dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
*425Wilbanks argues that the State’s reliance upon federal cases holding to the contrary is misplaced because the Georgia statute does not explicitly state, as does 21 USC § 881 (a) (7), that a violation of that act will result in a forfeiture of “[a] 11 real property, including any right, title, and interest (including any leasehold interest) in the whole of any lot or tract of land and any appurtenances or improvements, which is used, or intended to be used, in any manner or part, to commit, or to facilitate the commission of [a drug offense]. ...” The federal forfeiture statute originated in 1970. Pub. L. 91-513, Title II, § 511. Among its amendments since then is subsection (a) (7), which was added with certain other subsections in 1984. Pub. L. 98-473, 306 (a). The Georgia statute originated in 1974. Ga. L. 1974, p. 221, § 1. Section 16-13-49 was rewritten in 1991, effective before the seizure in this case. Ga. L. 1991, p. 886, § 1. Prior to rewriting, it did not include real property.
A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that “the court must first ascertain the legislative intent in enacting the law and then construe the law to implement that intent. [Cit.]” State of Ga. v. Jackson, 197 Ga. App. 619, 620 (1) (399 SE2d 88) (1990). The legislature used broadly inclusive language in OCGA § 16-13-49 (d) (2): “all property,” and “directly or indirectly,” and “used or intended for use in any manner to facilitate.” This clearly signifies the intent of the legislature that the entirety of any property, including real estate, be forfeited. Although it did not explain these plain words by describing their fullness in detail, as did the federal statute, it did not limit these all-inclusive words either.
We have recognized that the State’s interest in a forfeiture proceeding “is only to prevent a guilty party from further misusing the property,” and is thus remedial in nature. State of Ga. v. Sewell, 155 Ga. App. 734, 735 (2) (272 SE2d 514) (1980). The legislature explicitly expressed its intent by directing in subsection (z) that “[t]his Code section must be liberally construed to effectuate its remedial purposes.” The federal forfeiture statute contains no such clear legislative directive.4 Neither did the Georgia statute before the amendment, when it was strictly construed. See State of Ga. v. Jackson, supra.
To permit the forfeiture of only an internal portion of a tract of land, not even including the access by which the drugs were brought in, as the trial court did here, according to the State’s undisputed description below, thwarts the legislative intent and in addition results in many problems of practical usage and conveyance, which the *426legislature may have recognized. One of the principles of statutory construction applicable here is quoted in Hollowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 681 (279 SE2d 430) (1981): “‘[T]he language being plain, and not leading to absurd or wholly impracticable consequences, it is the sole evidence of the ultimate legislative intent.’ ”
Decided March 19, 1993 — Reconsideration denied April 2, 1993 Jack O. Partain III, District Attorney, Gary D. Bergman, Special Assistant District Attorney, for appellant. William W. Keith III, Karen E. Luffman, for appellee.In In the Matter of a Parcel of Real Property Known as 1632 N. Santa Rita, Tucson, 801 P2d 432 (Ct. App. Ariz. 1990), the Arizona Court of Appeals considered the same issue, under ARS § 13-2314 (F). It allows state forfeiture in racketeering cases, which covers possession of marijuana for sale. One of the categories subject to forfeiture, in subsection (3), is “all. . . property . . . used or intended to be used in any manner or part to facilitate the commission of the offense.” That court ascertained that this subsection “serves two purposes. It deprives the defendant of the means to commit further offenses, and it also helps the state defray the expenses of the investigation and prosecution. Based on the first purpose alone, the statute can be fairly characterized as remedial.” Id. at 436 (1). It further determined that, “like the federal statute, A.R.S. § 13-2314 (F) states that all property used to facilitate the commission of the offense is subject to forfeiture.” (Emphasis in original.) Id. at 437 (5). The Arizona statute does not contain the detail found in the federal statute. Nevertheless, the operative words were “all property.” Those same all-inclusive words are used in the Georgia statute. See also In re Land Located in Effingham, New Hampshire, 561 A2d 1061 (NH 1989) (entire 84-acre tract forfeited although marijuana found growing on only a portion of it; issue was whether the owner was aware of the drug violation).
The trial court incorrectly ruled that under the statute only real property within the curtilage of the mobile home is forfeited. No such carving out is contemplated by the statute. Of course, the innocent owners’ interests are protected. OCGA § 16-13-49 (e).
I am authorized to state that Chief Judge Pope and Presiding Judge Birdsong join in this dissent.The federal criminal forfeiture statute does. See 21 USC § 853 (o); United States v. Littlefield, 821 F2d 1365 (9th Cir. 1987).