumstances of the fall were relevant under the circumstances to the decedent’s diagnosis and treatment.
2.1 would further hold that a material factual dispute remains as to the appellees’ liability. While the appellant acknowledged that she and her husband had been frequent visitors to the store, there was no showing that the same conditions had been present in the store on those previous occasions, i.e., that there were boxes stacked on wooden pallets on either side of the narrow aisle in question. Moreover, while the presence of the boxes may have been readily observable, it is inferable from the decedent’s statements to the hospital physician, combined with the appellant’s testimony in the case, that what caused the fall was not the boxes themselves but the fact that the pallets on which they were stacked were “sticking out enough to trip you.” It is further inferable from the appellant’s testimony that this condition was not readily observable.
“ ‘Even though the facts in the case are uncontradicted and un-controverted, where they are such that there is room for difference of opinion between reasonable men as to whether or not negligence should be inferred, the right to draw the inference is peculiarly within the exclusive province of the jury. [Cits.]’ [Cit.]” Yeager v. Jacobs, 111 Ga. App. 358 (2) (141 SE2d 837) (1965). Because I cannot agree that the evidence currently of record in this case establishes as a matter of law that the decedent knew or should have known of the allegedly dangerous condition, I must respectfully dissent from the majority’s decision.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Cooper join in this dissent.
*197Decided March 15, 1991. Kopp, Peavy & Conner, J. Edwin Peavy, for appellant. Terry A. Dillard, Bryant H. Bower, Jr., for appellees.