dissenting.
I join Justice Lacy in dissent. I believe as she does that a fence-law constitutes special legislation if it grants an option to one landowner but denies the option to another for no better reason than to insure continuity of fencing. But I feel constrained to add that I think the legislation under review may be constitutionally infirm in another respect.
In addition to denying an owner of industrial, commercial, or subdivided land the option of choosing to let his land lie open, the 1970 amendment provides that the owner of such land “shall build one-half of [a division] fence or be liable therefor.” (Empha*435sis added.) This provision appears to make an owner of targeted land conclusively liable to build or to pay for building one-half of a division fence. If this be the effect of the legislation, it is woefully lacking in due process protection. I realize lack of due process is not the basis of the present attack upon the statute, but I would not want the Court’s silence on the subject to be taken as indicating that the law passes constitutional muster in this respect.