The issue in this case is whether the $100,000 liability limit in the pre-1989 version of the Oregon Tort Claims Act applies to attorney fees and costs awarded against a public body in an employment discrimination action that arose at the time that the limit was in effect. We hold that the limit applies.
Defendant Tri-County Metropolitan Transportation District of Oregon (Tri-Met) is a municipal corporation that is subject to the Oregon Tort Claims Act (OTCA), ORS 30.260 to 30.300.1 Plaintiff was employed by Tri-Met as a bus driver and dispatcher from 1976 to 1989. In 1989, plaintiff brought this action against Tri-Met, alleging that Tri-Met had engaged in an unlawful employment practice in violation of ORS 659.425(1).2 A jury returned a verdict awarding plaintiff $500,000 in compensatory damages. Applying the liability limit in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) (set out infra), the trial court entered judgment in the amount of $100,000. The trial court then ruled that the limit did not apply to an award of attorney fees and costs.3 Consequently, the court, in a separate order, awarded plaintiff attorney fees and costs in excess of $200,000.
*504Tri-Met appealed to the Court of Appeals, assigning various errors. Among other things, Tri-Met contended in the Court of Appeals that the trial court erred in awarding attorney fees and costs in addition to the $100,000 already awarded as damages. The Court of Appeals disagreed, holding that awards of attorney fees and costs were not intended to be included within the liability limit in the OTCA. Griffin v. TriMet, 112 Or App 575, 584, 831 P2d 42 (1992). We allowed TriMet’s petition for review in order to address that issue.
While Tri-Met’s petition for review was pending before this court, the Court of Appeals entered an order allowing plaintiff attorney fees, costs, and disbursements on appeal in the amount of $55,496.75. Tri-Met filed a second petition seeking review of the attorney fee and costs award in that order. We allowed review and consolidated the cases for argument and opinion.
We begin by clarifying why the pre-1989 version of ORS 30.270 applies to this case. Until 1987, ORS 30.270(1) provided:
“Liability of any public body or its officers, employes or agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties on claims within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 shall not exceed:
“(a) $50,000 to any claimant for any number of claims for damage to or destruction of property, including consequential damages, arising out of a single accident or occurrence.
“(b) $100,000 to any claimant for all other claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence.
“(c) $300,000 for any number of claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence.”
In 1987, the legislature amended ORS 30.270(1) to provide in part:
“Liability of any public body or its officers, employes or agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties on claims within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 shall not exceed:
*505“(b) $100,000 to any claimant as general and special damages for all other claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence unless those damages exceed $100,000, in which case the claimant may recover additional special damages, but in no event shall the total award of special damages exceed $100,000.
“(c) $500,000 for any number of claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence.”
Or Laws 1987, ch 915, § 13 (amendments emphasized). The 1987 amendments were to apply “only to claims that accrue on or after January 1, 1989.” Id. § 14.
In this case, plaintiff argued in the trial court that the amended version of the statute should apply because, according to plaintiff, his claim did not “accrue” until after January 1, 1989. The trial court rejected that argument and applied the pre-1989 version of the statute. Plaintiff assigned that ruling as error on cross-appeal, but the Court of Appeals declined to consider plaintiffs argument because, according to that court, “plaintiff failed to raise this issue in any way in the court below.” Griffin v. Tri-Met, supra, 112 Or App at 585.
The Court of Appeals was wrong factually; plaintiff did raise the issue in the trial court.4 Plaintiff also raised the issue in this court in a supplemental response filed after this court had allowed Tri-Met’s petition for review. We therefore address the issue.5
As noted, the 1987 amendments to ORS 30.275 apply “only to claims that accrue on or after January 1, 1989.” *506(Emphasis supplied.) Here, plaintiff has asserted a single claim of employment discrimination. The question, therefore, is whether that claim “accrued” on or after January 1, 1989. “When used with reference to a cause of action [the word ‘accrue’] means when an action may be maintained thereon. [The claim] accrues whenever one person may sue another.” Berry v. Branner, 245 Or 307, 312, 421 P2d 996 (1966) (emphasis deleted).
