(dissenting). I respectfully dissent for three reasons. First, readers of the opinion are obliged to assume a trial court finding that interest income earned on the pension and profit-sharing asset was unavailable to pay maintenance. Why else go into extended discussion of the subject? Such an assumption is unfair to the trial court since it never addressed the issue, but assumed that the interest was available for maintenance purposes.1 I believe, therefore, that the first part of the opinion is totally unnecessary.
Second, I have problems with the overly broad language of the first part of the opinion. In discussing James' pension, the opinion states that'' [t]here is nothing that distinguishes James' pension fund from other *419types of investments normally divided as part of a property division." Majority op. at 414, 481 N.W.2d at 506.1 imagine that what the majority means to say is that interest income from a pension awarded as part of property division should be available for maintenance just as interest from a CD or a savings account is.
I think that the language is overly broad for the following reason. Normally, interest from such things as CDs and savings accounts is immediately available as income to the payee. Thus, the interest is "income" in the true sense of the word. That is why the supreme court in Hommel v. Hommel, 162 Wis. 2d 782, 471 N.W.2d 1 (1991), had no hesitancy in deciding that interest of that type is available for maintenance. However, pensions and profit-sharing plans are different animals. Although interest may accumulate and roll over on an annual basis in these plans, no money is forthcoming to the employee until the plan vests and until the employee is entitled to begin receiving the benefits under the plan. In other words, no interest is available as income, at least until benefits begin.
I understand that we do not have that situation before us. Ellen is not attempting to obtain maintenance based upon interest that was rolled over into the pension before James' retirement. However, that is just the point. The language of the majority opinion could be used by some enterprising legal mind for a proposition that is not presently before this court. We should not be giving the impression that any interest earned on a pension after property division is available for maintenance. While I acknowledge that footnote 2 of the majority opinion attempts to circumscribe such a notion, I think it is necessary to point out that the language in the body of the opinion is overly broad and not germane to the narrow issue before us.
*420Third, I do not believe that the trial court abused its discretion in modifying the maintenance obligation. Contrary to the majority's opinion, I believe that the trial court gave full consideration to the support objective of maintenance. I fully support our case law decreeing that one spouse should not be forced to invade the property division in order to live while the other does not. The majority, however, has decided that this is the effect of the trial court's order.
I am convinced, however, that the trial court took into consideration the entire record before coming to the conclusion it did. The trust for Ellen was set up pursuant to stipulation by the parties. It provided for James to fund a trust to provide for Ellen's care and welfare. He did so. Although it was denominated as property division, I do not believe appellate courts should be so blind as to ignore the purpose of a legally created entitlement because of the legal moniker applied to that entitlement. As pointed out in many of our appellate opinions, courts are to consider maintenance and property division in tandem, not as separate entities. I conclude that Ellen was not "forced to invade the property division." Majority op. at 417, 481 N.W.2d at 507. Rather, the trust was set up to provide for and support Ellen.
The trial court recognized that the trust is dwindling. This does not mean, however, that the trust is not presently able to serve its purpose — Ellen's support. I believe that the trial court recognized just that. The trial court deemed that the support objective could be better met by lowering James' present maintenance obligation, thus making it necessary that the trust temporarily bear the major responsibility for Ellen's support. This would allow the pension to increase in value, thereby putting James in a much stronger position to provide for Ellen's maintenance through his income in the near future. I *421believe this to be the reasoning of the trial court, based upon the following statements made by the trial court, which I recite here:
James is asking for a suspension of maintenance on a temporary basis to allow his financial planning . . .. [A]bout the time James receives social security will be the time that his financial planning ripens and his financial picture with the tax considerations will be better than it is at present. A resumption of maintenance at a later time would find him in a better position to pay the support that is needed by Ellen. . . . James asks the court essentially for a reprieve. And the court finds that it is appropriate.
The court finds that to continue to force James to pay maintenance at the original level will force him to incur unduly harsh consequences for the benefit that is reaped by Ellen. Her monies are already dwindling, even at the current maintenance level. While the court's order may hasten their exhaustion, on the other hand James' funds are working well and hard for him and will place him in a better position in the future to fund maintenance. [Emphasis added.]
Contrary to the majority opinion, I am convinced that the trial court had the support objective of maintenance foremost in its mind in rendering its decision. The court was merely carrying out the original intent of the parties at the time they were divorced, which was for James to provide and care for Ellen's support. Permitting it to come now from the fast-depleting trust, funded by James, and, in the near future, to come from a financially healthier James, is a discretionary call for the trial *422court. In my view, the court's exercise of that call did not amount to an abuse of discretion. I dissent.
In fact, the trial court opined that Pelot v. Pelot, 116 Wis. 2d 339, 342 N.W.2d 64 (Ct. App. 1983), did not apply to the facts in this case.