Opinion
ARABIAN, J.As in the companion case of Knight v. Jewett, ante, page 296 [11 Cal.Rptr.2d 2, 834 P.2d 696] (hereafter Knight), the issue in this case is whether plaintiff’s cause of action, arising out of an injury allegedly caused by the negligence of a coparticipant in an active sport, is barred under the assumption of risk doctrine. As explained in Knight, in light of the adoption of comparative fault principles in Li v. Yellow Cab Co. (1975) 13 Cal.3d 804 [119 Cal.Rptr. 858, 532 P.2d 1226, 78 A.L.R.3d 393], the assumption of risk doctrine operates as a complete bar to a plaintiff’s action only in instances in which, in view of the nature of the activity at issue and the parties’ relationship to that activity, the defendant’s conduct did not breach a legal duty of care owed to the plaintiff. As Knight also explains, in general the legal duty applicable to a coparticipant in an active sport simply is a duty to avoid either intentionally injuring another participant or engaging in conduct so reckless as to bring it totally outside the range of the ordinary activity involved in the sport. A coparticipant in an active sport ordinarily bears no liability for an injury resulting from conduct in the course of the sport that is merely careless or negligent.
After summarizing the facts of this case, I shall proceed to apply the principles set out in Knight, supra, ante, at page 296, considering, in the process, whether a provision in the Harbors and Navigation Code prescribes the duty of care governing the liability of defendant on the facts of this case.
I
On June 12, 1983, plaintiff Larry C. Ford was seriously injured while waterskiing in the “Warren Cut” channel of the Sacramento River Delta. At *343the time of the accident, plaintiff was skiing barefoot and backward. He was injured when the back of his head struck a tree limb that extended over the channel from one of the riverbanks.
After the accident, plaintiff filed this action against defendant Jack Gouin, a friend of plaintiff, who, at the time of the accident, was driving the boat that towed plaintiff. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that the accident was proximately caused by defendant’s negligence in driving the boat too close to the riverbank.
After several depositions were taken, defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, asserting that even had he been negligent in driving the boat, plaintiff nonetheless was totally barred from bringing the action by the so-called “reasonable implied assumption of risk” doctrine, as reflected in the then-recent Court of Appeal decision in Ordway v. Superior Court (1988) 198 Cal.App.3d 98 [243 Cal.Rptr. 536] (Ordway). In support of his motion, defendant relied on the following concessions in plaintiff’s deposition: (1) plaintiff was an experienced water-skier and had begun waterskiing barefoot and backward approximately two years prior to the time of the accident, although he had not yet mastered the technique and could not cross the wake without falling down; (2) plaintiff had selected the waterskiing site, had decided upon the length of the tow rope, and had skied on that stretch of water at least fifty times in the past; and (3) at the time of the accident, plaintiff was wearing a protective neck brace and other safety equipment and thus was aware the sport was risky. Defendant also relied on the declaration of an accident reconstruction expert who stated that the channel was only 120 feet wide at the point where the accident occurred, and that, in the expert’s opinion, “the selection of this particular site by the plaintiff caused the accident in question.”1
In opposing the summary judgment motion, plaintiff relied on the declaration of a water ski expert—a two-time national champion—who stated that (1) “it is the responsibility of the driver of the boat to watch out for the skier being towed, like a guide dog for a blind person [and] ... to drive a course not dangerous to the skier,” (2) he had skied in the same area—the Warren Cut—where plaintiff had been injured, and (3) in his opinion, the site “was a reasonably safe area in which to ski barefoot and backwards and was an area which provided an adequate and safe area of lateral movement, especially since the area of lateral movement when skiing barefoot and backwards is greatly reduced from the usual area when waterskiing forward with *344skis.” Plaintiff also relied on his own declaration reciting his familiarity with the area in which the accident occurred and stating that “there was plenty of room between the eastern and western shores, even if the width was 120 feet, to avoid the trees while skiing, if the driver had been steering a proper course.” Finally, plaintiff relied on a portion of defendant’s deposition acknowledging that, prior to the accident, defendant had driven water-skiers in the same area of the Warren Cut on more than five occasions.
