dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. I am well aware of the frustration expressed by the majority at the actions of the trial court and all concerned with the disposition of this case. It is, however, only the latest in a long series of cases raising questions in connection with the juvenile court system and those participating in it. For a random sampling of past orders of this court which apparently have had no impact on juvenile court cases, see, In re Interest of S.R., D.R., and B.R., 239 Neb. 871, 479 N.W.2d 126 (1992) (in circumstances of this case, 5 years in the juvenile system too long); In re Interest of R. G., 238 Neb. 405, 425, 470 N.W.2d 780, 794 (1991) (practice caution concerning the bill of exceptions; conduct of the trial court in polling those present to determine if conduct of the mother was appropriate held “unfortunate, inappropriate, and not to be condoned”); In re Interest of N.W. and R.W., 238 Neb. 620, 472 N.W.2d 887 (1991) (no service of summons on father; record so confusing that it was difficult to find adjudication hearing; not all hearings on record; no copy of court-ordered rehabilitation plan in record); In re Interest of A.H., 237 Neb. 797, 467 N.W.2d 682 (1991) (within Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-292(6) (Reissue 1988) reasonable efforts under the direction of the court means efforts in relation to court-ordered plan for parental rehabilitation, not an extrajudicial agreement between a parent and an administrative agency regarding the parent’s lifestyle, as has been said many times before); In re Interest of G.G. et al., 237 Neb. 306, 465 N.W.2d 752 (1991) (total denial of due process to a person ordered to show cause why he should not be held in contempt); In re Interest of D.S. and 775., 236 Neb. 413, 417, 461 N.W.2d 415, 419 (1990) (court improperly restricted activities of guardian ad litem; “inhumane, inconsistent, and inefficient for the State to insist that one’s parental rights be terminated because of a mental inability to parent and at the same time demand that the terms of a plan ... be fulfilled”); In re Interest of L.C., J.C., and E.C., 235 Neb. 703, 457 N.W.2d 274 (1990) (resolution of case left to Department of Social Services, which apparently made no efforts to reunify family; 12 years in juvenile court system too long); In re Interest of P.M.C., 231 Neb. 701, 437 N.W.2d 786 (1989) (leaving one child in unsanitary home while using the fact that the home was *365unsanitary as the reason to terminate parental rights to another child was inconsistent); In re Interest of R.A., 226 Neb. 160, 410 N.W.2d 110 (1987) (separate juvenile courts are courts of record and are not free to shield their actions behind a cloak of secrecy by failing to make a verbatim record of the evidentiary proceedings before them); and In re Interest of D.R. and S.B., 217 Neb. 883, 351 N.W.2d 424 (1984) (13 years in juvenile court system too long).
Two of these cases deserve special note: In 1984, we said in In re Interest of D.R. and S.B. that 13 years in the system for one of two children was too long, and in 1990, in In re Interest of L.C., J.C., and E.C., we said 12 years in the system was too long. The system may be improving.
Nonetheless, in the case before us, I think it is improper to hold that the juvenile court does not have jurisdiction. The bases for the majority’s order seem to be the way the amended petition seeking adjudication was submitted to the court and the kind of evidence submitted at that time.
When the adjudication hearing convened on July 20, 1989, the juvenile court had before it a petition filed November 28, 1988, and amended on July 20, 1989, seeking adjudication that D.M.B. was a child within the meaning of Neb. Rev. Stat. § 43-247(3)(a) (Reissue 1988), in that she had been subjected to specified sexual abuse and that “[T.B.] has been involved with the Juvenile Court for two years in an effort to resolve poor parenting skills in reference to said child’s three siblings; [T.B.] has failed to comply with the Court’s recommendations, resulting in the termination of her parental rights of those siblings.” At this point, there cannot be any doubt that the juvenile court had jurisdiction to determine if the child was within the meaning of § 43-247(3)(a).
