Opinion
COLE, J.— Appellant, Clyde Earl Servis, III, appeals his convictions of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-265.3, possession of marijuana with the intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248.1, and possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to distribute in violation of Code § 18.2-248. He assigns the following errors on this appeal: (1) that the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence which was obtained through a warrantless entry into his motel room allegedly in violation of his fourth amendment rights; (2) that the trial court erred in not suppressing evidence obtained pursuant to an inventory search of his car because the circumstances did not warrant its impoundment; and (3) that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to strike the evidence because it was insufficient to establish his intent to distribute marijuana or cocaine. For the following reasons, we find no error and *511affirm the convictions.
I.
At about 4:00 a.m. on January 7, 1986, Valerie Lankford, the front desk clerk at Kings Quarters Motel in Hanover County, received a telephone call from an occupant of room 315 advising her of an attempted break-in to that room. She immediately telephoned the Hanover Police Department. Officers Farmer and Talley arrived on the scene minutes later. Lankford relayed the information she had given the dispatcher that an occupant of room 315 called the front desk to report an attempted break-in to that room.
Officers Farmer and Talley observed the room for about four or five minutes. Observing nothing unusual, they proceeded to the room. They knocked on the door for some time before the defendant finally answered. He only opened the door four or five inches and appeared “nervous,” “highly upset,” and “under the influence of something.” Officer Talley observed that chairs were piled up against the door.
Officer Farmer asked the defendant if “everything was O.K.” The defendant said that he had called the front desk because he thought someone had been trying to break in. When asked to whom the room was registered, he said that the room was rented to “Phillip” who had “gone down the block” and “wouldn’t be back for a while.” When Officer Farmer asked if he could come into the room, the defendant became very upset and refused.
Officers Farmer and Talley returned to the front desk. Lankford showed them the registration form which indicated that rooms 315 and 317 were single, adjoining rooms that had been rented to two people under the name of Eric Steinherner for one night. It also indicated that a Honda with Maryland tags was registered to those rooms. Lankford told the officers that those rooms had received several visitors and calls since she came on duty at 11:00 p.m. and that she “felt like something wasn’t right in the room.” Officer Farmer then telephoned the Hanover Commonwealth attorney who informed him that there was “no way” he could get a search warrant for the rooms.
Officers Farmer and Talley maintained surveillance of rooms 315 and 317 but noticed nothing peculiar until a cab arrived at *512the rooms. Officer Farmer then returned to the motel room while Officer Talley remained in the car. Farmer asked the defendant if the car registered to the room belonged to him; he said that it did. Farmer again asked the defendant to whom the rooms were registered. This time, he said to “Dan” who “had gone down the block.” At this point, Officer Farmer asked the defendant to provide some identification because he “didn’t feel like [the defendant] should have been in the room at all.” The defendant turned around and quickly walked back through the doorway into the adjoining room where Officer Farmer would not have been able to see him. Farmer followed him into the room out of “fear for [his] life.” Farmer testified:
He disappeared in the room quickly and from the manner in which he had been acting and the information that he’d given to me, ... I asked him for his identification and he turned around and went back into the room and I felt at that point because of my safety and other officers [sic] involved, I should stay right with him. I didn’t know what he was going to retrieve.
When Farmer entered the room he stayed right behind the defendant. In the back right-hand corner of the room, he observed a large box of baking soda turned over onto the floor and a grocery bag containing a large dispenser of Reynolds Wrap aluminum foil. Farmer seized those items and arrested the defendant for possession of drug paraphernalia, testifying that, in his experience as a police officer, they were used for freebasing, cutting and packaging cocaine. The defendant was also arrested for giving false information to a police officer.
The defendant still had provided no identification, so he asked to go to his car to retrieve it. Farmer escorted the defendant to his car. The defendant unlocked the car and searched for some identification. He located the car registration but no identification. Farmer called another deputy to transport the defendant to the magistrate’s office.
