dissenting.
For the reasons set forth in my dissents in Parra v. Parra, 1 Va. App. 118, 336 S.E.2d 157 (1985), and Morris v. Morris, 3 Va. App. 303, 349 S.E.2d 661 (1986), I respectfully disagree with the finding of the majority. I believe it was unnecessary for either party to object to the trial court’s erroneous attempt to reserve jurisdiction to make determinations prohibited by Code § 20-107.3 without the consent of the parties and a specific finding that the case involved complicated matter. Pursuant to Rule 1:1, I would hold that after the expiration of the twenty-one days from the entry of the final divorce decree, the trial court was without jurisdiction to enter the judgments contained in the equitable distribution decree.
That portion of the divorce decree which granted the divorce is not at issue here; rather, it is the subsequent equitable distribution decree which is the basis for this appeal. Rule 1:1 and Code § 20-107.3, as amended, preclude the trial court’s actions.