(concurring in part and dissenting in part). This case presents the Court with the opportunity to clarify the standard for sufficient evidence and its application to convictions of possession with intent to deliver less than fifty grams of cocaine and possession of a firearm during the commission of a felony. The jury relied on circumstantial evidence to convict the defendant without specifying whether liability was direct or based on the prosecutor’s aiding and abetting theory. I agree with the majority that, while the Court of Appeals articulated the proper test, it did not properly apply it.
The conclusion of the Court of Appeals is explicable either by a mistaken application of the Hampton standard,1 or under a theory that because the evidence was circumstantial, the prosecution was under an affirmative duty to rule out every hypothesis except that of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The standard for appellate review of convictions based on circumstantial evidence has been a persistent source of confusion and conflict for decades.2 Because the failure of the *529majority to deal fully with the issue presents the potential for further confusion, I write briefly to elaborate upon that issue, and to state that the felony-firearm question should be remanded to the *530Court of Appeals for resolution in light of the appropriate standard of review.
I
The defendant argues that the Court of Appeals properly applied the sufficiency of evidence rule to reverse his conviction. He emphasizes that the Court of Appeals articulated the proper standard, People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354; 285 NW2d 284 (1979). Despite the Court of Appeals citation of People v Davenport, 39 Mich App 252; 197 NW2d 521 (1972), defendant contends that the Court did not rely on Davenport for the proposition that the prosecution must disprove all reasonable theories of innocence. Thus, he urges this Court to avoid discussion of the conflicting lines of authority regarding the prosecutor’s burden in a circumstantial evidence case.
The defendant instead seeks to frame the issue as whether the evidence was sufficient to sustain a conviction under Hampton. Stressing that presence alone does not establish criminality, the defendant relies on People v Burrel, 253 Mich 321; 235 NW 170 (1931), and People v Lewis, 178 Mich App 464; 444 NW2d 194 (1989), to support the argument that more than mere association with an item must be shown to establish possession and that circumstantial evidence in this case is lacking because it shows only that "Wolfe may have had a connection to the previous sale of cocaine.” (Emphasis in original.) Emphasizing that the evidence linked Wolfe to the domicile, not to the drugs that were seized, and that others were present and had access to the drugs, the defendant contends that the circumstantial evidence presented is insufficient. Explicit in this argument and the Court of Appeals analysis is the standard of appellate review of a sufficiency claim in respect to a convic*531tion based on circumstantial evidence. Implicit in the argument is the notion that, unless the prosecutor negates theories of innocence, that is, proves that no one else possessed the drugs to the exclusion of the defendant, the jury is not entitled to infer possession with intent to deliver from the facts presented.3
Thus, the significance of this case is not whether Davenport is expressly referenced for the disputed proposition, but, rather, the appropriate standard of appellate review of the sufficiency of the evidence in criminal convictions. As explained in 2 Wright, Federal Practice & Procedure: Criminal (2d ed), § 467, p 655, the standard to be applied by a trial court in deciding a motion for judgment of acquittal is the same standard that an appellate court should apply when reviewing the matter. The theory that there is a special rule applicable to cases based on circumstantial evidence that requires the exclusion of every hypothesis except that of guilt, id. at 655-662, has been rejected by the United States Supreme Court, Holland v United States, 348 US 121, 140; 75 S Ct 127; 99 L Ed 157 (1954), by this Court, People v Bercheny, 387 Mich 431; 196 NW2d 767 (1972), and by virtually every federal circuit court. "It is now understood that a single test applies, regardless of the kind of evidence . . . .” Wright, supra at 662-663.
The majority properly emphasizes that, "when determining whether sufficient evidence has been presented to sustain a conviction, a court must view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution and determine whether any rational trier of fact could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a rea*532sonable doubt.”4 Griffin, J., ante, p 515. This standard underscores the critical differences between the functions of the trier of fact and the reviewing court. The trier of fact must be sure of every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Thus, the jury must be persuaded that the evidence it believes and upon which it relies is sufficiently strong to exclude a doubt based on reason regarding the defendant’s innocence. In State v Poellinger, 153 Wis 2d 493, 504-506; 451 NW2d 752 (1990), the Wisconsin Supreme Court identified the importance of the distinction between trial and appellate functions in the context of appellate challenges to convictions based on circumstantial evidence, stating:
[T]his court has often failed to maintain the appropriate distinction between the applicability of the hypothesis of innocence rule at the trial court level and the applicability of the reasonable doubt standard of review on appeal. We have recognized that the elimination of hypothesis of innocence is the process by which the trier of fact reaches a determination of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, and we have mistakenly stated that a conviction based on circumstantial evidence may be sustained on appeal or review if the evidence is sufficiently strong to exclude every reasonable theory of innocence.
