dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent. I disagree with the majority’s holding that the school board exceeded its authority when it adopted the provision in § 1(b) of the OPS Student Code of Conduct which states that “[i]t is not a defense to a charge of assault where someone is hurt that the student did not intend to hurt anyone as long as the student intended to engage in the conduct which caused the harm.”
Under § 1(b), a student who intends conduct which causes personal injury to another student may be found to have violated the Student Code of Conduct even if the consequences of that intended conduct are more severe than intended. The majority holds that this provision contradicts the statutory grant of authority to school districts provided in the school law statutes. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 79-4,180 (Reissue 1994) provides, in relevant part, that “[pjersonal injury caused by accident . . . shall not constitute a violation of this subdivision . . . .” The majority concludes that § 1(b) of the Student Code of Conduct does not permit the defense that an act caused a result that was unforeseen, unexpected, or accidental and that this is not consistent with the requirements of § 79-4,180.
The majority misses the mark in relying on authority regarding the construction of liability insurance policies in order to determine the meaning of the phrase “by accident.” More analogous to the provisions at issue in the instant case is our law defining the intent required for an assault that causes personal injury in the criminal law context, i.e., a general intent statute.
*758In this context, we have held that the intent required for an assault relates to the act which produces the injury, not to the consequences or injuries which result from the assault. See, State v. Williams, 243 Neb. 959, 503 N.W.2d 561 (1993); State v. Hoffman, 227 Neb. 131, 416 N.W.2d 231 (1987). In State v. Hoffman, 227 Neb. at 139, 416 N.W.2d at 237, we stated:
When one deliberately does an act which proximately causes and directly produces a result which the criminal law is designed to prevent, the actor is legally and criminally responsible for all the natural or necessary consequences of the unlawful act, although a particular result of the act was not intended or desired.
See, also, State v. Cebuhar, post p. 796, 567 N.W.2d 129 (1997). In this same context, an “accident” occurs where there is a “lack of intent to do the act at all.” See, e.g., Fields v. State, 167 Ga. App. 816, 818, 307 S.E.2d 712, 714 (1983). The code provision at issue in the instant case is, clearly, in keeping with this reasoning.
Thus, an accident as to the conduct itself remains a viable defense under the Student Code of Conduct, and a student who demonstrates that he or she did not intend to engage in the conduct which injures another student will not be held to have violated § 1(b). For example, a student who trips and runs into another student, causing injury, will not be held to have violated the Student Code of Conduct, because the injury was caused by accident. Conversely, a student who intentionally trips or pushes another student, causing injury, may be held to have violated the Student Code of Conduct. The fact that an intentional act has resulted in an unintended (i.e., more severe) harm does not constitute a defense to the charge of assault under either § 1(b) of the Student Code of Conduct or under § 79-4,180.
A student who purposely trips or pushes another student, intending for that student to stumble but not be injured, may be held accountable for the resulting personal injuries to that student, even though the particular injuries (i.e., more severe) were not intended. Because the act was intentional, it cannot be termed an “accident.” Therefore, § 1(b) is consistent with § 79-4,180, and I would hold that the school board did not exceed its authority in adopting § 1(b).
*759However, such a conclusion does not completely resolve this appeal. The district court determined that the school board’s decision to expel Spencer for the remainder of the school year was excessive and violated his constitutional right to substantive due process; thus, it reduced Spencer’s expulsion to one semester. We recently considered a similar substantive due process argument in a case in which a student was expelled from eighth grade for the remainder of a school year (i.e., two-semester expulsion) for the possession of a weapon at school. Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 251 Neb. 575, 558 N.W.2d 807 (1997). Having determined that expulsion is a rationally related means of protecting students and staff from violence, we held that a two-semester expulsion for the possession of a weapon at school did not violate the student’s rights under the Nebraska or federal Constitution. Id.
Likewise, the Omaha Public School District has determined within statutory guidelines, as a matter of policy, that any student who intentionally or knowingly causes personal injury to another student merits a mandatory two-semester expulsion because such conduct has the potential to seriously affect the health, safety, or welfare of other students or staff members, or to otherwise seriously interfere with the educational process. Under the rational basis test, so long as the official action is directed to a legitimate purpose and is rationally related to achieving that purpose, it is not unconstitutional. Id.
Applying the rational basis test, as we did in Kolesnick v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., supra, I would conclude that Spencer’s expulsion was rationally related to the board’s interest in protecting students and staff from another student who would intentionally or knowingly cause personal injury to others. Spencer admitted that he knew he was heating up the fork and that he intended to touch the other student with it. Moreover, there is evidence in the record to suggest that Spencer actually knew that the heat from the fork would cause a bum on the other student. The record is replete with evidence that Spencer knew exactly what he was doing and intended to do it — this is not an “accident” case.
Accordingly, Spencer’s two-semester expulsion did not violate his rights under the Nebraska or federal Constitution. It is *760not the province of the courts to question the wisdom or manner in which the board has exercised its discretion in regard to subject matter over which the board has jurisdiction, so long as it acts within the power conferred upon it by the Legislature. See id. The Omaha Public School District acted within the express authority conferred upon it by the Legislature, and the board’s decision was supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence. Therefore, the district court’s judgment reducing Spencer’s expulsion to one semester should have been reversed.