dissenting in part and concurring in part.
This appeal involves an important issue in the administration of the law applicable in Social Security appeals. When an ALJ intentionally or negligently violates the law, in this case 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a that sets forth a mandated special technique for the evaluation of claims based on mental illness, is such a violation merely of a regulation intended only for the internal administration of the business of the Social Security Administration or is it a violation of a regulation intended to confer important procedural benefits upon such claimants?
Any discussion of this issue must start with this court’s decision in Wilson v. Commissioner of Social Security, 378 F.3d 541 (6th Cir.2004).
I. The Wilson Case
In Wilson, as in the present case, the ALJ violated the Social Security Administration’s own procedural regulation. The regulation in Wilson, 20 C.F.R. § 404.1527(d)(2), provided, in part, that, “[w]e will always give good reasons in our notice of determination or decision for the weight we give your treating source’s opinion.” The court gave three reasons for this procedural requirement.
First, “to let claimants understand the disposition of their cases.” The quoted portion of the sentence is from Snell v. Apfel, 177 F.3d 128 (2d Cir.1999) in which the court said, “the requirement of reason-giving exists, in part, to let claimants understand the disposition of their cases— and perhaps especially — when those dispositions are unfavorable.” Id. at 134. The Snell court explained that when a claimant knows her physician has deemed her disabled, and no reason has been given for rejecting that physician’s opinion, she might be “bewildered when told by an administrative bureaucracy that she is not, unless some reason for the agency’s decision is supplied.” Id. The Wilson court adopted this language and reasoning to illustrate the importance of a regulation that enables a claimant to understand the outcome of the claimant’s case. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544.
The second reason given by the Wilson court for the regulation was that “the requirement also ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule.” Id.
The third reason for the requirement was that it “permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule.” Id.
*662The Sixth Circuit in Wilson emphasized the importance of a federal agency following its own regulations:
It is an elemental principle of administrative law that agencies are bound to follow their own regulations. As the Ninth Circuit well summarized in applying this principle: “The Supreme Court has long recognized that a federal agency is obliged to abide by the regulations it promulgates. See Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 545, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 372, 77 S.Ct. 1152, 1 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1957); Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954). An agency’s failure to follow its own regulations ‘tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice’ and consequently may result in a violation of an individual’s constitutional right to due process. Where a prescribed procedure is intended to protect the interests of a party before the agency, ‘even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed.’ Vitarelli, 359 U.S. at 547, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (Frankfurter, J., concurring); see also Note, Violations by Agencies of Their Own Regulations, 87 Harv. L.Rev. 629, 630 (1974) (observing that agency violations of regulations promulgated to provide parties with procedural safeguards generally have been invalidated by courts).”
Id. at 545 (quoting Sameena, Inc. v. United States Air Force, 147 F.3d 1148, 1153 (9th Cir.1998) (parallel citations and circuit court citations omitted)).1
Of great importance in the present case is the Wilson court’s rejection of the argument that failure to follow the regulation in that case was harmless error. The court held that even if the record should show that there would be little chance for success if the case were remanded, a violation of the agency’s own rules cannot be excused as harmless error.
“[A] procedural error is not made harmless simply because [the aggrieved party] appears to have had little chance of success on the merits anyway.” Mazaleski v. Treusdell, 562 F.2d 701, 719 n. 41 (D.C.Cir.1977); see also Ingalls Shipbuilding, Inc. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 102 F.3d 1385, 1390 (5th Cir.1996). To hold otherwise, and to recognize substantial evidence as a defense to non-compliance with *663§ 1527(d)(2), would afford the Commissioner the ability [to] violate the regulation with impunity and render the protections promised therein illusory. The general administrative law rule, after all, is for a reviewing court, in addition to whatever substantive factual or legal review is appropriate, to “set aside agency action ... found to be ... without observance of procedure required by law.” Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(D) (2001).
Id. at 546.
With reference to when an agency’s violation of its own regulations would not require a remand, the court noted that when a regulation merely provides for the orderly transaction of the agency’s business and does not confer any substantial right on a claimant, it is necessary for the claimant to show prejudice as a result of the violation before a remand is ordered.
The Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between regulations “intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals” and regulations “adopted for the orderly transaction of business before [the agency].” Am. Farm Lines v. Black Ball Freight Serv., 397 U.S. 532, 538-39, 90 S.Ct. 1288, 25 L.Ed.2d 547 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). In the former case, the regulation bestows a “substantial right” on parties before the agency, and “it is incumbent upon agencies to follow their own procedures ... even where the internal procedures are possibly more rigorous than otherwise would be required.” Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 235, 94 S.Ct. 1055, 39 L.Ed.2d 270 (1974); see also Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 540, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959); United States ex rel. Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 267, 74 S.Ct. 499, 98 L.Ed. 681 (1954). In contrast, in the case of procedural rules “adopted for the orderly transaction of business,” an agency has the discretion “to relax or modify its procedural rules” and such action “is not reviewable except upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party.” Am. Farm Lines, 397 U.S. at 539, 90 S.Ct. 1288, 25 L.Ed.2d 547 (quotation omitted). Section 1527(d)(2) falls in the former category, creating an important procedural safeguard for claimants for disability benefits. Snell, 177 F.3d at 134.
Id. at 547.
II. Application of Wilson to the Facts of the Present Case
The majority opinion rejects any application in the present case of the law set forth in Wilson regarding the need to reverse and remand when the Social Security Administration has violated its own regulation. It attempts to distinguish Wilson with the following arguments.
First, the regulations are different:
Because the opinion of the treating physician plays such a central and important role in a claimant’s application for social security benefits, the reasons-giving requirement of § 404.1527(d)(2) serves its own independent and important function: as a safeguard to “ensure[] that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. We are unable to conclude that the same rationale applies in the context of an ALJ’s failure to rate the B criteria.
Majority Opinion, p. 656.
I disagree. In my opinion, the ALJ’s failure to rate the B criteria and include in the ALJ’s decision specific findings as to the degree of limitation in each of the functional areas of the B criteria, as required by law in § 404.1520a, is just as important as the failure of an ALJ to include in his decision the reasons for the weight given the claimant’s treating physician, as required by law in § 404.1527(d)(2). As noted, the Wilson *664court gave three reasons why enforcement of the regulation in that case was so important.
1. The regulation lets “claimants understand the disposition of their cases.”
2. The regulation “ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule.”
3. The regulation “permits meaningful review of the ALJ’s application of the rule.”
Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. Those reasons apply with equal, if not greater, force in the present case.
A. The Need For Claimants to Understand the Disposition of Their Cases
Section 404.1520a created a “special technique” which the regulation states in subsection (a), “we must follow.” The heart of that special technique is the requirement that the ALJ rate the degree of a claimant’s limitations in four functional areas: daily living activities; social functioning; concentration, persistence or pace; and episodes of decompensation; and include the findings on each of these areas in the decision that is rendered.
The court in Wilson pointed out that if a claimant knows that the claimant’s physician has deemed him disabled, the claimant might be especially bewildered when “told by an administrative bureaucracy” that he is not. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. In the present case, it is just as likely, as it was in Wilson, that the claimant was aware that his treating physician, Dr. Fomunung, was of the opinion that claimant was disabled. Dr. Fomunung testified under oath that Rabbers was disabled as a result of his bipolar mental condition. The transcript of that testimony shows that Dr. Fomunung described Rabbers’s condition in great detail, e.g., Rabbers was not able to function at work and even if he could make it to work, “it’s just trouble,” (A.R. 257); he was not able to follow the demands of a work environment, follow rules and instructions, or get along with coworkers. (A.R.265). More importantly, in the context of this particular case, Dr. Fomunung testified regarding the B criteria. He found that with respect to Rabbers’s “Restriction of Activities of Daily Living,” it would be “mild.” With respect to Rabbers’s “Difficulty in Maintaining Social Functioning,” the limitation would be “marked.” With respect to “Difficulties Maintaining Concentration, Persistence, or Pace,” the limitation would be “marked.” With respect to “Repeated Episodes of Decompensation,” Dr. Fomunung found “four or more.” (A.R.266-67). The only thing that was needed to find Rabbers disabled under the applicable listing was at least two “marked,” or one “marked” and three or more episodes of decompensation.2
The majority opinion is that “the ALJ’s procedural violation [of § 404.1520a] is neither as strong nor as personal” as the ALJ’s procedural violation of § 404.1527(d)(2), the regulation at issue in Wilson. Consequently, the majority thinks that a claimant will not be as “ ‘especially bewildered’ or offended” by the ALJ’s failure to apply the law in the instant case as compared to the bewilderment and offense felt by a claimant when an ALJ fails to apply the law in a case involving § 404.1527(d)(2). Majority Opinion, p. 657. I seriously question whether a court of appeals’ opinion regarding the degree of bewilderment or offense a claimant may suffer as a result of an ALJ’s unlawful conduct is a valid measurement of how that conduct should be treated by the court. I believe that any violation of the law by an ALJ that affects a claimant, who expects the ALJ to apply the law properly and fairly, 'is very serious and should not be subject to how “bewildered or offended” *665the claimant may or may not be as a result of that violation.