The defendant is, in essence, asking this court to sit as a judge or jury making findings of fact and to apply the hypothesis of innocence rule de novo to the evidence presented at her trial to determine if, in our view, the hypothesis that she did not know that she possessed cocaine is sufficiently *533reasonable to warrant reversal of her conviction. It is not the role of an appellate court to do that. To the extent that prior decisions of this court have suggested that the hypothesis of innocence rule is in any way applicable in reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a conviction, we . . . take the opportunity presented in this case to clearly state that it is not.
The Ohio Supreme Court aptly observed that the rule that the prosecutor must disprove reasonable innocence theories turns the "standard on its head.” State v Jenks, 61 Ohio St 3d 259, 267; 574 NE2d 492 (1991). Similarly, although defendant’s argument has been presented with exceptional skill, it mistakenly suggests that the negation of reasonable theories consistent with innocence is the standard of appellate review. The result of adopting this suggestion would be to permit the reviewing court to ask whether any reasonable juror could have found the defendant innocent, not, as required under Hampton, whether any reasonable juror could have found the defendant guilty. As this Court explained in People v Fuller, 395 Mich 451, 455; 236 NW2d 58 (1975),
It is for the trier of fact to determine if the prosecution has "negate[d] every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant’s innocence of the crime charged.”
A
At the appellate level, all reasonable inferences must be drawn in favor of the prosecution, and then, if any reasonable juror could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the verdict must be upheld. A major focus of the defendant’s argument in the Court of Appeals and this Court was *534that there was insufficient evidence connecting him to the cocaine and the weapon. Relying on People v Millard, 53 Mich 63, 70; 18 NW 562 (1884), the defendant asserted that the prosecution’s "case was not only circumstantial and weak, it was too weak to overcome the reasonable theory of innocence Mr. Wolfe presented throughout the trial.” The defendant suggests that "even if the Court of Appeals in this case did implicitly apply the circumstantial evidence rule, it was not error to do so.” The defendant’s argument, the Court of Appeals focus on the circumstantial nature of the evidence, and the panel’s conclusion that the evidence demonstrates, "at best, that defendant was at the wrong place at the wrong time,” all evidence an approach that transmits the reviewing court into a thirteenth juror weighing inferences against the prosecution. Unpublished opinion per curiam of the Court of Appeals, decided December 19, 1990 (Docket No. 113403). As Chief Judge Julian Cook observed in rejecting a similar circumstantial evidence claim in United States v Turner, 490 F Supp 583, 590 (ED Mich, 1979):
It would be improper to . . . hold that when any inference of innocence (arising out of circumstantial evidence) exists, the Court must acquit. ... To hold otherwise would be to return to the old and rejected "only hypothesis” rule. [Emphasis in the original.]
Several Court of Appeals opinions5 have misread *535the holding of People v Millard, supra, and applied it to the issue of sufficiency of the evidence of a crime where more than one person might be participating.6 In People v Spann, 3 Mich App 444, 454; 142 NW2d 887 (1966), the Court extended the Millard rule to reverse a conviction where the "prosecution failed to present a theory of the case and proof that excluded all possible theories of innocence explaining [the defendant’s] conduct.”
Other authority has extended the rationale of People v Burrel, supra, to expand the standard of appellate review. The defendant in Burrel was convicted for aiding and abetting the statutory rape of a young woman by a codefendant. The defendant drove his car and, at the direction of the codefendant, picked up a young girl who got into the back seat with the codefendant where they had consensual intercourse. There was no evidence that the defendant was aware that the girl was underage or knew that the codefendant intended statutory rape. The Burrel Court reversed the defendant’s conviction on the basis that mere presence is not enough to make a person an aider or abettor. Thus, no inference of the defendant’s *536criminality could logically be drawn from the facts of Burrel. The holding does not authorize reviewing courts to thwart the factfinder from drawing permissible inferences from a defendant’s presence at the scene of a crime or at the scene of contraband.7
The rule that mere presence is not enough to conclude that a defendant is guilty does not mean that a jury may not draw any inference regarding possession or intent to deliver from the defendant’s presence in compromising circumstances.