Plaintiff’s fourth amended complaint alleges instances of discrimination by Tri-Met beginning in October 1987 and continuing through his allegedly unlawful termination in December 1989. Plaintiff contends that his claim did not accrue until his termination in December 1989. According to the complaint, however, plaintiff filed a parallel discrimination claim with the Bureau of Labor and Industries in 1988. Moreover, plaintiff filed his first complaint in the present action in February 1989. We need not decide which of the discriminatory events alleged by plaintiff caused his claim to accrue. It is sufficient here to hold that the claim had accrued at least by the time plaintiff filed his complaint with the Bureau of Labor and Industries; plaintiffs termination in December 1989 was not essential to the accrual of his claim. It follows that the pre-1989 version of ORS 30.270 applies to this case.
Before proceeding to the central issue, we address an argument raised by amicus curiae Oregon Trial Lawyers Association. Amicus argues that plaintiffs action was not subject to the OTCA at all, because engaging in an unlawful employment practice in violation of ORS 659.425(1) — the gravamen of this action — is not a “tort” within the meaning of the OTCA. For the following reasons, we disagree.
For purposes of the OTCA, a “tort” is
“the breach of a legal duty that is imposed by law, other than a duty arising from contract or quasi-contract, * * * which results in injury to a specific person or persons for which the law provides a civil right of action for damages or for a protective remedy.”
ORS 30.260(8). This court has held that ORS 659.425(1) “imposes on an employer a duty to make reasonable accommodation for its employees’ physical and mental impairments.” *507Braun v. American International Health, 315 Or 460, 470, 846 P2d 1151 (1993). That “duty to make reasonable accommodation” is a “legal duty that is imposed by law, other than a duty arising from contract or quasi-contract” within the meaning of ORS 30.260(8). Moreover, ORS 659.121 provides “a civil right of action for damages,” ORS 659.121(2), and “for a protective remedy,” ORS 659.121(1), for persons claiming “injury” due to violations of ORS 659.425(1). Accordingly, the unlawful employment practice that was the basis for this action constituted a “tort” within the meaning of the OTCA, and plaintiffs action was therefore subject to the provisions of the OTCA. Cf. Urban Renewal Agency v. Lackey, 275 Or 35, 38, 549 P2d 657 (1976) (holding that a state agency’s breach of its statutory duty to assist individuals in reestablishing their business was a “tort” within the meaning of the OTCA).
We proceed next to the central issue in the case, namely, whether the $100,000 liability limit in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) applies to attorney fees and costs awarded against a public body in an employment discrimination action. ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) provides that the “[liability of any public body * * * on claims within the scope of ORS 30.260 to 30.300 [i.e., the OTCA] shall not exceed * * * $100,000 to any claimant for all [non-property] claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence.” (Emphasis supplied.) Plaintiff concedes that “[a] tort lawsuit against a public body is necessarily a ‘claim’ within the scope of the OTCA.” Because the violation of ORS 659.425(1) alleged in this action was a “tort” within the meaning of the OTCA, see supra, 318 Or at 506, the present action was a “tort” action. Therefore, this action was necessarily a “claim within the scope of the OTCA.” The only question remaining is whether, in limiting the “liability” of a public body on such a tort “claim,” the legislature intended to limit attorney fees and costs awarded against the public body when the tort “claim” at issue is an employment discrimination action.6
*508This court’s duty in interpreting a statute is to discern the intent of the legislature. PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, 317 Or 606, 610, 859 P2d 1143 (1993). We must, therefore, attempt to determine whether the legislature intended the limit on “liability” in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) to apply to attorney fees and costs awarded against a public body in an employment discrimination action. As always, we begin our search for the legislature’s intent with the text and context of the statute itself. Id. at 610-11. Context includes “other provisions of the same statute and other related statutes.” Id. at 611.
As noted above, ORS 30.270(l)(b) (1985) imposes a $100,000 limit on a public body’s “liability” in a case such as this. The word “liability” is not defined in the statute, or anywhere else in the OTCA. In interpreting a statute, however, “words of common usage typically should be given their plain, natural, and ordinary meaning.” PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, supra, 317 Or at 611. “Liability” commonly means, inter alia, a “duty to pay money or perform some other service,” Black’s Law Dictionary 914 (6th ed 1990), a “legal responsibility,” id., or “an amount that is owed,” Webster’s Third New International Dictionary 1302 (1976). As used in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985), then, “liability” must refer to the duty or legal responsibility to pay money on a tort claim. By imposing a $100,000 limit on a public body’s “liability” in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985), the legislature limited the amount of money that a public body must pay to a claimant as the result of any “single accident or occurrence” that constitutes a “tort” within the meaning of the OTCA.