B. The Need to Ensure that Administrative Law Judges Apply the Law
In Wilson, this court explained that the second reason why enforcement of the regulation in that case was so important was that the regulation “ensures that the ALJ applies the treating physician rule.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 544. In response to this finding, the majority states that, “[w]e are unable to conclude that the same rationale applies in the context of an ALJ’s failure to rate the B criteria.” Majority Opinion, p. 656. I disagree. It is just as important in the present case as it was in Wilson to ensure that administrative law judges apply the regulation in question, a regulation dealing with a required special technique and a disclosure in the ALJ’s decision of the required findings the ALJ must make. In Wilson, the court said that to excuse non-compliance simply because there is substantial evidence that a different outcome on remand is unlikely would not be right. “To hold otherwise, and to recognize substantial evidence as a defense to non-compliance with § 1527(d)(2), would afford the Commissioner the ability [to] violate the regulation with impunity and render the protections promised therein illusory.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 546.
I believe that the same reasoning is applicable in this case. To not reverse a decision which resulted from the ALJ intentionally or negligently violating the law required for a fair decision would “afford the Commissioner the ability [to] violate the regulation with impunity and render protections promised therein illusory.” Id. Furthermore, an agency’s failure to follow its own regulations “tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice contrary to fundamental concepts of fair play and due process.” NLRB, 443 F.2d at 20.
C. The Need for a Meaningful Review of the ALJ’s Decision
The third reason given in Wilson as to why enforcement of the regulation requiring disclosure of specific reasons for the weight given to the treating physician’s opinion is important is that it “permits meaningful review” of the ALJ’s application of the regulation requiring an ALJ to give more weight to opinions from treating physicians. The need for a meaningful review applies with equal, if not greater force, in the present case. As noted earlier, the heart of the special technique for evaluating mental impairments is the mandatory application of that procedure and the disclosure of the required B criteria findings by the ALJ. Rather than just a requirement to disclose the ALJ’s reasons for the ALJ’s evaluation of a treating physician’s opinion, the regulation in the present case requires that the ALJ make and also disclose the ALJ’s own opinions regarding the B criteria which are critical to a finding of disability or no disability. As noted earlier, the fact that a reviewing court is of the opinion that based on the record presented to the court, the claimant would have little success on the merits anyway is not a sufficient reason to not enforce compliance with the regulation. Wilson, 378 F.3d at 546. A person is entitled by law to know how the ALJ evaluated the B criteria so that the claimant can argue whether the ALJ’s evaluation is supported by or in conflict with the evidence and whether an appeal is warranted. A complete record, one that is required by law, is necessary not only for the benefit of the claimant but also for the benefit of a reviewing court.
III. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a is Not Merely an “Adjudicatory Tool”
I believe, for the reasons stated above, that the rationale of the Wilson case does *666apply, with equal, if not greater force, in the context of an ALJ’s failure to rate the B criteria. The majority, however, states that the law specifically requiring an ALJ to assign a score to each functional area of the B criteria and to publish the ALJ’s evaluations “strikes us more as an ‘adjudicatory tool’ designed to aid the SSA in determining the severity of a claimant’s mental impairment.” Majority Opinion, p. 656. I disagree. Wilson, of course, did draw the distinction between regulations intended primarily to confer important procedural benefits upon individuals and regulations adopted only for the orderly transaction of business before the agency. In the former case, an agency must follow its own procedures, whereas in the latter case the agency’s action is not reviewable except upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party. Supra, p. 649-50. The only authority cited by the majority in support of its opinion that § 404.1520a is nothing more than an “adjudicatory tool” is an unpublished per curiam opinion, Clark v. Sullivan, No. 92-1030, 1992 WL 296709, at *4 (6th Cir. Oct.19, 1992) (per curiam).