B
When applied to a circumstantial evidence case for possession of, or possession with intent to deliver, drugs, and involving more than one potential defendant, an expansive interpretation of the authority of the reviewing court produces the anomalous consequence that each defendant must be acquitted because all might be guilty. Thus, the Court of Appeals here concluded that the evidence merely shows that defendant was one of many who had access to the apartment from which cocaine was sold.
In viewing evidence that could support conflicting inferences, the trier of fact is free to "believe, or disbelieve, in whole or in part, any of the evidence presented.” Fuller, supra at 453. The trier of fact can choose among rational inferences from evidence presented and reject an inference consistent with acquittal. Thus, when a reviewing court is presented with a record of historical facts *537that could support more than one inference, an appellate court is obligated to accept the inference drawn by the trier of fact and defer to that resolution as long as any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Jackson v Virginia, 443 US 307; 99 S Ct 2781; 61 L Ed 2d 560 (1979).8
The appellate court is not authorized to substitute its judgment for that of the factfinder when additional evidence beyond mere presence has been presented.9 For purposes of appellate review, " 'mere proximity to illegal drugs, mere presence on the property where they are located or mere association with persons who do control them, without more, is insufficient to support a finding of possession.’ ” However, " 'such proximity, presence, or association is sufficient when accompanied ... with testimony connecting the defendant with the incriminating surrounding circumstances.’ ” United States v Rogers, 921 F2d 1089, 1093 (CA 10, 1990). In other words, while mere presence cannot result in a conviction, the fact that the prosecution need not disprove all reasonable innocence theories means that the prosecution need not affirmatively prove that no individual other than the defendant had access to the contraband for the conviction to survive appellate challenge. When an appellate court independently reviews the evidence, it asks whether a *538reasonable juror could have found that the essential elements of the crime were proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Hampton, supra.
II
Because it concluded that the underlying felony required reversal, the Court of Appeals did not address the felony:firearm count except to note that the evidence was "tenuous.” Slip op, p 3, n 1. The parties here have focused largely on the underlying felony and issues surrounding that count. Rather than decide the issue without the benefit of a' full record, I would remand the case to the Court of Appeals for its consideration of that issue. In doing so, I would observe, however, that the evidence shows more than mere presence. The jury could have found that defendant had the exclusive means of access to the apartment and, given the compactness of the apartment and the visibility of the weapon, might have concluded that he had constructive possession of the weapon as well as the cocaine. See United States v LaGuardia, 774 F2d 317 (CA 8, 1985); United States v Curry, 911 F2d 72 (CA 8, 1990).
Thus, I concur in the majority’s reversal of the decision of the Court of Appeals and reinstatement of the defendant’s conviction with respect to the first count, possession with intent to deliver. I respectfully, but strenuously disagree with the majority’s decision to opine with respect to the second issue, and would remand this question to the Court of Appeals.
People v Hampton, 407 Mich 354; 285 NW2d 284 (1979).
Compare, e.g., People v Davenport, 39 Mich App 252; 197 NW2d 521 (1972), People v Simpson, 104 Mich App 731; 305 NW2d 249 (1980), and People v Lewis, 178 Mich App 464; 444 NW2d 194 (1989), *529with People v Mumford, 60 Mich App 279; 230 NW2d 395 (1975), People v Edgar, 75 Mich App 467; 255 NW2d 648 (1977), and People v Carson, 189 Mich App 268; 471 NW2d 655 (1991). See also People v Hellenthal, 186 Mich App 484; 465 NW2d 329 (1990) (the Court held that it is permissible to infer that the defendant was in possession of cocaine and marijuana from the presence of drugs in the defendant’s house, a urinalysis test showing a positive result for marijuana, and the defendant’s concession that he was aware of drug paraphernalia in his house); People v Spann, 3 Mich App 444; 142 NW2d 887 (1966) (the Court concluded there was insufficient evidence to sustain a conviction for conspiracy and larceny despite evidence that the defendant, Adams, was in the room from which the property was stolen when he did not work there, was seen marking the property with chalk when the store did not use such a marking system, and was in possession of a car parked near the loading dock at the time the theft occurred); People v Casper, 25 Mich App 1; 180 NW2d 906 (1970) (after acknowledging that mere presence at the scene of a crime is insufficient evidence, the Court concluded that the defendant’s close friendship with a codefendant, his presence at the scene, his prior possession of the murder weapon, his lack of