(dissenting). I dissent from the majority's opinion concluding that the intentional misrepresentations on how the plaintiffs had voted on various financial issues before them while members of the Rusk County Board are not defamatory as a matter of law. In Frinzi v. Hanson, 30 Wis. 2d 271, 275, 140 N.W.2d 259, 261 (1966), the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that a complaint alleging defamation should be dismissed if the language complained of is incapable under the circumstances pleaded of harming the reputation of the plaintiff so "as to lower him in the estimation of the community or to deter third persons from associating or dealing with him." I think it is important to note that the court continued to state that, " [i]n determining whether language is defamatory, the words must be reasonably interpreted and must be construed in the plain and popular sense in which they would naturally be understood in the context in which they were used and under the circumstances they were uttered." Id. at 276, 140 N.W.2d at 261.
The plaintiffs' complaint alleges that the defendants had intentionally misrepresented their voting record on numerous financial issues before them while members of the Rusk County Board. If believed, the letters would make the plaintiffs appear as spendthrifts and not caring how taxpayer money was spent. Frinzi tells us that in determining whether the language is defamatory, the alleged false statements must be considered in the context in which they were used and under the circumstances they were uttered. Here, letters containing these intentional misrepresentations were distributed to the *274public four days before the election and for the purpose of lowering the public's perception of these candidates and to defeat them at the voting booths. Whether these false letters caused their defeat is unknown, but the plaintiffs, all incumbents, were in fact defeated. Although not perfect, a public election does tell us something about the community's estimation of a candidate. However, when the estimation is influenced by lies, the candidate's standing in the community has been lowered.
Obviously, the only purpose of these intentionally false letters in the context used and uttered was to cast these plaintiffs as individuals who waste taxpayers' money in order to lower their estimation in the community and lessen their chances for re-election. If we believe the complaint, which we must at this stage of the action, the defendants succeeded. This type of activity must not be condoned anywhere in a democratic society. I recognize, that in elections we must allow rough and coarse comments concerning a candidate's qualifications, but the line must be drawn when those comments are intentionally false representations made to influence the election and defeat the candidate. A candidate for any public office should never have to accept intentionally false statements about his character that lower him in the community's eye. Making intentional false statements has never been protected under the first amendment, nor should it be.
Wisconsin has recognized this and made it a crime for one to make false representations pertaining to a candidate that is intended to affect voting at an election. See sec. 12.05, Stats. Similarly, one should be liable in a defamation action for damages when making to the public intentionally false representations about a candidate *275when those false representations are made to influence the voter's estimation of that candidate.
Therefore, I would reverse the summary judgment and allow this action to go to trial on the merits of the complaint.