After considering the parties’ papers, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of defendant. On appeal, the Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. It concluded that (1) under Li v. Yellow Cab Co., supra, 13 Cal.3d 804, the so-called “reasonable implied assumption of risk” doctrine may apply to totally bar a plaintiff’s action, and (2) the doctrine was applicable because plaintiff, by voluntarily choosing to ski barefoot and backward in the Warren Cut, “impliedly assumed the risk [that the driver of his boat] might veer from a straight course and tow him in such a way he would collide with a branch overhanging the waterway . . . .”
Plaintiff sought review, noting that the Court of Appeal’s endorsement of the “reasonable implied assumption of risk” doctrine conflicted with the earlier Court of Appeal decision in Segoviano v. Housing Authority (1983) 143 Cal.App.3d 162 [191 Cal.Rptr. 578], which rejected the doctrine. Plaintiff contended that even if such a doctrine should be recognized, it would be inapplicable in the present case, because a factual dispute existed at least as to whether plaintiff, in skiing backward and barefoot in a relatively narrow tree-lined channel, had acted “unreasonably” rather than “reasonably.” In view of the conflict among the Courts of Appeal, we granted review.
II
As we have explained at some length in Knight, supra, ante at page 296, the question whether plaintiff’s action properly was barred under the assumption of risk doctrine does not depend on the reasonableness or unreasonableness of plaintiff’s action in skiing backward and barefoot in a narrow tree-lined channel, nor on whether plaintiff subjectively knew of the specific risk of harm posed by defendant’s allegedly negligent driving or impliedly consented to relieve or excuse defendant of a duty of care owed to plaintiff. Instead, the propriety of the summary judgment turns on whether defendant’s alleged conduct breached the legal duty of care that defendant owed to plaintiff.
As in Knight, defendant was a coparticipant in the sports activity in which plaintiff was engaged when he was injured. Under the authorities discussed *345in Knight, defendant, as a coparticipant, properly could be held liable only if he intentionally injured plaintiff or engaged in conduct that was so reckless as to be totally outside the range of the ordinary activities involved in the sport. In light of such a limited duty owing to plaintiff, it would clearly appear that summary judgment in favor of defendant properly was entered, because plaintiff’s evidence indicates that defendant was, at most, careless in steering the boat.
Plaintiff argues, however, that although a rule limiting a coparticipant’s duty of care to the avoidance of intentionally injurious or reckless conduct appropriately may be applied to a “competitive” sport such as the touch football game involved in Knight, such a limited duty should not apply in the context of a “cooperative” sport such as waterskiing. Although most of the prior authorities cited in Knight did involve sports that are played by competing teams, the rationale of those decisions is, in our view, equally applicable to an active sport such as waterskiing even when it is engaged in on a noncompetitive basis.
As noted in Knight, the decisions that have recognized the existence of only a limited duty of care in a sports situation generally have reasoned that vigorous participation in the sport likely would be chilled, and, as a result, the nature of the sport likely would be altered, in the event legal liability were to be imposed on a sports participant for ordinary careless conduct. (Knight, supra, ante, at p. 318.) This reasoning applies to waterskiing. Even when a water-skier is not involved in a “competitive” event, the skier has undertaken vigorous, athletic activity, and the ski boat driver operates the boat in a manner that is consistent with, and enhances, the excitement and challenge of the active conduct of the sport. Imposition of legal liability on a ski boat driver for ordinary negligence in making too sharp a turn, for example, or in pulling the skier too rapidly or too slowly, likely would have the same kind of undesirable chilling effect on the driver’s conduct that the courts in other cases feared would inhibit ordinary conduct in various sports. As a result, holding ski boat drivers liable for their ordinary negligence might well have a generally deleterious effect on the nature of the sport of waterskiing as a whole. Additionally, imposing such liability might well deter friends from voluntarily assisting one another in such potentially risky sports. Accordingly, the general rule limiting the duty of care of a coparticipant in active sports to the avoidance of intentional and reckless misconduct, applies to participants engaged in noncompetitive but active sports activity, such as a ski boat driver towing a water-skier. Under the principles set forth in Knight, summary judgment in favor of defendant was properly entered.