Officer Farmer then contacted the motel clerk and advised her that the man who owned the car registered to rooms 315 and 317 had been arrested. He asked if the motel would take responsibility for the car. When she said that it would not, Farmer called for a *513wrecker to tow it. Pursuant to standard police procedure, Officer Farmer then conducted a cursory inventory search of the car in the motel parking lot. Inside a magazine, he found a hypodermic needle and a bottle cap containing what appeared to be drug residue. He ceased his search at that point due to the lateness of the hour and his surmise that the car contained much contraband.
Officer Farmer then proceeded to the magistrate’s office where the defendant was being held. After being given his Miranda warnings, the defendant stated that there was ten thousand dollars and an ounce of cocaine in the car. He said that the drugs were for his personal use and that the money was not related to the drugs but was for his move to Alabama.
The inventory search pursuant to the impoundment of the defendant’s car was conducted according to standard police procedure. It revealed 26.42 grams of cocaine and 2.02 ounces of marijuana, both packaged in bulk; several large plastic bags; five tablets;1 and a piece of glass, a plastic bag, and a bottle cap, each containing drug residue. No money was located. The defendant was arrested for possession of marijuana and a controlled substance with intent to distribute.
A subsequent search of the two motel rooms turned up only bottle caps containing drug residue. A few days after the arrest, a maid at the Kings Quarters Motel found $9,920 in what had been one of the defendant’s rooms. The money, mostly fifty and one hundred dollar bills, was packaged with bank bands in thousand dollar increments.
The defendant testified at trial that he was en route from Silver Spring, Maryland to Mobile, Alabama to visit a friend at Southern Alabama University and to relocate there. He testified that he purchased the drugs in Maryland solely for his personal use and that he had a large supply to last him until he relocated and found a new drug source. He said that he had a bad drug habit and that it would only take him one week to smoke an ounce of marijuana and about ten days to use an ounce of cocaine. He said that he had been injecting and freebasing cocaine the day of his arrest. He testified that he had not been selling and had no *514intent to sell drugs. He explained that the $9,920 located in his hotel room was his personal savings that he had brought with him for his move. When asked how he had earned the money, he said he earned it from selling shrimp in Maryland.
The defendant moved to suppress the evidence seized from the motel room and all evidence derived therefrom, contending that his fourth amendment rights were violated when Farmer entered his motel room without a warrant. He also moved to suppress the evidence seized from the inventory search of his car, contending that impoundment of his car was not warranted under the circumstances. The trial court overruled both motions. At the close of the evidence, the defendant moved to strike the evidence for failure of the evidence to show intent to distribute. The trial court overruled the motion. The defendant was subsequently convicted of possession of drug paraphernalia with intent to distribute, possession of marijuana with intent to distribute and possession of a controlled substance with intent to distribute. This appeal followed.
II.
The defendant contends that the trial court erred in refusing his motion to suppress the evidence seized in the motel room and all evidence derived therefrom because no exigent circumstances existed to justify a warrantless entry into the motel room. The Commonwealth contends that exigent circumstances did exist and that, in any event, Officer Farmer was justified in following the defendant into his motel room under the authority of a Terry “stop and frisk.”
The fourth amendment rights of a guest in a motel room are equivalent to those of the rightful occupants of a house. Stoner v. California, 376 U.S. 483, 490 (1964). The fourth amendment protects people against unreasonable searches and seizures. A warrantless entry into a dwelling is presumptively unreasonable. Cf. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). “Exigent circumstances, however, may justify as reasonable a warrantless entry into a dwelling [and] a search of the interior.” Verez v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 405, 410, 337 S.E.2d 749, 752 (1985), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 813 (1986).
Exigent circumstances justifying a warrantless entry and search exist only where the police have probable cause to obtain a *515search warrant but, due to the nature of the situation, are precluded from doing so. Factors considered relevant in determining the exigency of the situation include:
(1) the degree of urgency involved and the time required to get a warrant; (2) the officers’ reasonable belief that contraband is about to be removed or destroyed; (3) the possibility of danger to others, including police officers left to guard the site; (4) information that the possessors of the contraband are aware that the police may be on their trail; (5) whether the offense is serious, or involving violence; (6) whether officers reasonably believe the suspects are armed; (7) whether there is, at the time of entry, a clear showing of probable cause; (8) whether the officers have strong reason to believe the suspects are actually present in the premises; (9) the likelihood of escape if the suspects are not swiftly apprehended; and (10) the suspects’ recent entry into the premises after hot pursuit.