Plaintiff concedes that the $100,000 limit on “liability” in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) is alimit on a public body’s duty to pay money. Plaintiff argues, however, that the limit was meant to apply only to awards of tort damages, not to awards of attorney fees and costs. The statute, however, contains no such qualification. The statute provides that “[liability * * * shall not exceed * * * $100,000.” The statute does not refer to “damages” at all. Had the legislature *509intended the limit on “liability” to apply only to liability for tort damages, it could have said so.7
Plaintiff points to the definition of “tort” in ORS 30.260(8) (see supra, 318 Or at 506) and argues that, because “a tort is specifically defined as a breach for which the law provides an action for £damages[,]’ [t]he question, then, is whether statutory attorney fees are tort damages.” We disagree that that is the question to be answered in this case. The definition of “tort” in ORS 30.260(8) serves to establish what sorts of claims fall within the purview of the OTCA. As we have noted already, the employment discrimination alleged and proven by plaintiff in this case was a “tort” within the meaning of the OTCA. Therefore, this action based on that discriminatory conduct is a tort “claim” within the scope of the OTCA. The question that remains, viz., whether attorney fees and costs awarded against a public body in such an action are subject to the $100,000 liability limit in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985), is not answered by looking to the OTCA’s definition of the word “tort.”
Other parts of the OTCA, however, support the conclusion that the monetary limit on “liability” contained in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) was not intended to apply only to awards of tort damages. One obvious purpose of the OTCA was to allow public bodies to insure against potential liability for their torts. ORS 30.282 contains provisions allowing local public bodies to obtain insurance, to establish self-insurance funds, or to contract with the Department of Administrative Services to cover potential tort liability. The liability limits in ORS 30.270(1) (1985) facilitate the process of insuring against potential tort liability by fixing the amounts for which a public body may be held liable. ORS 30.270(1)(a) (1985) sets a $50,000 limit to any claimant on “any number of claims for damage to or destruction of property, including consequential damages, arising out of a single accident or occurrence.” ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) — the statute at issue in this case — setsa $100,000 limit to any claimant on “all other claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence.” Finally, ORS *51030.270(1)(c) (1985) sets a $300,000 limit “for any number of claims arising out of a single accident or occurrence.”8 If amounts awarded against a public body as attorney fees and costs, rather than as damages, were excluded from the liability limits in the OTCA, the ability of a public body to determine with any certainty its potential liability for its torts would be diminished. It seems unlikely that the legislature would have intended to create such uncertainty when it imposed monetary limits on liability in the OTCA.
Furthermore, there is nothing in ORS 659.121(2), the statute under which the award of attorney fees and costs was made in this case, to support plaintiffs argument that the liability limit in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) applies only to an award of damages against a public body and not to an award of attorney fees and costs. ORS 659.121(2) permits the award of “costs and reasonable attorney fees at trial and on appeal” to the prevailing party in an action brought under that statute. There is no question that public bodies are subject to employment discrimination actions brought únder ORS 659.121(2).9 However, nothing in ORS 659.121(2) or any other part of the Oregon civil rights law suggests that the legislature intended an award of attorney fees and costs against a public body in such an action to be exempt from the $100,000 liability limit in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985).
Other provisions also support the conclusion that the $100,000 liability limit in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) was not intended to apply only to awards of tort damages against a public body. Plainly, the duty to pay attorney fees and costs as the result of a tort action is a “liability.” For instance, ORS 20.130, which addresses a public body’s duty to pay costs, provides that “the state or public corporation is liable for * * * costs and disbursements in like manner and with like effect as in the case of natural persons.” (Emphasis supplied.) ORS 659.121(2), which authorized the specific award of attorney fees and costs in this case, does not refer expressly to *511“liability.” However, inasmuch as ORS 659.121(2) constituted a waiver of the state’s immunity to such an award, that waiver necessarily recognized a “liability” on behalf of the state. See Or Const, Art IV, § 24 (“Provision may be made by general law, for bringing suit against the State, as to all liabilities originating after, or existing at the time of the adoption of this Constitution” (emphasis supplied)). There is no logical basis for concluding that an award of attorney fees and costs made against a public body in a tort action is not part of the public body’s “liability” in that action.
