dissenting.
The fundamental question in this case is whether the affidavit that was submitted in support of the application for a search warrant
*179“[contained sufficient facts] that would lead a reasonable person to believe that [some quantity of marijuana] would, more likely than not, be found in defendant’s home.” State v. Chambless, 111 Or App 76, 80 ,824 P2d 1183, rev den 313 Or 210 (1992). (Emphasis supplied.) See ORS 133.555(2).
The majority and the special concurrence squabble about whether ORS 133.545(4) sets a standard that applies to the unnamed, unwitting “informant.” It hardly seems to matter. No reasonable person could conclude, on the basis of an uncorroborated statement made by an unnamed person whose credibility cannot be assessed, relayed to the affiant by yet another unnamed person, that defendant’s house contained evidence of a crime. Accordingly, I dissent.
ORS 133.545(4) codifies the two-pronged AguilarI Spinelli test for weighing the sufficiency of an affidavit containing hearsay from an unnamed informant in support of a warrant application. State v. Young, 108 Or App 196, 201, 816 P2d 612 (1991); see Spinelli v. United States, 393 US 410, 89 S Ct 584, 21 L Ed 2d 637 (1969); Aguilar v. Texas, 378 US 108, 84 S Ct 1509, 12 L Ed 2d 723 (1964). It provides, in part:
“If an affidavit is based in whole or in part on hearsay, the affiant shall set forth facts bearing on any unnamed informant’s reliability and shall disclose, as far as possible, the means by which the information was obtained.” (Emphasis supplied.)
In State v. Young, supra, we wrote:
“The two-pronged Aguilar/Spinelli formulation is that the affidavit supporting a search warrant must demonstrate an unnamed informant’s veracity and the basis of the informant’s knowledge. The veracity component can be demonstrated by facts showing either that the informant is credible or that the information supplied is reliable.” (Citation omitted; emphasis in original.) 108 Or App at 201.
In this case, the affidavit contains hearsay upon hearsay —an unnamed CRI relayed information from an unnamed and unwitting “informant” to the affiant. The special concurrence relies on State v. Villagran, 294 Or 404, 409, 657 P2d 1223 (1983), for the proposition that an “informant” is “[a person] who gives information to the police” and *180concludes that the “unwitting citizen” was not an “informant,” but “merely [the] source of'the informant’s information.” 114 Or App at 177. That conclusion may be correct. Cases from other jurisdictions that have ventured to define the term “informant” have focused on the question of whether the person providing information to the police is an “informant” or a “witness.” See 21 Words and Phrases, 1991 Supp 126-27 (1960 & 1991). However, none of those cases addressed the issue of whether the person who provides information to the police must do so knowingly or directly in order to be considered an “informant.”
I am not particularly troubled by the concurrence’s proposition that the “unwitting citizen” is not an “informant” for the purposes of ORS 133.545(4). However, the concurrence goes on to say that “[once] the CRI’s credibility is established * * * no further showing need be made.” 114 Or App at 178.1 cannot accept the conclusion that information contained in the statement of an unidentified person is taken as incontrovertible truth merely because it passes through a confidential reliable informant. A CRI is not an information purifying conduit, capable of taking statements from questionable sources and rendering them truthful. If ORS 133.545(4) does not apply to the “unwitting citizen’s” statement, then the veracity of the information in that statement should be scrutinized under “the totality of the circumstances.” State v. Young, supra, 108 Or App at 202 (citing Illinois v. Gates, 462 US 213, 103 S Ct 2317, 76 L Ed 2d 527 (1983)).
The majority correctly recognizes that the affidavit contains no information about the “unwitting informant’s” credibility. Regardless of whether the “Aguilar/Spinelli” standard or the “totality of the circumstances” test applies, I agree with the majority that the sufficiency of the affidavit depends on the reliability of the information supplied by the “unwitting informant’s” statements.
The majority, relying on State v. Alvarez, 308 Or 143, 776 P2d 1283 (1989), concludes:
“The [unwitting] informant’s statements that ‘he ha[d] purchased more than an ounce of marijuana from the unknown white male at said residence on prior occasions,’ that he ‘intended to purchase more than one ounce’ at the *181residence, and that he intended to return to the residence to rob the occupants of the remaining marijuana are reliable because they are statements against penal interest.” 114 Or App at 173.
The majority has not read Alvarez closely enough. In that case, the court wrote:
“[T]he declaration was made to another informant who was cooperating with the police unbeknownst to the second informant. A declaration against penal interest is a declaration against penal interest, however, regardless of whether it is made to a judge, to a police officer, or to a neighbor over the back fence. Its character is not altered by a change in interlocutors although, as [State v. Carlile, 290 Or 161, 619 P2d 1280 (1980)] recognized, its indicia of reliability may.
“As the passage from Carlile also recognizes, a declaration against penal interest is entitled to some weight in determining the reliability of information conveyed by an informant![1] Although the declaration may ‘not go far’ in establishing the reliability of the information, other ‘circumstances’ may contribute to or bolster the reliability of the information thus conveyed.” 308 Or at 149. (First emphasis in original; second emphasis supplied.)
Although the Supreme Court opinion in Alvarez does not say so, the first informant was unnamed. 93 Or App at 716. Generally, an unnamed informant is considered less reliable than a named informant. See State v. Girard, 106 Or App 463, 808 P2d 1017 (1991). The lesson of Alvarez is that a statement against penal interest made by an unnamed informant, by itself, is not sufficiently reliable to establish the veracity of the information that it contains. There must be other circumstances that “contribute to or bolster the reliability of the information [conveyed].” 308 Or at 149. In Alvarez, the affiant
“made certain that informant #1 did not independently possess cocaine by searching informant #1 before informant #1 went with informant #2 to the mobile home. Moreover, [the affiant] observed informant #2 enter the mobile home *182and return to informant #1; he then regrouped with informant #1 and recovered and tested the substance [that informant #2 allegedly obtained inside the mobile home, and it] proved to be cocaine.” 308 Or at 149.
Those circumstances bolstered the reliability of informant #2’s statement that he had bought cocaine inside the mobile home.
In contrast, there are no indicia of reliability to bolster the veracity of the statement made by the “unwitting informant” in this case. The affiant did not search the CRI before the CRI accompanied the “unwitting informant” to defendant’s house. The affiant did not personally observe the “unwitting informant” go into defendant’s home, where he allegedly obtained marijuana. The CRI did not retrieve the marijuana that the “unwitting informant” allegedly obtained inside defendant’s house. Neither the affiant nor any other officer examined the substance. It was not tested or confirmed to be marijuana by anyone other than the unnamed CRI. In short, there was no corroboration whatsoever.
We are asked to rely solely on the unnamed CRI to provide accurate information, which came from a source whose credibility cannot be assessed. It makes no difference whether we apply ORS 133.545(4) to the statements made by the “unwitting informant” or not. The question is not the “character” of the declaration against penal interest by the “unwitting informant.” State v. Alvarez, supra, 308 Or at 149. The question is how much weight should be given to that declaration when conducting a probable cause analysis. 308 Or at 148. The answer is: Not much. No reasonable person could conclude, on the basis of an uncorroborated statement, which was made by an unnamed person whose credibility cannot be assessed and relayed to the affiant by yet another unnamed person, that defendant’s house, more likely than not, contained evidence of a crime. The trial court erred when it denied defendant’s motion to suppress.
Buttler and Durham, JJ., join in this dissent.Although the Supreme Court referred to the “unwitting citizen” as an “informant,” I am not persuaded that the court considered the declarant an “informant” in the context of ORS 133.545(4).