Id. at 410-11, 337 S.E.2d at 753. “[I]n determining whether exigent circumstances were sufficient to overcome the presumption of unreasonableness and justify a warrantless entry, the court must examine the circumstances as they reasonably appeared to the law enforcement officers on the scene.” Id. at 411, 337 S.E.2d at 753.
Applying the foregoing principles, we find no support for the Commonwealth’s position that exigent circumstances existed. Officer Farmer did not have probable cause to enter or search the motel room, as the Hanover County Commonwealth attorney properly advised him. While Officer Farmer had a reasonable belief that the defendant was the reported burglar who might be armed and dangerous and might be holding the lawful occupants of the motel rooms, such a belief was not supported by enough objective facts to justify a warrantless entry into and a full scale search of the motel room.
Because exigent circumstances did not exist, our decision in this case turns on whether, and to what extent, the police can, during a valid Terry stop, make a warrantless entry into a dwelling. Initially, we find that the “stop” of the defendant was clearly valid. “[A] police officer may in appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner approach a person for purposes of investigating possibly criminal behavior even though there is no probable *516cause to make an arrest.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 22 (1968). “A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to determine his identity or to maintain the status quo momentarily while obtaining more information” is a reasonable seizure. Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 146 (1972). By statute in Virginia, a “police officer may detain a person in a public place whom he reasonably suspects is committing, has committed or is about to commit a felony or possesses a concealed weapon . . . and may require of such person his name and address.” Code § 19.2-83. Indeed, the defendant does not question the legality of the “stop” but instead he questions the scope of the “frisk.”
In Terry, police officers were given “a narrowly drawn authority to . . . search for weapons for the protection of the police officer, where he has reason to believe that he is dealing with an armed and dangerous individual.” Terry, 392 U.S. at 27. In determining whether an officer’s belief is reasonable, “due weight must be given, not to his inchoate and unparticularized suspicion or ‘hunch,’ but to the specific reasonable inferences which he is entitled to draw from the facts in light of his experience.” Id.
The defendant does not contest the reasonableness of Officer Farmer’s belief; he contests the scope of the “frisk” incident to that belief, contending that where an officer has reason to believe that he is dealing with an “armed and presently dangerous” individual, Terry confines a “frisk” to “a carefully limited search of the outer clothing of such person in an attempt to discover weapons which might be used to assault him.” Id. at 30. However, the defendant is mistaken in this belief. While the “frisk” in Terry was limited to a pat-down of the suspect’s outer clothing, Supreme Court, lower federal court, and state court cases since Terry have extended the scope of a frisk beyond the suspect’s outer clothing. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983) (Terry search for weapons extends to passenger compartment of car); United States v. McClinnhan, 660 F.2d 500 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (Terry search of briefcase upheld); United States v. Johnson, 637 F.2d 532 (8th Cir. 1980) (Terry search for weapons extends to area within suspect’s immediate control); United States v. Riggs, 474 F.2d 699 (2d Cir. 1973) (Terry search of camera case upheld); Henighan v. United States, 433 A.2d 1059 (D.C. 1981) (Terry search of purse upheld); State v. Ortiz, 67 Hawaii 181, 683 P.2d 822 (1984) (Terry search of knapsack upheld); Williams v. State, *51719 Md. App. 204, 310 A.2d 593 (1973) (Terry search extends to area within which suspect might gain access to weapons); People v. Brooks, 65 N.Y.2d 1021, 484 N.E.2d 132, 494 N.Y.S.2d 103 (1985) (Terry search for weapons extends to area within suspect’s immediate control); People v. Pugach, 15 N.Y.2d 65, 204 N.E.2d 176, 255 N.Y.S.2d 833 (1965) (Terry search of brief case upheld); State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d 802 (1983) (Terry search for weapons extends.to area within suspect’s immediate control); Wood v. State, 515 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) (Terry search for weapons extends to area within suspect’s immediate control).
