(concurring in result).
I would not make any determination regarding the requirements of SB 169 and the Initiated Measure in light of our holding that SDDS’ permit had not been properly granted by the Board at the times material to the issue presented in this appeal.
In Matter of SDDS, Inc., 472 N.W.2d 502 (S.D.1991) (hereinafter SDDS I), we determined the Board’s findings that the issuance of the permit was environmentally safe and in the public interest were “so general and conclusory as to wholly fail to satisfy the standards of SDCL 1-26-25 and Lemke v. Rabenberg’s, Inc., 89 S.D. 386, 233 N.W.2d 336 (1975).” SDDS I, at 514.
Since Board gave no underlying basis for its conclusion that Lonetree was environmentally safe, we were unable to engage in any form of meaningful judicial review. We reversed the Board and circuit court decisions and remanded the environmental safety and public interest issues to Board to make more particular findings as required by statute and its own rules when issuing a permit. SDDS I, at 514.
While this court has never specifically addressed the issue, it is a general rule that the failure of an administrative agency to make express findings of fact where such findings are required, renders the administrative determination void. Wichita R.R. v. Pub. Util. Comm., 260 U.S. 48, 43 S.Ct. 51, 67 L.Ed. 124 (1922); Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 55 S.Ct. 241, 79 L.Ed. 446 (1935); United States v. B. & O. Co., 293 U.S. 454, 55 S.Ct. 268, 79 L.Ed. 587 (1935); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 44 S.Ct. 283, 68 L.Ed. 549 (1924); Garden Court Apartments v. Hartnett, 45 Del. 1, 65 A.2d 231 (1949); Chicago Rys. Co. v. Commerce Commission, 336 Ill. 51, 167 N.E. 840 (1929); Mitchell Bros. Truck Lines v. Hill, 227 Or. 474, 363 P.2d 49 (1961).
In Wichita, supra, the United States Supreme Court held, in reviewing an administrative decision, as follows:
The proceeding we are considering is governed by § 13. That is the general section of the act comprehensively describing the duty of the Commission, vesting it with power to fix and order substituted new rates for existing rates. The power is expressly made to depend on the condition that after full hearing and investigation the Commission shall find existing rates to be unjust, unreasonable, unjustly discriminatory or unduly preferential. We conclude that a valid order of the Commission under the act must contain a finding of fact after hearing and investigation, upon which the order is founded, and that for lack of such a finding, the order in this case was void. (Emphasis supplied.)
260 U.S. at 58, 43 S.Ct. at 55, 67 L.Ed. at 130.
*274SDCL 1-26-25 states: “Findings of fact, if set forth in statutory language, shall be accompanied by a concise and explicit statement of the underlying facts supporting the findings.” We further interpreted this statute in Lemke, supra, and, in fact, already held that Board’s findings on public interest and environmental safety were insufficient. SDDS I, at 514. Since there were no findings as required, I would hold SDDS did not possess a valid permit when SB 169 was enacted by the South Dakota legislature. Therefore, there would have been no permit in existence for the legislature to approve and approval could not be given until Board had performed its mandatory statutory and administrative duty. Wichita, supra; Panama, supra.
Until such time as SDDS does, in fact, possess a validly issued permit, I would decline to determine when SDDS could commence operation.
In conclusion, I would affirm the decision of the trial court for the reasons stated herein.