concurring specially.
I concur in Division 1 but not fully in Division 2. I concur only because I am bound by Parrish v. State, 194 Ga. App. 760, 762 (4) (391 SE2d 797) (1990). I agree with Chief Judge Pope for the most part, but I do not join in his suggestion for a solution.
In my view, the better practice would be to require defendants who wish to claim that trial counsel was constitutionally ineffective to present that claim “at the earliest practicable moment,” in the words of Smith v. State, 255 Ga. 654, 656 (3) (341 SE2d 5) (1986). That *82should mean, when new counsel enters the case before the judgment is appealed, by motion for new trial, or amendment to motion for new trial, or extraordinary motion for new trial after the time for motion for new trial has passed or such a motion has been denied. OCGA § 5-5-41 (a) and (b). Although an extraordinary motion does not extend the time for filing a notice of appeal, a 30-day extension for filing the notice can be sought. OCGA § 5-6-39 (a) (1) and (c). It can also be done after permission to file an out-of-time appeal has been obtained and before the notice for such is filed. Ponder v. State, 260 Ga. 840 (400 SE2d 922) (1991). There is ample opportunity, under orderly procedure readily available, for raising the issue at the trial court level while the case is still there, witnesses are available, memories are fresh, and an optimum quality hearing can be held. This avoids the long delay in final disposition of the case, with all of delay’s evil consequences.
When defendants are allowed to remain mum about the issue until the appeal is eventually ruled on and they gain a return to the trial court for consideration of an issue which could have been dealt with a year or more before, the procedure becomes, in my view, an abuse of process and a disservice to the constitutional mandate for the “speedy, efficient, and inexpensive resolution of . . . prosecutions.” Ga. Const. 1983, Art. VI, Sec. IX, Par. I. It wastes judicial resources, requiring the trial court to resurrect its recollection after a much greater time lapse from the time of trial and in most instances requires piecemeal appeal.
If there is some valid reason the issue is not raised and ruled on at the earliest practicable moment, then the avenue of habeas corpus is available. Requiring timely raising, with the clear sanction of waiver, would in most cases result in resolution of the issue, if there is an arguable one, before any direct appeal, and would serve to afford a speedier trial in needful cases, without the delay of a remand.
It is not necessary to determine effectiveness as part of the procedure in every criminal case, as suggested in the special concurrence. This would bog down the system with unfounded inquiries or could even lead to cursory decisions on the question because it becomes routine. It would require new counsel to enter every criminal case so that the record, which would have to be prepared, can be reviewed. New counsel would have to interview trial counsel and comb the record for indicia of ineffectiveness and would have to investigate defendant’s complaints about trial counsel’s actions, or inactions, which are outside the record. The trial court cannot represent the defendant in ascertaining flaws in trial counsel’s performance.
Moreover, a hearing will have to be conducted in most cases. This issue would then automatically be a part of every criminal appeal.
In the case of Sixayaketh v. State, 261 Ga. 690 (410 SE2d 112) *83(1991), considered by the majority as controlling, defendant was proceeding pro se. For him, proceeding without the aid of counsel, the earliest practicable moment to complain of trial counsel’s representation may well have been on direct appeal.
Decided March 19, 1993. Bruce F. Morriss, Daniel Shim, for appellant. Lewis R. Slaton, District Attorney, Kenneth D. Feldman, Carl P. Greenberg, Assistant District Attorneys, for appellee. I am authorized to state that Judge Johnson and Judge Blackburn join in this special concurrence.