funds as a possible motive, and the finding that he wiped the weapon clean of fingerprints and tried to get rid of it, was sufficient to sustain a conviction); People v Valot, 33 Mich App 49; 189 NW2d 873 (1971) (the Court affirmed a conviction for possession where the defendant was found in a room with a strong marijuana odor, hand-rolled marijuana cigarettes, a brass water pipe on the table next to the bed occupied by the defendant, and two marijuana cigarette butts on the floor, one next to the defendant’s bed); People v Cardenas, 21 Mich App 636; 176 NW2d 447 (1970) (the Court affirmed a conviction for possession where marijuana was found on the floor of the defendant’s car in an area toward which the defendant was seen to bend down); People v Iaconis, 29 Mich App 443; 185 NW2d 609 (1971), aff’d People v Bercheny, 387 Mich 431; 196 NW2d 767 (1972) (the Court affirmed a conviction for conspiracy on the basis of circumstantial evidence where the police seized drugs and discovered the defendants in proximity after surveillance that had revealed the defendants and others frequently arriving at the premises, staying a short time, employing a ritual to obtain admittance, and leaving the premises in what appeared to be a narcotic stupor); People v Davenport, supra (the Court reversed a conviction for possession on the basis that the evidence regarding possession was circumstantial and the inferences were not sufficiently compelling where the defendant resided in the house where the drugs were found, the bag in which the drugs were located also included a bottle with the defendant’s name on it, and a detective testified that he saw the defendant tossing objects into a toilet when he arrived and later retrieved from the toilet three envelopes and loose marijuana).
The defendant explicitly contends in the brief filed with this Court that the "prosecution has the fair burden of negating reasonable theories advanced at trial” and defines reasonable theories as those "supported with a modicum of evidence.”
To repeat and emphasize that the issue presented on appellate review of claims of insufficiency is distinct from the role of the factfinder, it must be observed that the question of appropriate instruction of a jury where the evidence is wholly circumstantial is not implicated in this appeal.
See People v Johnson, 4 Mich App 205, 207; 144 NW2d 646 (1966) (the Court relied on Millard for the proposition that the measure of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt is whether the reviewing court "find[s] evidence in the record which supports a conclusion that negatives every reasonable theory consistent with the defendant’s innocence”); People v Morrow, 21 Mich App 603; 175 NW2d 523 (1970) (the Court relied on Johnson to reject the inference that the defendant’s unexplained presence at the scene sufficed to sustain a conviction for larceny).
Millard involved the prosecution of a husband for the death of his wife, allegedly by poisoning, although the evidence regarding death by poisoning was ambiguous. In concluding that a series of rulings led to error in the jury instructions regarding the burden of proof, the Millard Court applied the rule that the prosecutor must prove the corpus delicti before introducing evidence directed at demonstrating that the defendant was the perpetrator. Thus, Millard involved a review of jury instructions, not the sufficiency of evidence. Furthermore, the Millard Court focused on the corpus delicti rule that where "independent evidence was as consistent with death from natural causes as from poison,” a conviction cannot be sustained. Perkins, Criminal Law (3d ed), p 147. This Court more recently explained that the corpus delicti of a crime means "the essential wrong” and does not require independent proof of every essential element of the crime charged. People v Williams, 422 Mich 381, 392; 373 NW2d 567 (1985). Rather, we embraced the approach taken by Wigmore, that the corpus delicti includes two elements, the fact of the specific loss and someone’s criminality. 7 Wigmore, Evidence (Chadbourn rev), § 2072, pp 524-526.
Other panels have applied the same rationale without citing Burrel. See, e.g., People v Lewis, supra (the Court reversed a conviction because it concluded that the "most” that the evidence showed was that the defendant was not the only person who had access to the inside of a house where drugs were sold); People v Simpson, n 2 supra at 733-734.
See Poellinger, supra at 505-507.
See, e.g., People v Fuller, supra at 454 (the defendant’s activities "were consonant with a theory of active participation” in the crime as a lookout); People v Dockery, 20 Mich App 201, 206, n 1; 173 NW2d 726 (1969) (where the defendant knowingly took advantage of the fear induced in the rape victim by two codefendants who had raped her first his "participation goes far beyond . . . mere presence”); People v Valot, n 2 supra (the Court held that the defendant’s control of the drugs was reasonably inferred from the fact that he registered for the room, paid the rent, was arrested in the room where the odor of marijuana was strong, and marijuana was found in proximity to the defendant’s bed in which he was sleeping).