dissenting.
I must respectfully dissent from the majority opinion’s partial affirmance of the denial of the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, because I believe that the appellant was entitled to complete summary judgment.
1. OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) provides that “an action for medical malpractice shall be brought within two years after the date on which an injury or death arising from a negligent or wrongful act or omission occurred.” The whole court has had recent occasion to determine the proper starting date for the running of that limitation period, unfortunately without reaching a consensus. Jones v. Lamon, 206 Ga. App. 842 (426 SE2d 657) (1992). In that case, a four-judge plurality opinion settled upon the date of the injury or the date of the discovery of the injury, but avoided making a definite selection. The remaining five judges, in two separate dissents and one special concurrence, favored or seemed to favor selecting the date of the discovery of the injury as the starting point. The only date apparently ruled out was the actual date of the negligent act.
In the instant case, the majority opinion concludes that “the focus of OCGA § 9-3-71 (a) is not the date of the negligent act but when the injury resulting therefrom manifests itself,” and cites Jones v. Lamon, supra, for support of that conclusion. However, considering the splintered opinions in that case (a 4-2-2-1 vote), it is doubtful that the.case can support any proposition.
The language of the statute of limitation should be applied with *310as little contortion as possible. As stated above, that statute bars medical malpractice actions brought after two years from the date on which the injury occurred. Determination of the date an injury occurred often is difficult in cases of this nature, but that is the statutorily mandated focus. The majority opinion, however, in considering “when the injury . . . manifests itself,” instead applies a discovery of the injury rule.
The uncontroverted facts in this case are that on March 11, 1989, the appellee underwent an abortion procedure performed by the appellant. On March 15, 1989, the appellant performed a second abortion procedure, after another physician determined that the first procedure had not removed all of the products of conception. On March 20, 1989, the appellee saw another physician, who performed yet a third abortion procedure to remove products of conception. The appellee subsequently commenced this action on March 18, 1991.
I agree with the majority opinion that the third abortion procedure performed on the appellee was part of the course of treatment resulting from the appellant’s failure to remove all of the products of conception, and did not constitute the injury to the appellee. Surgery Assoc., P. C. v. Kearby, 199 Ga. App. 716, 718 (405 SE2d 723) (1991). In concentrating on the manifestation of the injury, however, the majority opinion fails to identify the actual injury to the appellee, viz., the retention of products of conception. That being the injury, it necessarily follows that the date of the injury’s occurrence would be the date of the procedure itself. In this particular instance, the date of the negligent act and the date of the injury would be the same.
In summary, with regard to the abortion procedure performed on March 11, 1989, the injury occurred upon the completion of the procedure on that same date. With regard to the second procedure performed on March 15,1989, the injury likewise occurred upon the completion of the procedure on the same day. Under these circumstances, the appellee’s commencement of this action on March 18, 1991, was more than two years after the date either injury occurred, and the action should be barred pursuant to OCGA § 9-3-71 (a). Accordingly, the appellant was entitled to summary judgment on the entire claim asserted against him.
In opposing the appellant’s motion for summary judgment, the appellee recalled statements made by the appellant following the second procedure, assuring her that he had correctly completed the procedure, and that “everything was now alright.” However, those alleged statements hardly constitute the type of representation or fraud such as will toll the statute of limitation until an injury can be discovered. Gillis v. Palmer, 178 Ga. App. 608 (344 SE2d 446) (1986); cf. Quattlebaum v. Cowart, 182 Ga. App. 473 (356 SE2d 91) (1987).
2. In conjunction with his motion for summary judgment, the ap*311pellant submitted his own affidavit as a medical expert, in which he averred that (1) his treatment of the appellee comported with the appropriate degree of care, skill, and diligence ordinarily exercised by members of the medical profession under the same or similar circumstances, and (2) an incomplete abortion is a risk ordinarily associated with an abortion. In response, the appellee submitted the affidavit of another physician who reviewed the medical records pertaining to the two procedures performed by the appellant and the third procedure performed by another physician.
Decided March 31, 1993The appellee’s medical expert opined that the appellant “failed to follow generally accepted and customary medical practices and failed to exercise the degree of care generally employed by medical professionals in the field of obstetrics and gynecology.” As a matter of law, this affidavit was insufficient to create an issue of fact regarding any negligence on the appellant’s part.
“It is established in this state that in medical malpractice cases, the professional defendant may defend by asserting that in his treatment of the plaintiff, he complied with the specific standard of care in the profession; and if he does so, giving his own expert opinion or any others, then in order to prevail the plaintiff at the minimum must counter that expert opinion with a contrary expert opinion in her behalf, so as to create an issue of fact for a jury. [Cit.] . . . [T]he plaintiff cannot prevail on motion for summary judgment by merely presenting a conclusory opinion that defendant was negligent or failed to adhere to the professional standard. [Cit.] She must state the particulars. She must establish the parameters of the acceptable professional conduct and set forth how or in what way the defendant deviated therefrom. [Cits.]” Loving v. Nash, 182 Ga. App. 253, 255 (355 SE2d 448) (1987).
In the instant case, the affidavit of the appellee’s medical expert also stated that the record fails to reveal any follow-up inquiries by the appellant to determine the appellee’s condition after the procedures, and that this failure to follow-up did not comport with accepted and customary medical practices. However, that omission, if any, was immaterial, as it bore no causal relationship to the injury complained of, i.e., the retention of products of conception. Inasmuch as the affidavit of the appellee’s expert was entirely conclusory, it failed to preserve an issue of fact regarding negligence on the appellant’s part, and the trial court should have granted summary judgment for the appellant on that basis as well.
I am authorized to state that Judge Johnson joins in this dissent. *312Sullivan, Hall, Booth & Smith, Rush S. Smith, Jr., Eleanor L. Martel, for appellant. Donald W. Johnson, for appellee.