Of particular importance to this case is Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983). In Long, two police officers stopped the defendant’s car to investigate his erratic driving. Id. at 1035. The defendant was unresponsive to the officers’ request for his driver’s license and registration and he “appeared to be under the influence of something.” Id. at 1036. When the defendant turned from the officers and began walking toward his vehicle, the officers followed him and observed a hunting knife on the floorboard of the car. The defendant was then stopped and frisked; no weapons were discovered, so the officers searched the car for other weapons and discovered marijuana. Id.
The defendant contended, and the Michigan Supreme Court agreed, that the officers’ entry into and search of his vehicle could not be justified under the principles set forth in Terry because “ ‘Terry authorized only a limited pat-down search of a person suspected of criminal activity’ rather than a search of an area.” Id. at 1045 (quoting People v. Long, 413 Mich. 461, 472, 320 N.W.2d 866, 869 (1982)). The Supreme Court disagreed: “Contrary to Long’s view, Terry need not be read as restricting the preventative search to the person of the detained suspect.” Id. at 1047. The Court, recognizing that “suspects may injure police officers and others by virtue of their access to weapons, even though they may not themselves be armed,” id. at 1048, held:
Our past cases indicate . . . that protection of police and others can justify protective searches when police have a reasonable belief that the suspect poses a danger, that roadside encoúnters between police and suspects are especially hazardous, and that danger may arise from the possible presence *518of weapons in the area surrounding a suspect. These principles compel our conclusion that the search of the passenger compartment of an automobile, limited to those areas in which a weapon may be placed or hidden, is permissible if the police officer possesses a reasonable belief based on “specific and articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant” the officer in believing that the suspect is dangerous and the suspect may gain immediate control of weapons.
Id. at 1049 (quoting Terry, 392 U.S. at 21) (footnote omitted).
Similarly, we find support for Officer Farmer’s entry into the defendant’s motel room pursuant to a Terry stop in Washington v. Chrisman, 455 U.S. 1 (1982). In Chrisman, a Washington State University police officer observed Overdahl, a university student, leaving a student dormitory carrying a half-gallon bottle of gin in violation of state law and university regulations. The officer stopped and arrested him and asked for his identification. When Overdahl said that his identification was in his dormitory room, the officer accompanied him to retrieve it. Id. at 3. Upon entering the dormitory room, the officer observed, in plain view, marijuana seeds and a small pipe. Overdahl and his roommate, Chrisman, admitted possession of drugs, and a subsequent search of the dormitory room revealed quantities of marijuana and LSD. Chrisman was tried and convicted on two counts of drug possession. Id. at 4.
On appeal, Chrisman contended that the officer was not entitled to accompany Overdahl from the public corridor of the dormitory into his room, absent a showing that such “intervention” was required by “exigent circumstances.” Id. at 6. The United States Supreme Court disagreed:
[I]t is not “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment for a police officer, as a matter of routine, to monitor the movements of an arrested person, as his judgment dictates, following the arrest. The officer’s need to ensure his own safety—as well as the integrity of the arrest—is compelling. Such surveillance is not an impermissible invasion of the privacy or personal liberty of an individual who has been arrested.
Id. at 7. The Supreme Court thus adopted a per se rule that once a suspect is placed under arrest, an officer is authorized in accom*519panying the arrestee wherever he goes.
While we do not go so far as to adopt such a per se rule in a Terry context, we find that the concerns present in an arrest situation may also be present in an investigatory detention. As the Supreme Court noted in Long, 463 U.S. at 1050, “[i]f a suspect is ‘dangerous,’ he is no less dangerous simply because he is not arrested.” “[A] Terry investigation . . . involves a police investigation ‘at close range,’ when the officer remains particularly vulnerable in part because a full custodial arrest has not been effected, and the officer must make a ‘quick decision as to how to protect himself and others from possible danger.’ ” Id. at 1053 (citations omitted) (emphasis in original). Once an officer has lawfully stopped a suspect, he is “authorized to take such steps as [are] reasonably necessary to protect [his and others’] personal safety and to maintain the status quo during the course of the stop.” United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 235 (1985).