Clark is inapplicable in the present case. That case involved an allegation that the ALJ erred by not requiring a psychiatrist who had submitted a report of his examination to also complete the Psychiatric Review Technique form (PRT form), although two other doctors had in fact completed the PRT form. Id. The Clark decision contains a single sentence reference to the ALJ’s failure to have a psychiatrist complete the PRT form — “[t]he failure to complete the Psychiatric Review Technique form, an adjudicatory tool, see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a(d) (1992), is not significant.” It is followed by this statement: “Moreover, nothing in the record indicates that Mrs. Clark has a mental impairment. None of her treating physicians noted any mental problems or recommended psychiatric treatment.” Id. Thus, Clark is an unpublished per curiam opinion by a panel of this court with no analysis whatsoever for the bare conclusion that the regulation in effect at that time was “an adjudicatory tool,” and the remark was made in the context of a record that contained absolutely no evidence of any mental impairment.
Furthermore, the regulations in effect at the time of the Clark decision required that the PRT form be completed at the initial and reconsideration levels and also at the administrative law judge hearing and Appeals Council levels. The administrative law judge, either alone or with the assistance of a medical advisor, was required to complete the form, and for all cases involving mental disorders at the administrative law judge hearing or Appeals Council levels, the form had to be appended to the decision.3 The current regulations do not require that this form be completed at all levels of the process. Instead, it was recognized that the PRT form
... simply documents application of the technique with a checklist of our conclusions ... Administrative law judge and Appeals Council decisions include a more detailed explanation of the findings and conclusions reached, supported by a narrative rationale. The decisions under these final rules must include, among other things, the pertinent findings and conclusions required in the application of the technique.
Revised Medical Criteria for Evaluating Mental Disorders and Traumatic Brain In*667jury, 65 Fed.Reg. 50746, 50757 (August 21, 2000) (emphasis added).
Therefore, while the form itself, being a “checklist” regarding application of the special technique at the lower initial and reconsideration levels, arguably could be considered an “adjudicatory tool” at those stages, it obviously is not an “adjudicatory tool” at the ALJ and Appeals Council levels. As explained above, the form is not needed at those levels because the decisions themselves must contain “the pertinent findings and conclusions required in the application of the technique.” Section 404.1520a(e)(2) provides:
At the administrative law judge hearing and Appeals Council levels, and at the Federal reviewing official, administrative law judge, and the Decision Review Board levels in claims adjudicated under the procedures in part 405 of this chapter, the written decision must incorporate the pertinent findings and conclusions based on the technique. The decision must show the significant history, including examination and laboratory findings, and the functional limitations that were considered in reaching a conclusion about the severity of the mental impairment(s). The decision must include a specific finding as to the degree of limitation in each of the functional areas described in paragraph (c) of this section.
(Emphasis added). The “functional areas described in paragraph (c) of this section” are the B criteria.
The only other comment made by the majority regarding its belief that § 404.1520a is simply a regulation enacted for the benefit of the agency and not for the benefit of claimants is a reference to the difference between the word “us” and the word “you.” Section 404.1520a(a) states, in the introductory “general” section, that the special technique helps “us” to:
(1) Identify the need for additional evidence to determine impairment severity;
(2) Consider and evaluate functional consequences of the mental disorder(s) relevant to your ability to work; and
(3) Organize and present our findings in a clear, concise, and consistent manner.
To find that the use of the word “us” instead of “you” in the general introductory paragraph to § 404.1520a makes that regulation merely for the benefit of the agency, and not for the benefit of the claimant, is, in my view, unsupportable. How can it be said, for example, that a regulatory requirement imposed on the ALJ to set forth in the ALJ’s opinion the specific findings as to the degree of limitation in each of the functional areas of the B criteria be solely for the benefit of the agency and not for claimants?