As plaintiff observes, ORS 20.107 provides another basis for awarding attorney fees and costs in an employment discrimination action such as the present one.10 Like ORS 659.121(2), however, there is nothing in ORS 20.107 to indicate that such an award, when made against a public body, falls outside the $100,000 limit on “liability” contained in ORS 30.270(l)(b) (1985).
No statutory provision that we have found supports plaintiffs argument that the $100,000 limit on liability in ORS 30.270(l)(b) (1985) was intended to apply only to awards of tort damages. Nevertheless, because text and context are not entirely conclusive, we look to legislative history for guidance. See PGE v. Bureau of Labor and Industries, supra, 317 Or at 611-12 (when text and context of statute do not make legislature’s intent clear, court looks to legislative history). That history is most consistent with the conclusion that the liability limit in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) was intended to apply to attorney fees and costs awarded against a public body in an employment discrimination action like the present one.
The OTCA, which originated as House Bill 1624, was enacted in 1967 and became effective in July 1968. Or Laws 1967, ch 627, § 14. By enactingthe OTCA, the legislature gave “the state’s consent to being held liable for tort claims.” *512Beaver v. Pelett, 299 Or 664, 667, 705 P2d 1149 (1985). Even before the enactment of the OTCA, however, public bodies were subject to some liability for their torts. For instance, this court had held that, in authorizing school districts to purchase liability insurance, former ORS 332.180, the legislature “intended to provide that the district’s [tort] immunity would be lifted to the extent * * * that its activities were in fact covered by insurance as authorized by the statute.” Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C et al, 226 Or 263, 281, 360 P2d 282 (1961). Also, ORS 30.320 (later amended) provided that an action or suit could be maintained against certain public corporations “for an injury to the rights of the plaintiff arising from some act or omission of such * * * public corporation.” This court had long interpreted that statute and its predecessor as permitting negligence actions against municipalities acting in a proprietary capacity, but not those acting in a governmental capacity. See, e.g., Antin v. Union High School Dist. No. 2., 130 Or 461, 465-66, 280 P 664 (1929) (discussing proprietary/governmental distinction). Additionally, however, this court had held that “even, in the performance of a governmental act, if the municipality is guilty of active wrongdoing, there is no immunity for damages resulting from such active wrongdoing.” Adams v. City of Toledo, 163 Or 185, 191, 96 P2d 1078 (1939); see generally Phillips, “Active Wrongdoing” and the Sovereign-Immunity Principle in Municipal Tort Liability, 38 Or L Rev 122 (1959) (discussing principle).
In effect, then, the OTCA did not create, so much as rearrange, governmental tort liability. Lansing, The King Can Do Wrong! The Oregon Tort Claims Act, 47 Or L Rev 357, 357-59 (1968). The tort liability that preexisted the OTCA was, for the most part, not subject to monetary limits. But see, e.g., Vendrell v. School Dist. No. 26C et al, supra, 226 Or at 281, 285 (school district liable only to extent of liability insurance coverage). In its initial form, House Bill 1624 left this unlimited liability intact. At the first hearing on the bill in the House Committee on State and Federal Affairs, however, a government witness called the committee’s attention to Senate Bill 431, a comparable bill in the Senate that contained limits on liability. Minutes, House Committee on State and Federal Affairs, March 13, 1967, p 3. The witness stated that “it would make determining of insurance premium[s] easier if there were definite limits to the amount of liability.” Id.
