concurring in part, specially concurring in the result in part, and dissenting in part:
I join parts III and IV of the opinion, which hold that under applicable statutory criteria the defendant in this case would be eligible for parole after serving forty years of any life sentence imposed by a jury. However, for the reasons set forth in my opinion specially concurring and dissenting in People v. District Court, 834 P.2d 181 (Colo.1992), I respectfully dissent from the conclusion reached by a majority of the court in part IIA of the opinion that the four-step jury deliberation process set forth in section 16-11-103, 8A C.R.S. (1986), was not revived as the result of our determination in People v. Young, 814 P.2d 834 (Colo.1991), that section 16-11-103, 8A C.R.S. (1986 & 1990 Supp.), was unconstitutional. Because I believe the earlier statute must be deemed revived as the result of our decision in People v. Young, I concur specially with the majority’s ultimate determination that in this case the People *242may seek the death penalty against the defendant.1
I also dissent from the conclusion reached by a plurality of the court in part IIB of the opinion that the adoption of House Bill 91S2-1038 did not violate prohibitions against adoption of ex post facto legislation contained in article II, section 11, of the Colorado Constitution. As indicated in my opinion specially concurring and dissenting in People v. District Court, I find persuasive the conclusions and reasoning set forth in parts I, II, and III of Justice Lohr’s dissent in that case.
. The defendant asserts that application of the doctrine of statutory revival to revive the 1986 statute would violate federal and Colorado constitutional prohibitions guaranteeing due process of law, prohibiting the adoption of ex post facto laws, and prohibiting the revival, amendment or extension of laws. In view of the conclusion of a majority of the court that the 1986 statute is not revived, these constitutional arguments need not be addressed.