(Concurring).
I concur generally in the majority opinion, but write to clarify two points. First, the majority opinion states that a county only has “those rights and powers granted it by the Utah Constitution and statutes or those implied as a necessary means to accomplish them” and that an act by the county “in excess of [that] authority or forbidden by the Utah Constitution is null and void as an ultra vires act.” While I agree with that statement, especially in the context of the facts of the case, I think it important to clarify that powers delegated to local governments are not to be strictly construed. In State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980), we rejected Dillon’s Rule, which over the years had hamstrung local government by requiring strict construction of the powers delegated to local governments. Specifically, we held that the rule of strict construction could not be used to restrict a legislative grant of the general welfare power to a county or to prevent a county from “using reasonable means to implement specific grants of authority.” Id. at 1127.
My second point is that even though it is generally stated that estoppel may not be asserted against a governmental entity, this Court has recognized exceptions to that general rule, particularly when “it is plainly apparent that its application would result in injustice, and there would be no substantial adverse effect on public poli-cy_” Utah State Univ. of Agriculture and Applied Science v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 718 (Utah 1982); see also Celebrity Club, Inc. v. Utah Liquor Control Comm’n, 602 P.2d 689 (Utah 1979) (if necessary to prevent manifest injustice and will not impair the exercise of governmental powers). In this case, however, I do not believe that estoppel can be used legitimately against the county.