(dissenting).
I concur in Parts I and II of the opinion, but respectfully dissent as to Part III. Numerous pieces of evidence support the jury’s conviction, only one of which was Weatherspoon’s plea statement. I therefore conclude that the district court’s decision to admit the statement was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
When reviewing an error to determine whether it is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt, we must conduct a thorough examination of the record as a whole in order to determine if the verdict was unattributable to the error. State v. Juarez, 572 N.W.2d 286, 292 (Minn.1997); State v. VanWagner, 504 N.W.2d 746, 749 (Minn.1993) (“The error and its impact are to be examined within the context of the record as a whole, considering the strength of the state’s evidence and the weaknesses of any defense evidence.”). The court may not view each incident in isolation when deciding if an error is harmless. State v. Dillon, 582 N.W.2d 558, 558 (Minn.1995) (“The reviewing court * * * must read the entire record * * *.”). Whether an error is harmless depends on factors such as the importance of the testimony or statement, the presence or absence of corroborating or contradicting evidence, and the overall strength of the prosecution’s case. State v. Wildenberg, 573 N.W.2d 692, 702 (Minn.1998); Dillon, 532 N.W.2d at 558 (“As a general rule, the stronger the evidence of guilt, the less likely that any error is prejudicial.”).
King admitted that he used his car to drive Weatherspoon to the house in Grant. He acknowledged being at the house dur*812ing the burglary, and an eyewitness confirmed his presence there. During the booking process, King described the robbery to Deputy Gribble in such a way as to imply that he, King, had been inside the house. Further, King’s interviews with Investigator Tilley contain inconsistencies relating to what he did and saw during the robbery. During his second interview, King admitted that he did not tell the full truth at his initial interview and conceded that he told a “bogus” story.7 The jury also heard evidence that King fled the scene after being discovered by Koelbl and that King evaded capture for several hours during a wide-spread manhunt involving local police officers, police dogs, the state patrol, and a state patrol helicopter.
The state also introduced evidence of King’s 1996 attempted second-degree burglary conviction to demonstrate modus op-erandi. Minn. R. Evid. 404(b) (“Evidence of another crime, wrong, or act is not admissible to prove * * * character * * * [but it] may * * * be admissible [to prove] motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident.”). The majority acknowledges that intent was an issue in the case, but asserts that the other-crimes evidence here could not be used to show intent: “[T]he jury could properly consider King’s prior conviction only to establish that in the past he had attempted to take valuable things from a home * * *.” Supra at 810 (emphasis added). However, upon introduction of the evidence the district court instructed:
THE COURT: At this time the state intends to introduce evidence of an occurrence on September 14th, 1995 at Hennepin County. This evidence is being offered for the limited purpose of assisting in determining whether defendant committed those acts with which defendant is charged in the complaint I have read to you.
The majority dismisses the remarkable similarities between the present case and King’s prior conviction. Specifically, in the 1996 burglary King and an accomplice broke into and ransacked a residence. During the burglary, jewelry boxes were overturned and emptied, drawers were open and disturbed, and a VCR was sitting on a chair, apparently ready to be taken. At the scene, police found several socks strewn about, found socks near a fence that King had jumped, and found a pair of socks close to where King was ultimately apprehended. The facts surrounding King’s 1996 burglary conviction are essentially identical to the case at hand. In the current case, the house was broken into and ransacked, the contents of drawers, closets, and jewelry boxes were in disarray, jewelry was stolen, a VCR sat outside the home, socks were strewn about the scene, and some of the socks contained pieces of jewelry.
The combined effect of all of this evidence points unerringly to King’s guilt. Despite the majority’s concern that Weatherspoon’s testimony was the only direct evidence placing King in the house, circumstantial evidence can be sufficient to support a conviction. E.g., State v. Whittaker, 568 N.W.2d 440, 452 (Minn.1997). Moreover, the crime for which King was convicted, aiding and abetting burglary, does not require that King entered the house. Minn.Stat. § 609.05, subd. 1 (2000) (“A person is criminally liable for a crime committed by another if the person intentionally aids, advises, hires, counsels, or conspires with or otherwise procures the other to commit the crime.”). Further, any possible prejudice resulting from the introduction of Weatherspoon’s statement was minimized because the jury was aware of Weatherspoon’s conviction for aiding *813and abetting burglary, and King used the conviction to impeach the plea statement. During the jury charge, the judge also reminded the jury that it should consider Weatherspoon’s conviction when deciding the weight to give to the statement.
In summary, given the strength of the state’s evidence against King and the minimal impact that Weatherspoon’s statement could have had on the jury, the verdict was surely unattributable to the admission of the plea statement. Therefore, I would hold that the admission of the statement was harmless error and King is not entitled to a new trial.