*346III
Although neither party raised the matter in the trial court or on appeal, in the course of our consideration of this case we discovered a statute, Harbors and Navigation Code section 658, subdivision (d), which appeared on its face to have potential bearing on the scope of the duty applicable to defendant in this case. The court requested, and received, supplemental briefing from the parties with regard to the effect of the statute.2
Harbors and Navigation Code section 658, subdivision (d), provides in full: “No person shall operate or manipulate any vessel, towrope, or other device by which the direction or location of water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device may be affected or controlled so as to cause the water skis, aquaplane, or similar device, or any person thereon, to collide with, or strike against, any object or person. This subdivision does not apply to collisions of two or more persons on water skis, aquaplanes, or similar devices being towed by the same vessel.”3
Plaintiff contends it is clear from the undisputed facts that defendant violated the provisions of section 658, subdivision (d), and further maintains that, under the provisions of Evidence Code section 669, such a violation establishes a rebuttable presumption that defendant breached his duty of care to plaintiff. Evidence Code section 669 provides, in relevant part: “(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if: [ft] (1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity; [ft] (2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to person or property; [ft] (3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute, ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and [ft] (4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was adopted, [ft] (b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that: [ft] (1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might reasonably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances, who desired to comply with the law . . . .”
*347Defendant, on a number of grounds, takes issue with plaintiff’s contention that section 658, subdivision (d), is applicable to the facts of this case, arguing that (1) the undisputed evidence demonstrates it was plaintiff’s conduct, rather than defendant’s control of the ski boat, that “caused” plaintiff to collide with the tree, and (2) the statute is inapplicable because plaintiff was not on “water skis, an aquaplane, or similar device” when he collided with the tree, but rather was skiing barefoot. In my view, neither of these arguments can withstand analysis.
In asserting that the declarations in support of and in opposition to the summary judgment motion establish, as a matter of law, that it was plaintiff’s, rather than defendant’s, conduct that caused the collision, defendant points out it is undisputed that plaintiff (1) chose the site for the skiing and the length of the tow rope, (2) chose to ski backwards, and (3) was in control of the angle at which he skied. But although these facts certainly would be sufficient to enable the trier of fact to find it was plaintiff himself who was the sole cause of his injuries, the facts asserted in plaintiff’s declarations raise a factual dispute as to whether defendant’s steering of the boat was at least a contributing cause of the collision. Plaintiff’s declaration specifically states that “[o]n the date of the accident, I was not skiing more than a 45 [degree] angle from the boat; and most likely skiing within only a 35 [degree] angle from the boat," that “there was plenty of room between the eastern and western shores, even if the width was 120 feet, to avoid the trees while skiing, if the driver had been steering a proper course,” and that “[defendant drove too close to the shore on one side.” Thus, on the basis of the declarations, there clearly is a factual dispute as to whether defendant’s manner of controlling the ski boat was a cause of the accident.
Indeed, at the initial hearing on the summary judgment motion, defendant’s counsel so conceded, telling the court that, for purposes of the motion, “I have asked the Court to assume [defendant’s] negligence,” and maintaining that under the Ordway decision, supra, 198 Cal.App.3d 98, defendant was entitled to summary judgment even if his negligence had played some role in plaintiff’s injury. Accordingly, I am unable to conclude section 658, subdivision (d), is inapplicable on the ground that defendant, as a matter of law, did not operate the vessel “so as to cause” the collision within the meaning of the statute.
Defendant next contends that section 658, subdivision (d), is inapplicable because plaintiff was skiing barefoot, rather than on water skis, at the time of the accident. Defendant maintains the language of the statute, which provides that “[n]o person shall operate . . . any vessel, towrope, or other device by which the direction or location of water skis, an aquaplane, or a *348similar device may be affected or controlled so as to cause the water skis, aquaplane, or similar device, or any person thereon, to collide with, or strike against, any object or person,” (ibid., italics added) properly should be interpreted as being inapplicable to a barefoot water-skier. Defendant acknowledges that in 1987 the Legislature added a provision to the applicable definitional section of the Harbors and Navigation Code that specifically defines the phrase “water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device” to include “all forms of waterskiing, barefoot skiing, ... or any activity where a person is towed behind or alongside a boat” (Stats. 1987, ch. 745, § 7, pp. 2363-2364, enacting former § 651, subd. (t), now § 651, subd. (z), italics added), but defendant points out that the accident in this case occurred in 1983 and contends that the 1987 legislation should not apply retroactively. Because the phrase “water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device” was not specifically defined to include “barefoot skiing” in 1983, defendant contends that, at the time of plaintiff’s injury, section 658, subdivision (d), did not apply to barefoot skiing.
