concurring in part and dissenting in part.
1. Because I find some evidence upon which to base the charges of which appellants complain, I must concur in Divisions 1-4 and in the affirmance of the judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of Peggy Grogan. However, I wish to note that Jenkins v. Burns, 202 Ga. App. 579 (415 SE2d 30) (1992) and Stroud v. Woodruff, 183 Ga. App. 628, 629 (2) (359 SE2d 680) (1987), “[t]he cases most strongly relied on by [appellees,] are not in point. [This is a case] where [appellees’ truck] . . . had blocked the [intersection], and [appellants’ automobile] collided with the [truck]. The questions involved in [this case], of course, are materially different from the ones in [Jenkins and Stroud] where the [intersection] was clear as the [plaintiff] approached the [intersection], and the [vehicles] collided as they both entered the [intersection]. [Nevertheless, I agree that this] is not one of those cases where the questions of negligence and diligence are ones of law and not of fact. [Cits.]” Jones v. McCranie, 92 Ga. App. 505, 508 (1) (88 SE2d 849) (1955). See New Cigar Co. v. Broken Spur, 103 Ga. App. 395 (119 SE2d 133) (1961).
2. However, I cannot concur in the affirmance of the judgment entered on the jury verdict in favor of the defendants on Robert Grogan’s loss of consortium claim. In Division 5, the majority correctly states that it is not in every instance that an injury and resultant damages to one plaintiff necessarily results in a compensable claim for loss of consortium to the spouse. However, my review of the record in this case convinces me that the general rule applies here and that the verdict against Mr. Grogan on his loss of consortium claim is inconsistent with Mrs. Grogan’s recovery and cannot stand. “While there was evidence that [the wife] had been [injured several] years earlier . . . , there [is] evidence that the latest accident directly caused some injuries. . . . When the jury found for the wife, it, in effect, determined that [appellees] had caused her injury. The uncontradicted evidence shows that those injuries caused . . . the husband [some loss of consortium]. In other words, the same jury’s verdict for the wife could not logically preclude those damages sought by the husband which are directly derivative from the wife’s claim.” Clark v. Wright, 137 Ga. App. 720, 721-722 (1) (224 SE2d 825) (1976).
“In the case sub judice, the injured party has suffered significant injuries, has been awarded a substantial verdict for those injuries and the spouse has presented unrefuted evidence as to loss of consortium. Under these circumstances, the award of zero damages to the spouse *105is an inconsistent verdict entitling [Mr. Grogan] to a new trial on the issue of damages. [Cit.]” Nelson & Budd, Inc. v. Brunson, 173 Ga. App. 856, 859 (6) (328 SE2d 746) (1985). Compare Copelin v. Russell, 205 Ga. App. 540, 541 (423 SE2d 6) (1992) (where the “evidence would authorize a finding that appellant and her husband had a troubled marriage for personal reasons which pre-existed the automobile collision and which were in no way attributable thereto”) (emphasis supplied); Gurly v. Hinson, 194 Ga. App. 673, 675 (9) (391 SE2d 483) (1990) (where the “evidence on the consortium issue was not uncontradicted,” “the jury awarded the appellant wife a small amofint over the documented special damages,” (emphasis supplied) and the “jury could have determined that the appellant wife’s injuries were such that her husband suffered no compensable damage for loss of consortium”).
Decided March 10, 1993 — Reconsideration denied March 23, 1993 Edenfield, Stone & Cox, Gerald M. Edenfield, Susan W. Cox, for appellants. Dillard, Landers & Bower, Terry A. Dillard, Bryant H. Bower, Jr., for appellees.Accordingly, I believe that Mr. Grogan is entitled to a new trial on the issue of damages for his claim for loss of consortium and I respectfully dissent as to Division 5.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge McMurray and Judge Blackburn join in this opinion.