Applying the principles announced in Long, Chrisman, and Hensley, we hold that police officers may, whenever they possess an articulable and objectively reasonable belief that a suspect is presently or potentially dangerous, conduct a protective search of the area within the suspect’s immediate control. If the suspect moves about, an officer is justified in staying with the individual during the course of the stop and conducting a protective search of . the areas which come within the suspect’s immediate control, even if this action necessitates entry into the suspect’s home. Accord State v. Mayfield, 10 Kan. App. 2d 175, 694 P.2d 915 (1985) (where officers reasonably believed that suspect was potentially dangerous, they were justified in accompanying him into his apartment when he entered it purportedly to retrieve identification); Commonwealth v. Daniels, 280 Pa. Super. 278, 421 A.2d 721 (1980) (suspicious conduct of suspect upon being questioned at door justified officers in following him into his home). Contra State v. Davis, 295 Or. 227, 666 P.2d 802 (1983) (even where officers reasonably believed that suspect was potentially dangerous, they were not justified under Terry in following him into his motel room).
We are not unmindful that such a holding will allow warrant-less entries into dwellings in certain extenuating circumstances. However, we find that this holding is necessary in the interest of police protection. As one judge stated in a case similar to the one *520at bar:
I, too, am troubled by the entry into the home. But once the crucial factor exists — a need to search for the protection of the police — I would not forbid police to do what they did here, for the risk to the police is the same, on whichever side of the threshold [the] defendant is standing.
State v. Davis, 295 Or. 277, _, 666 P.2d 802, 819 (1983) (Peterson, J., dissenting).
In the present case, Officer Farmer had an articulable and objectively reasonable basis for suspecting that the defendant was potentially dangerous. As in Long, the hour was late and the area was rural. The police had been called to the scene to investigate a possible break-in to the room in which the defendant was found. The defendant appeared “nervous,” “highly upset,” and “under the influence” of some intoxicant. Twice he gave false answers to the police about to whom the rooms were registered. Chairs were piled against the door to block entry. When asked for his identification, the defendant “quickly” retreated into the room without responding. Based on the totality of the circumstances, Officer Farmer could reasonably suspect that the defendant was the reported burglar who might be armed and potentially dangerous. Accordingly, he was justified in conducting a pat-down of the defendant’s outer clothing and a protective search of the area within the defendant’s immediate control, as well as monitoring the defendant’s movements during the course of the stop. Therefore, we find that Officer Farmer’s warrantless entry into the motel room was reasonable. Since Officer Farmer was then lawfully in a position to view the seizable items, the drug paraphernalia, the plain view exception to the warrant requirement consequently applied and the evidence seized was admissible. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443 (1971).
III.
Having ruled that the initial warrantless entry into the defendant’s motel room was justified under Terry, we must now determine whether the impoundment of the defendant’s vehicle and the inventory search pursuant thereto were reasonable under the fourth amendment. In South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 *521(1976), the Supreme Court held that a routine inventory search of a lawfully impounded vehicle conducted pursuant to standard police procedure is reasonable under the fourth amendment unless it is “a pretext concealing an investigatory motive.” Id. at 376. Since Officer Talley testified that the inventory search was conducted pursuant to Hanover County Sheriffs Department regulations, and there is no evidence in the record that the police had an investigatory motive, the crux of the issue in this case is whether the defendant’s car was lawfully impounded.