The argument is unpersuasive. Viewing the statutory language of section 658, subdivision (d), as a whole, and considering the evident legislative intent underlying the statutory provision, we conclude that even before the 1987 legislation, section 658, subdivision (d), clearly was intended to apply to barefoot waterskiing, and that the phrase “water skis, aquaplane, or similar device’’’ encompassed bare feet when used for waterskiing. Nothing in the statute, as it existed in 1983, suggests that the Legislature intended to impose a duty on a ski boat driver to operate the vessel in a manner so as to avoid causing a person on skis from colliding with a swimmer, but did not intend to impose a similar duty to avoid towing a barefoot skier into the swimmer. Defendant’s suggested interpretation to the contrary would defeat the obvious legislative purpose of the statute and must be rejected. “Rules of statutory construction require courts to construe a statute to promote its purpose, render it reasonable, and avoid absurd consequences.” (In re Atiles (1983) 33 Cal.3d 805, 810, fn. 4 [191 Cal.Rptr. 452, 662 P.2d 910].)
Although neither of the arguments advanced by defendant establishes the inapplicability of section 658, subdivision (d), there is another argument that merits serious consideration in determining whether section 658, subdivision (d), prescribes the duty of care applicable to defendant in this case. As already noted, under Evidence Code section 669, a statutory violation gives rise to a presumption that the violator has failed to exercise due care only if “[t]he person suffering ... the injury . . . was one of the class of persons for whose protection the statute . . . was adopted.” (Evid. Code, § 669, subd. (a)(4).) The question thus raised is whether section 658, subdivision *349(d), was adopted only for the protection of third persons with whom a water-skier might collide or whose property might be damaged by a collision with water skis, an aquaplane, or the water-skier, or whether, instead, the statute also was intended to protect water-skiers themselves from collisions caused by their boat drivers.
The language of section 658, subdivision (d), provides no clear answer to this question. It appears from the initial sentence of the subdivision that the provision was intended to impose a duty on both ski boat operators and water-skiers to operate any device within each party’s control in a manner so as to avoid a collision with any object or person. Thus, water-skiers are within the class of persons whose conduct the statute was intended to regulate. Whether water-skiers also are within the class of persons whom the statute was intended to protect is another matter.
Although the first sentence of section 658, subdivision (d), which refers to “any object or person,” appears sufficiently broad to include water-skiers themselves within the protected class, the concluding sentence, which provides that the subdivision “does not apply to collisions of two or more persons on water skis . . . being towed by the same vessel,” suggests that the statute was not designed to create a duty of care on the part of the driver of the vessel to the persons being towed. This conclusion appears to be even more reasonable when subdivision (d) is considered in the context of other subdivisions of section 658.4
*350As noted above, section 658, subdivision (d), imposes a duty on the operator of the vessel not to cause a collision between the person towed and “any object or person.” Subdivision (e) of section 658 imposes a corresponding duty on the water-skier not to “endanger the life, limb or property, of any person.” Obviously, the class of persons protected by subdivision (e) is limited to third parties and their property, since the water-skier is in no position to harm anyone else. It seems reasonable to conclude that subdivision (d) serves as a complementary provision to subdivision (e), imposing a similar duty on the driver of the vessel not to cause a collision with any third person or object.
In his concurring and dissenting opinion, Justice George suggests that subdivision (a) of section 658 supports a contrary conclusion. That provision states that “[n]o person shall operate a vessel ... for towing a person or persons on water skis . . . unless there is in the vessel a person at least 12 years of age, in addition to the operator, in a position to observe the progress of the persons being towed.” Although I agree that this subdivision shows that water-skiers are within the class of persons the statute was designed to regulate, the issue is whether they are within the class of persons the statute was intended to protect. In my view, requiring a spotter in the boat to observe the progress of the person being towed is plausibly interpreted as a measure to ensure that drivers do not inadvertently steer water-skiers into the path of third persons or objects. Viewing the statute as a whole, this appears to be the most reasonable construction.5
In sum, I conclude that section 658, subdivision (d), was intended to safeguard only the lives and property of third persons. Plaintiff does not fall within this protected class. (Evid. Code, § 669.) Accordingly, the statute does not impose a duty of care on defendant that is otherwise precluded under the principles set forth in Knight, supra, ante, at page 296.