Contrary to the majority opinion, I believe that the regulation governing evaluation of mental impairments was not enacted merely for the benefit of the agency but was obviously enacted for the benefit of persons claiming mental impairments who are entitled to have their claims processed fairly and in strict compliance with the special technique regulation and entitled to have the required findings made known to them in documentary form, especially in any decisions by the ALJ and the Appeals Council.
While there may indeed be rare instances in which failure to comply with the regulation can be found to be harmless error — the de minimis violation in Clark is an example — the present case is obviously not such a case. The present case includes vastly different opinions regarding the claimant’s disability, including specific findings of disability by the claimant’s own treating psychiatrist. This is clearly a case of a regulation of exactly the same nature as the one in Wilson — one intended to confer important procedural benefits on *668claimants — and is subject to exactly the same requirement that it be “scrupulously observed,” because “[a]n agency’s failure to follow its own regulations ‘tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice’ ... of an individual’s constitutional right to due process.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 545 (citation omitted).
IV. The Ease With Which a Court of Appeals Can Make its Own Findings of Fact is Not a Valid Reason to Reject the Reasoning of the Wilson Case.
The last effort of the majority to distinguish the Wilson case is its finding that, as compared with the regulation in that case, “it is much easier for a reviewing court to determine whether an error under § 404.1520a is harmless.” Majority Opinion, p. 657. According to the majority, if the reason-giving requirement of § 404.1527(d)(2) is violated, as it was in Wilson, it is difficult for the court of appeals to “make a judgment as to what the ALJ’s reasons [for rejecting the treating physician’s opinion] would have been.” Id. The majority finds that if the special technique application and documentation requirement of § 404.1520a is violated, as it was here, it is easier for the court of appeals to “make a judgment as to what the ALJ’s reasons would have been” and to make its own factual findings. I do not believe, however, that the ease or the difficulty with which a court of appeals can make its own findings that the law requires an ALJ to make and provide in the ALJ’s decision should make any difference as to how this regulation should be enforced. The court of appeals in Wilson did not vacate the judgment of the district court because it had difficulty in deciding what reasons the ALJ would have given if he had complied with the regulation. It did not even mention such a problem. It vacated the judgment of the district court for one reason and one reason only — the agency violated its own regulation, and the violation was not a de minimis violation.
V. The Majority’s Search For Prejudice or No Prejudice
The Wilson court noted that, unlike a regulation that confers a substantial right on a claimant, a regulation which is adopted only for the orderly transaction of the agency’s business “is not reviewable except upon a showing of substantial prejudice to the complaining party.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547 (quoting American Farm Lines, 397 U.S. at 539, 90 S.Ct. 1288). Because the majority in the present case believes that § 404.1520a is nothing more than an “adjudicatory tool” enacted for the benefit of the agency in the orderly transaction of the agency’s business, it necessarily had to determine whether the violation of the regulation resulted in substantial prejudice to Rabbers. This, in turn, led the majority to search the record for evidence that would be relevant to each of the four B criteria functional limitations. As a result, the majority makes its own findings of fact:
1. “Rabbers did not have a marked restriction in his activities of daily living.” Majority Opinion, p. 658.
2. “[T]he record does not indicate that Rabbers had marked difficulties in maintaining social functioning.” Majority Opinion, p. 659.
3. “As to the third functional area— maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace — there is no evidence that Rabbers suffered marked difficulties.” Majority Opinion, p. 659.
4. “Finally, with respect to the last of the four functional areas, the record shows that Rabbers experienced only one or two episodes of decompensation.” Majority Opinion, p. 659.
To support a finding of no prejudice and therefore its opinion that the violation was *669a harmless error, the majority also noted that the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Fomunung’s opinion for the reasons given by the ALJ, and that Dr. Fomunung’s opinion was “the only evidence in the record that would have potentially supported a finding that Rabbers satisfied the B criteria of a listed impairment.” Majority Opinion, p. 661.