The Supreme Court has upheld impoundment of vehicles pursuant to police “community caretaking functions:”
In the interests of public safety and as part of what the Court has called “community caretaking functions,” . . . automobiles are frequently taken into police custody. Vehicle accidents present one such occasion. To permit the uninterrupted flow of traffic and in some circumstances to preserve evidence, disabled or damaged vehicles will often be removed from the highways or streets at the behest of police engaged solely in caretaking and traffic-control activities. Police will also frequently remove and impound automobiles which violate parking ordinances and which thereby jeopardize both the public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic. The authority of police to seize and remove from the streets vehicles impeding traffic or threatening public safety and convenience is beyond challenge.
Id. at 368-69 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court also has implicitly upheld the impoundment of vehicles pursuant to a state forfeiture statute, see Cooper v. California, 386 U.S. 58 (1967), and the impoundment of vehicles that are evidence of a crime. See Harris v. United States, 390 U.S. 234 (1968) (per curiam). The Supreme Court has not addressed the lawfulness of an impoundment where the vehicle is not “impeding traffic or threatening public safety” but is impounded solely to protect a defendant’s property when he is arrested away from home. However, the Virginia Supreme Court has addressed the issue.
*522In Cabbler v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 520, 184 S.E.2d 781 (1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1073 (1972), a Roanoke police officer had an arrest warrant for Cabbler. The officer arrested Cabbler at the Roanoke Memorial Hospital after observing him park his car in the hospital’s ambulance driveway such that it blocked the emergency entrance. Id. at 521, 184 S.E.2d at 782. Upon arresting Cabbler inside the hospital, the officer impounded his car pursuant to “long-standing practice and policy” of the Roanoke Police Department to take temporary custody of an arrestee’s property for safekeeping when he is arrested away from home and no other immediate means are available to protect such property. Id. at 522, 184 S.E.2d at 782. Once impounded, the contents of the car were removed and inventoried and stolen goods were discovered. Id. at 521, 184 S.E.2d at 782.
Cabbler contended that the search and seizure were unlawful. The court disagreed:
It has always been the public policy of the Commonwealth to preserve and protect the individual rights of its citizens. Public policy also dictates that a citizen’s rights in his property shall likewise be preserved and protected. Thus it would appear, and we so hold, that the policy established and the procedure followed by the Roanoke Police Department to protect the property of a citizen arrested away from his home in possession of property where no other immediate means is available for safekeeping of such property are reasonable and in accord with the public policy of the Commonwealth ....
Id. at 522, 184 S.E.2d at 782. The court concluded that the seizure and subsequent search were not unreasonable because the procedure was “in accord with the public policy of the Commonwealth, [was] not violative of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and serve [d] the best interest of the property owner by protecting and safeguarding the property in his possession at the time of his arrest.”2 Id. at 523, 184 S.E.2d at 783.
*523In this case, Officer Farmer stated that he acted “pursuant to written SOP [standard operating procedure] policy of the [Hanover County] Sheriffs Department” in towing the defendant’s car. He did not state what that procedure was and the written procedure was not introduced in evidence. However, it can be inferred from the record that the procedure followed in this case was sufficiently analogous to that in Cobbler to pass constitutional muster. Officer Farmer testified that he had the car towed pursuant to standard police procedure. He further stated that had the Kings Quarters Motel taken responsibility for the car, he would not have taken custody of it, nor would he have taken custody of it if someone else had been immediately available to assume responsibility for it. Further, the defendant did not object to the impoundment or suggest any other disposition.
Officer Farmer’s decision to impound the defendant’s car was reasonable under the totality of the circumstances. Although the car was registered to the rooms under someone else’s name, the defendant had the key and claimed ownership, and the officers had observed him exercising dominion and control over it. Although the car was lawfully parked on the motel premises until eleven o’clock that morning, it was uncertain whether the defendant would be processed and released before that time. Further, the motel clerk asked that it be removed. Under these circumstances, we find that the impoundment of the defendant’s car was reasonable. Consequently, the car was lawfully impounded and the inventory search pursuant to standard police procedure was valid.
IV.
Finally, although the defendant admits possession of marijuana and cocaine, he maintains that the evidence was insufficient to establish an intent to distribute either cocaine or marijuana. In passing on the sufficiency of the evidence, we are guided by well-established principles:
On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. The judgment of a trial court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict and will not be set aside unless it appears from the evidence that the judgment is plainly wrong *524or without evidence to support it.
Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987).
Where an offense consists of an act combined with a particular intent, proof of the intent is essential to the conviction. Patterson v. Commonwealth, 215 Va. 698, 699, 213 S.E.2d 752, 753 (1975). Because direct proof of intent is often impossible, it must be shown by circumstantial evidence. But “[w]here . . . the Commonwealth’s evidence of intent to distribute is wholly circumstantial, ‘all necessary circumstances proved must be consistent with guilt and inconsistent with innocence and exclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.’ ” Wells v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 549, 551, 347 S.E.2d 139, 140 (1986) (quoting Inge v. Commonwealth, 217 Va. 360, 366, 228 S.E.2d 563, 567 (1976)).
“The quantity of a controlled substance is a factor which may indicate the purpose for which it is possessed. Possession of a small quantity creates an inference that the drug is for personal use.” Monroe v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 154, 156, 355 S.E.2d 336, 337 (1987). Possession of a small quantity of a controlled substance, however, when considered with other circumstances, may be sufficient to establish an intent to distribute. Dutton v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 762, 765, 263 S.E.2d 52, 54 (1980).
The method of packaging of the controlled substance is such a circumstance. Monroe, 4 Va. App. at 156, 355 S.E.2d at 337. “However, even if the substance is packaged for distribution, there must be additional evidence to preclude the inference that it was purchased in the packaged form for personal use rather than being held in that fashion for distribution.” Id. “The additional evidence available to preclude such an inference [may be] the presence of a large, or bulk, quantity from which smaller packages may have been made up for distribution,” id. at 156-57, 355 S.E.2d at 337, or “the presence of paraphernalia used in the packaging process.” Hambury v. Commonwealth, 3 Va. App. 435, 438, 350 S.E.2d 524, 525 (1986).
The presence of an unusual amount of money, suggesting profit from sales, is another circumstance that negates an inference of possession for personal use. See Colbert v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 1, 4, 244 S.E.2d 748, 749 (1978); see also Dukes *525v. Commonwealth, 227 Va. 119, 123, 313 S.E.2d 382, 384 (1984); Wells, 2 Va. App. at 551-52, 347 S.E.2d at 140.
Guided by these principles, we find that the evidence was sufficient to support convictions of possession of marijuana and cocaine with the intent to distribute. While the quantity possessed was relatively small, the cocaine was packaged in bulk and the marijuana was packaged in distributable form. Paraphernalia used in the packaging process was seized from the motel room. Finally, the defendant was in possession of almost ten thousand dollars in cash — an unusual amount of money which suggests profit from consummation of sales.
While the defendant gave an explanation for the money at trial, it was within the judge’s province to assess the defendant’s credibility and the weight to be given his testimony. See Barker v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 370, 373, 337 S.E.2d 729, 732 (1985). Although his testimony was uncontradicted and therefore ordinarily should have been accepted as true, “[i]t may be disbelieved where it is inherently improbable, inconsistent with circumstances in evidence, or somewhat contradictory in itself, especially where the witness is a party.” Stegall v. Commonwealth, 208 Va. 719, 722, 160 S.E.2d 566, 568 (1968).
The defendant stated that he had the ten thousand dollars with him for his relocation to Alabama and that the money was from his personal savings. However, he had no bank account from which he withdrew the money and no satisfactory explanation for how he earned the money. On these facts, the judge could reasonably conclude that the money was earned from the sale of drugs.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the judgments of the trial court.
Affirmed.
Duff, J., concurred.
The record is unclear whether these were writing tablets or some form of oral medication.
Although Cabbler could have been decided based on the clear authority of the police to seize and remove vehicles “impeding traffic or threatening public safety” since Cabbler’s car was parked illegally, blocking the hospital’s emergency entrance, it was not decided on those grounds. See Cabbler v. Superintendent, 528 F.2d 1142 (4th Cir. 1975) (habeas corpus).