dissenting.
While I agree with Divisions 1 and 2 of this court’s opinion, I cannot agree with Divisions 3 and 4; therefore, I must respectfully dissent.
The drastic action of removing a judge from office is one that should be taken with great caution and concern. When a judge has been elected by the people, removal from office is tantamount to impeachment; therefore, the violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct should be proved by “clear and convincing” evidence. Divisions 1 and 2 of the majority opinion clearly show a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct, and I concur in those determinations. However, my concurrence dissolves when we reach Divisions 3 and 4 of the majority opinion. In Division 3, the majority states:
The statement [an account by the judge in the local newspaper of what transpired and her motivations for taking the actions she took] appears to be an attempt to influence public opinion in her favor and against other Peach County officials, including the sheriff and board of commissioners. Such conduct violates Canons 1, 2A, 2B, and 3B (4) and is prejudicial to the administration of justice and undermines public confidence in the impartial functioning of judicial officers.
Judges do not lose their right to freedom of expression when they take the bench. In fact, public officials — including judges — are oftentimes called upon to explain their conduct in public fora. Our democratic society is based on a free flow of information and ideas *331and we have jealously guarded this right for as long as the republic has existed. Donning a robe does not strip a judge of freedom of expression.
Decided March 17, 1995 Reconsideration denied March 30, 1995. Earle B. May, Jr., for Judicial Qualifications Commission.The majority opinion does not state how the statement by the judge in the local paper violated the Code of Judicial Conduct or undermined public confidence in the office. Judges are accountable to the public and they should not be unduly punished for explaining their actions to the public. In the absence of a showing that the statement by the judge violated a specific provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct, I must disagree with the majority’s determination as to Division 3.
In Division 4 of its opinion, the majority apparently finds evidence of aggravation and states:
O’Neal refused to acknowledge that any specific action was improper; nor did O’Neal accept personal responsibility for the difficulties she experienced with the other elected officials of Peach County. We take this refusal into account in determining that O’Neal’s acts of wilful misconduct and prejudicial conduct demonstrate she is presently unfit to hold judicial office.
This statement is a slim reed indeed upon which removal from office is justified. We must keep in mind that, while the actions taken by the judge were unauthorized, she sought to have done nothing more than was provided for under law.6 Therefore, I disagree with the majority’s determination in Division 4 that refusal to admit fault is justification for removal from office.
The decision of the court follows the recommendation of the Judicial Qualifications Commission; however, noticeably absent — though I recognize it is not required by the rules governing the JQC — is a finding by the JQC as to why some lesser punishment is not applicable. In the five years I have served on the Supreme Court of Georgia, this court has never seen fit to remove a judge from office. Instead of ordering this judge from office, I would remand the case to the JQC for a finding as to why lesser punishment is not appropriate.
*332Pete C. Whitlock, Bruce S. Harvey, for O’Neal.The judge sought to have the sheriff attend sessions of court and to prevent the Board of Commissioners from reducing her statutorily-mandated salary.