(concurring in part and dissenting in part).
I would hold that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the request for prejudgment interest.
The trial court entered two sets of findings on May 29, 1991. The first set was in response to the December 12,1990, paternity action. In these findings, the trial court concluded that Hershey owed Linard an amount of $2,794.10 in past child support. The trial court also entered findings that day in response to Linard’s motion for a new trial and for prejudgment interest on the arrearages. It concluded Linard was not entitled to prejudgment interest, since the arrearages could not be reasonably ascertained.
The majority opinion states: “Trial court denied this request [for prejudgment interest based on SDCL 21-1-11] holding that SDCL 21-1-13 ... is the applicable statute.” * I agree that SDCL 21-1-13 is the appropriate statute. It provides: “In an action for the breach of an obligation not arising from contract, and in every case of oppression, fraud, or malice, interest may be given, in the discretion of the jury.”
“[A]n award of prejudgment interest based on SDCL 21-1-13 [is] within the discretion of the trial court as trier of fact.” Winterton v. Elverson, 389 N.W.2d 633, 639 (S.D.1986); Shaffer v. Honeywell, Inc., 249 N.W.2d 251, 259 (S.D.1976).
This court has often stated that “a trial court’s findings of fact and the subsequent application of discretion shall not be disturbed unless there is clearly no basis in reason or evidence to support that finding.” Matter of Estate of Donahue, 464 N.W.2d 393, 395 (S.D.1990). Furthermore, this court is “ ‘not to determine whether the judges of this court would have made an original like ruling, but rather whether we think a judicial mind, in view of the law and the circumstances of the particular case, could reasonably have reached such a conclusion.’ ” Id. (quoting Davis v. Kressly, 78 S.D. 637, 641-42, 107 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1961)).
The trial court found that it could not reasonably ascertain the amount of child support due from Hershey and the amount which he had already paid. In fact, the trial court had to go through a detailed and calculated process in order to determine the amount of arrearages. Finally, the appellant, Linard, had the burden to show the trial court’s abuse of discretion and, since she has not provided this court with the transcripts of the hearings where the amount of arrearages was determined, I must believe that reason and evidence supported the trial court's decision.
It is also important to point out that this action was originally commenced on May 9, 1990, thus the provisions of SDCL 21-1-13 and not SDCL 21-1-13.1 are controlling. See SDCL 21-1-13.2 (provisions of SDCL 21-1-13.1 apply to any suit commenced after July 1, 1990).