*351As plaintiff’s action was clearly barred by the doctrine of assumption of risk, I conclude that the Court of Appeal properly affirmed the summary judgment in favor of defendant.
The judgment of the Court of Appeal is affirmed.6
In his declaration, the accident reconstruction expert specifically indicated his opinion was based on the “assumption” the tree branch with which plaintiff collided extended 35 feet over the river. Other portions of defendant’s summary judgment motion, however, disclosed a disparity in the eyewitnesses’ estimates as to how far the tree branch extended over the river: defendant, himself, believed the tree extended only 10 to 15 feet from the shore, while another witness described the tree as extending anywhere between 10 and 35 feet from the shore.
Although the statute was not cited or relied on in the trial court, it is appropriate for us to consider the provision in determining the legal issue of the existence and scope of the duty owed by a ski boat driver to a towed water-skier. The matter is one of general public significance and interest, affecting all persons in the state engaged in waterskiing, and presents a pure question of law. (See, e.g., Sea & Sage Audubon Society, Inc. v. Planning Com. (1983) 34 Cal.3d 412, 417 [194 Cal.Rptr. 357, 668 P.2d 664]; Hale v. Morgan (1978) 22 Cal.3d 388, 394 [149 Cal.Rptr. 375, 584 P.2d 512]; Ward v. Taggart (1959) 51 Cal.2d 736, 742 [336 P.2d 534].)
Hereafter, unless otherwise indicated, all section references are to the Harbors and Navigation Code.
Section 658 provides in full:
“(a) No person shall operate a vessel on any waters for towing a person or persons on water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device unless there is in the vessel a person at least 12 years of age, in addition to the operator, in a position to observe the progress of the persons being towed.
“This subdivision does not apply to motorboats less than 16 feet in length actually operated by the person or persons being towed and so constructed as to be incapable of carrying the operator in or on the motorboat. The department may establish rules and regulations governing the operation of those watercraft, which rules and regulations shall provide the greatest possible safety of persons and vessels.
“(b) No person shall operate a vessel on any waters of this state towing a person or persons on water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device nor shall any person engage in waterskiing, aquaplaning, or other similar activity at any time between the hours from sunset to sunrise, except that those hours do not apply to those waters of this state as to which prohibited hours for those activities are fixed by local ordinances, laws, or regulations enacted pursuant to this chapter.
“(c) Subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section do not apply to a performer engaged in a professional exhibition or a person or persons engaged in a regatta, vessel or water ski race, or other marine event authorized pursuant to Section 268.
. “(d) No person shall operate or manipulate any vessel, towrope, or other device by which the direction or location of water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device may be affected or controlled so as to cause the water skis, aquaplane, or similar device, or any person thereon, *350to collide with, or strike against, any object or person. This subdivision does not apply to collisions of two or more persons on water skis, aquaplanes, or similar devices being towed by the same vessel.
“(e) No person shall operate water skis, an aquaplane, or a similar device so as to endanger the life, limb, or property of any person.”
I have reviewed the legislative history to which Justice George refers (post, p. 368) and find it, at best, inconclusive. Although there is a reference in the Senate Report to “protecting . . . those who participate,” this is followed immediately by an injunction that the statute “should, above all, be sensible, practical, and flexible.” (Sen. Interim Com. Rep. on Bay Development and Small Boat Harbors, p. 22, 1 Appen. to Sen. J. (1957 Reg. Sess.).) It is difficult to see how extending a duty of care to water-skiers who ski barefoot and backwards can be described as “sensible.”
Justice Kennard’s concurring opinion asserts that I am “bothered” by the result in this case and misconstrue the meaning of section 658. As she otherwise fails to engage the issue, no detailed response is necessary. There is no need to sink that which does not float.
As the preceding discussion makes clear, although I agree with Justice Kennard that the judgment of the Court of Appeal should be affirmed, I do not share her views of the assumption of risk doctrine set forth in her concurring opinion in this case and her dissenting opinion in Knight, supra, ante at page 324.