*513At a later hearing in the House Committee on Judiciary, further testimony was taken regarding the need for liability limits in House Bill 1624. A representative of the Association of Oregon Counties stated that the counties “would like to know what their liabilities are going to be and set limitations.” Minutes, House Committee on Judiciary, May 10, 1967, p 5. The city attorney for Salem testified that “there are many small cities in the state that will be in opposition to a bill with no limitations. They are fearful of a large verdict which would bankrupt them.” Id. atp 6. Finally, the city attorney for Portland “strongly urged a limitation because common belief is that public money is manna from heaven and doesn’t cost anything.” Id.; see also Exhibits p 5 (statement by City of Eugene: “[insurance costs would be tremendous because [the bill] does not state a limit. Want to stress need for limit.”). Later, the bill was revised to include monetary limits on liability, and the bill was enacted with those liability limits in place.11
The foregoing excerpts from the legislative history demonstrate that the legislature included liability limits within the OTCA to ensure fiscal stability for public bodies and to facilitate the purchase of liability insurance by those bodies by establishing certain limits on monetary liability resulting from torts committed by the public bodies and their agents. Undoubtedly, the legislature was aware that the imposition of limits would prevent some claimants from being compensated fully for their injuries arising from such torts. Nevertheless, the legislature chose to limit the “liability” of public bodies in order to impose a measure of certainty and to protect the public fisc. So far as we can determine, no later legislature, in modifying the OTCA liability limits, ever has abandoned that underlying purpose of quantifying and placing known limits on the financial exposure of public bodies.
*514Furthermore, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the legislature intended to depart from that purpose when it authorized the award of attorney fees and costs in an action brought under ORS 659.121(2). Likewise, there is nothing in the legislative history to suggest that the legislature intended such a departure when it authorized attorney fee and costs awards in discrimination actions under ORS 20.107. It is entirely consistent with the legislative history of those statutes to construe the liability limit in ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985) as applying to awards of attorney fees and costs, as well as awards for damages, made against public bodies.
Plaintiff argues that construing the liability limit in ORS 30.270(l)(b) (1985) to apply to attorney fees and costs in employment discrimination actions “would be to negate, without justification, the legislature’s plan for encouraging discrimination claimants.” As the Court of Appeals noted, “One obvious purpose of ORS 659.121 is to ameliorate the financial burdens associated with litigation to vindicate a person’s right not to be discriminated against unlawfully.” Griffin v. Tri-Met, supra, 112 Or App at 584. The same maybe said of ORS 20.107. We are cognizant that, in deciding in this case to honor the policy choice of the legislature in imposing liability limits in the OTCA, we detract to some degree from the policy choice that the legislature made in providing for attorney fees and costs in employment discrimination actions. But making a choice between the two policies cannot be avoided, because both cannot be fully vindicated at the same time. We have chosen the policy of the statutoiy scheme that governs the amount of liability of governments for their torts — the OTCA — over the policy of a statutory scheme that applies to one particular kind of harm that a government might cause. We believe that our choice is inherent in the OTCA. Given the political struggle that always accompanies attempts to enlarge the financial exposure of governmental bodies, as exemplified in the legislative history to which we have referred, we are unwilling to attribute to the legislature an intent — never expressed anywhere — to waive the OTCA limits on this single form of wrong out of all the kinds of wrongs that could be committed by governmental bodies. If a future legislature disagrees, it has the ability to alter that choice.12
*515We hold that in an employment discrimination action such as the present one, the $100,000 liability limit in ORS 30.270(l)(b) (1985) applies not only to the award of damages, but also to any award of attorney fees and costs. Therefore, in this case, Tri-Met’s total liability to plaintiff for damages and attorney fees and costs could not exceed the $100,000 limit in ORS 30.270(l)(b) (1985). It follows that the trial court erred in awarding plaintiff attorney fees and costs in excess of the $100,000 already awarded to plaintiff as damages. Similarly, the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the trial court’s award of attorney fees and costs.
The foregoing logic applies with equal force to the award to plaintiff by the Court of Appeals of attorney fees, costs, and disbursements on appeal. Under ORS 30.270(1)(b) (1985), Tri-Met’s total liability to plaintiff in this case cannot exceed $100,000. The trial court reached that limit when it entered judgment in favor of plaintiff for $100,000 in damages. It follows that Tri-Met could not be subjected to any further award of attorney fees, costs, or disbursements by the Court of Appeals.
The decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed in part and reversed in part. The order of the Court of Appeals allowing attorney fees, costs, and disbursements is reversed. The order of the circuit court awarding plaintiff attorney fees and costs is reversed. The case is remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings.