Because I regard the regulation that the ALJ violated as a law that confers substantial procedural rights on a claimant, it is not necessary, in my opinion, to scour the record and make findings of fact that the ALJ was required by law to make. Instead, it is my belief that a violation of this type of regulation requires the court of appeals to vacate the judgment of the district court and remand the case with instructions that the ALJ comply with the law and make the required findings, unless the violation is a de minimis violation or a remand would be a useless formality.4 In the Wilson case, this court quoted from NLRB v. Wyman-Gordon, 394 U.S. 759, 766 n. 6, 89 S.Ct. 1426, 22 L.Ed.2d 709 (1969), that where “remand would be an idle and useless formality,” courts are not required to “convert judicial review of agency action into a ping-pong game.” Wilson, 378 F.3d at 547.
Accordingly, the only question in a case of this nature is whether the ALJ’s intentional or negligent violation of the law can be considered to be a de minimis violation or, if not a de minimis violation, is there any reason why the case should not be remanded with instructions that the ALJ comply with the law and make the required findings on the four functional limitations listed in the B criteria.
VI. Remand in This Particular Case Would be an Idle and Useless Formality
As the majority correctly observed, the only medical evidence in the record that could support a finding by the ALJ that Rabbers’s condition met the B criteria is the testimony of Dr. Fomunung.5
I also conclude, as did the majority, that “the ALJ properly rejected Dr. Fomunung’s opinion” for the reasons given in the majority opinion. The obvious result, therefore, of any reversal and remand would be a repetition by the ALJ of his rejection of Dr. Fomunung’s opinion for exactly the same reasons he previously explained. There then being no medical evidence to counter the medical evidence relied upon by the Commissioner, requiring the ALJ to make the necessary B criteria findings would be fruitless.
While I do not regard the intentional or negligent violation of the law by the ALJ to be in any sense a de minimis violation, this is a rare case in which a reversal and remand would be an “idle and useless formality.” For that reason, and for that reason alone, I concur with the judgment of this court affirming the district court’s decision upholding the Commissioner’s denial of Rabbers’s application for disability insurance benefits.
VII. Conclusion
I dissent from the majority’s opinion that the reasons for a reversal and remand *670when an agency violates its own law, as set forth in this court’s opinion in Wilson, do not apply to the regulation in this case which the majority believes is a mere “adjudicatory tool.” I concur with the majority’s affirmance of the district court’s judgment upholding the Commissioner’s denial of Rabbers’s application for disability benefits, only because a reversal and remand under the particular circumstances of this case would be futile.
. The sentence in the above quotation from Wilson, "[a]n agency's failure to follow its own regulations ‘tends to cause unjust discrimination and deny adequate notice' and consequently may result in a violation of an individual's constitutional right to due process,” while true, is found in NLRB v. Welcome-American Fertilizer Co., 443 F.2d 19, 20 (9th Cir.1971), not in Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 547, 79 S.Ct. 968, 3 L.Ed.2d 1012 (1959). In Vitarelli, Justice Frankfurter did say that:
An executive agency must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged. See Securities & Exchange Commission v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 87-88, 63 S.Ct. 454, 87 L.Ed. 626. Accordingly, if dismissal from employment is based on a defined procedure, even though generous beyond the requirements that bind such agency, that procedure must be scrupulously observed. See Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 77 S.Ct. 1152, 1 L.Ed.2d 1403. This judicially evolved rule of administrative law is now firmly established and, if I may add, rightly so. He that takes the procedural sword shall perish with that sword.
359 U.S. at 546-47[, 79 S.Ct. 968], Similarly, in the present case, the Social Security Administration "must be rigorously held to the standards by which it professes its action to be judged,” and having enacted 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520a, having taken "the procedural sword,” its conduct in violation of that regulation should cause that conduct to "perish with that sword.”
. 20 C.F.R. Pt. 404, Subpt. P„ App. 1, § 12.04(B).
. See Federal Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance; Listing of Impairments— Mental Disorders, 50 Fed.Reg. 35038, 35065 (Aug. 28, 1985) for relevant commentary and the text of § 404.1520a(d) as it existed at the time of the Clark decision.
. In fact, the Commissioner recognizes that a different standard of review applies in such cases when he refers in his brief to the "heightened harmless error standard described in Wilson.” (Appellee’s Br. 17).
. The majority opinion notes that Rabbers's own testimony regarding his symptoms was insufficient to establish that he met the B criteria of one of the listed impairments. According to 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(5)(A), "there must be medical signs and findings, established by medically acceptable clinical or laboratory diagnostic techniques, which show the existence of a medical impairment...."