Pursuant to a plea agreement (although not so stated in the record), T.B., with her counsel, admitted the allegations as to D.M.B.’s birth and residence and the allegations that T.B. had been involved with the juvenile court for 2 years in an effort to resolve poor parenting skills with regard to D.M.B.’s three older siblings, that T.B. had not complied with plans to improve those skills, and that T.B.’s lack of compliance resulted in the termination of her parental rights to those three children. The *366State then dismissed sexual abuse allegations which had been testified to, in revolting detail, at D.M.B.’s detention hearing on December 6,1988.
The admitted facts, then, at D.M.B.’s adjudication hearing were that between November 1986 (2 years before the initial petition in this case) and April 24, 1989 (the date of the termination of T.B.’s rights to the older three children, as set out in In re Interest of L.B., A.B., and A.T., 235 Neb. 134, 454 N.W.2d 285 (1990)), T.B. had not been able to comply with plans to improve her parenting skills sufficiently to avoid termination of her parental rights. On March 31, 1987, D.M.B. was born, and she apparently lived under such conditions. This fact should concern any court. See In re Interest of P.M.C., supra. The court also had before it the facts from the detention hearing of December 6, 1988.
At that December 6, 1988, hearing, T.B., her counsel, a Deputy Douglas County Attorney, a representative of the Attorney General’s office, an attorney and two employees from the Department of Social Services, a member of the Omaha Police Division, and others were present. Testimony was adduced. The police officer testified that D.M.B. was present during a visit scheduled for T.B. and her three older children, L.B., A.B., and A.T. L.B. told the police officer that at that visitation, A.B. “had got hurt” in A.B.’s vaginal area when “tickled” by T.B. and that L.B. and A.T. had also been tickled. The police officer testified that L.B. and A.B. had been taken to a doctor, who found A.B. had hemorrhaging and L.B. had hemorrhaging and five adhesions “between the labia and the vaginal opening.” In separate interviews with L.B. and A.B., both told the police officer of similar “ticklings.” A.B. told the police officer that T.B. had “tickled” D.M.B. in the same way on another occasion and that “the baby had cried, but [T.B.] just kept on tickling her.” Other details were elicited, both on direct and cross-examination.
A Department of Social Services employee testified as to activities of the three older children after the visit with T.B. on November 8,1988, and recommended that D.M.B. be detained and not be returned to T.B. The witness testified that her concern for D.M.B.’s welfare was “based on what happened to *367the other kids.” T.B. also testified and denied she had done anything wrong.
At the conclusion of the December 6, 1988, hearing, the court ordered detention for D.M.B. The matter came on for adjudication on July 20,1989. For whatever reason, the county attorney agreed to dismiss all the sexual abuse charges and rested the case involving D.M.B. on the sole allegation, for adjudication purposes, that
[T.B.] has been involved with the Juvenile Court for two years in an effort to resolve poor parenting skills in reference to said child’s three siblings [not named, but L.B., A.B., and A.T.]; [T.B.] has failed to comply with the Court’s recommendations, resulting in the termination of her parental rights of those siblings.
Why the county attorney was willing to proceed on such a flimsy allegation, and why the juvenile court permitted the procedure, cannot be known, but for the purpose of an adjudication hearing, we should construe the allegation as meaning that T.B. has no parenting skills and has refused to try to learn those skills and that she was therefore unable to properly care for and protect D.M.B.
I think that construction is appropriate, particularly as the adjudication order was not appealed from and is apparently the result of an agreement between counsel. To hold otherwise is to permit lawyers’ skills to oust a juvenile court of jurisdiction, when a child in need of protection is before the court.
I cannot say that T.B. has not been denied procedural due process in these proceedings, but I do not agree that the juvenile court is without jurisdiction as to D.M.B. It is true that the case could be refiled, but why run that risk? D.M.B. is entitled to as much due process as her mother, T.B. I would reverse, and remand the cause for further proceedings, including a new termination hearing, if that is necessary.
Hastings, C. J., and Boslaugh, J., join in this dissent.