ORS 30.265(1) provides in part that, ‘Tslubject to the limitations of ORS 30.260 to 30.300, every public body is subject to action or suit for its torts and those of its officers, employees and agents acting within the scope of their employment or duties.” (Emphasis supplied.) ORS 30.260(4)(b) defines “public body” to include ‘Ta]ny city, county, school district or other political subdivision or municipal or public corporation." (Emphasis supplied.) The parties agree — as do we — that TriMet is a “public body.”
ORS 659.425(1) provides:
“For the purpose of ORS 659.400 to 659.460, it is an unlawful employment practice for any employer to refuse to hire, employ or promote, to bar or discharge from employment or to discriminate in compensation or in terms, conditions or privileges of employment because:
“(a) An individual has a physical or mental impairment which, with reasonable accommodation by the employer, does not prevent the performance of the work involved;
“(b) An individual has a record of a physical or mental impairment; or
“(c) An individual is regarded as having a physical or mental impairment.”
Plaintiff claimed that Tri-Met discriminated against him because he was infected with Human Immunodeficiency Virus (HIV), the virus that causes AIDS.
Plaintiff sought attorney fees and costs under ORS 659.121(2), the statute that provided the basis for the action. That statute provides in part:
“Any person claiming to be aggrieved by alleged violations of ORS * * * 659.415 to 659.435 * * * may file a civil action in circuit court to recover compensatory damages or $200, whichever is greater, and punitive damages.
*504* * * In any action brought under this subsection, the court may allow the prevailing party costs and reasonable attorney fees at trial and on appeal.”
After the jury returned its verdict, the parties briefed and presented oral arguments on the form of the judgment. One of the issues argued was whether the 1987 amendment to ORS 30.270(l)(b) applied to plaintiffs action. Ruling on that issue, the trial court stated: “I’m of the opinion and so rule that the $100,000 limitation on damages does apply, and I think I can summarize my feelings by simply saying that I feel that the key, in my mind, is when the claim occurred.”
ORAP 9.20(2) provides in part:
“If the Supreme Court allows a petition for review, the court may limit the questions on review. If review is not so limited, the questions before the Supreme Court include all questions properly before the Court of Appeals that the petition or the response claims were erroneously decided by that court.”
(Emphasis supplied.)
The Court of Appeals held that the OTCA “specifically covers only tort claims” and “does not include attorney fees and costs within the definition of a tort claim.” Griffin v. Tri-Met, 112 Or App 575, 583, 831 P2d 42 (1992). According to the Court of Appeals, ‘Ttlhe tort claim in this case is the discriminatory conduct of the tortfeasor.” Id. at 584. The error in that reasoning, as Tri-Met points out, is that the OTCA does not define the term “tort claim” at all. Rather, it defines the word “tort.” *508See supra 318 Or at 506 (setting out the OTCA definition of “tort”). What the Court of Appeals describes as the “tort claim” is, instead, the “tort.”
For example, the present version of ORS 30.270(l)(b) expressly provides that ‘ ‘ [liability of any public body * * * on claims within the scope of [the OTCA] shall not exceed * * * $100,000 to any claimant as general and special damages.” (Emphasis supplied.)
As noted above, 318 Or at 504-05, the limit in ORS 30.270(1)(c) has been increased to $500,000.
For purposes of the statutes prohibitingunlawful employment practices, ORS 659.010(6) defines “employer” to include “state agencies, political subdivisions and municipalities.” Therefore, public bodies are subject to actions brought under ORS 659.121(2) based on unlawful employment practices.
ORS 20.107 provides in part:
“(1) In any civil judicial proceeding, * * * a complaining party who prevails in a final binding judgment on a claim of illegal discrimination in violation of state * * * statute * * * shall be entitled to recover costs and disbursements, including attorney and expert witness fees reasonably and necessarily incurred in connection with the discrimination claim, at the trial court * * * and on appeal.”
Upon enactment of the OTCA, ORS 30.270(1) provided:
“Liability of any public body on any claim within the scope of this Act shall not exceed:
“(a) $25,000 when the claim is one for damage to or destruction of property and $50,000 to any claimant in any other case.
“(b) $300,000 for any number of claims arising out of a single occurrence.”
Or Laws 1967, ch 627, § 4.
Our decision in this case applies only to the pre-1987 version of ORS *51530.270(1). We express no opinion regarding the effect of the 1987 amendments. See supra, 318 Or at 504, for the text of those amendments.