concurring.
I concur fully in the majority opinion and write separately to point out that the law provides different protection for married couples and unmarried cohabitants, and to address the issue of unjust enrichment, on which the dissenting opinion invites comment.
First, the dissent submits that there is something incongruous in allowing an unmarried but cohabiting partner to enter into a valid contract regarding the support of the other partner, but not affording a married partner this same privilege. The marital relationship is bestowed special protections by the laws of North Carolina, protections that a cohabiting partner cannot claim. These include, for example: the right to have property held as tenants by the entireties, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 39-13.6 (1984); the right, upon the death of one’s spouse, to dissent from an unfavorable bequest in the deceased’s will, in favor of a larger portion of the estate, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 30-1 (1992); an entitlement to a year’s allowance upon the death of one’s spouse, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 30-15 (1992); and numerous rights arising from the dissolution of the marital relationship that *364are not available to a cohabiting partner when his or her relationship comes to an end. See generally N.C. Gen. Stat. Chapter 50 (1987, Supp. 1992). Quite simply, the rules are different for married couples. See Ritchie v. White, 225 N.C. 450, 453, 35 S.E.2d 414, 416 (1945) (the moment the marriage relation comes into existence certain rights and duties spring into being). The dissent chooses to focus on one aspect of the law which does not grant a married person the same privilege as an otherwise similarly situated unmarried cohabitant in an effort to illustrate that the married couple is unduly restrained by our laws. The fact that the law does not allow a married couple to contract regarding spousal support, however, is not indicative of a general trend in the law to deprive married individuals of otherwise valid legal rights.
Second, having found, as the majority has, that an oral agreement existed between the parties in the present case pursuant to which the plaintiff wife agreed to support the defendant husband while he was in school, and having further found that there exists a personal duty of each spouse to support the other which duty cannot be modified by the parties to a marriage, the issue of unjust enrichment is easily resolved.
The doctrine of unjust enrichment is an equitable doctrine intended to require a recipient to pay for benefits received under circumstances in which it would be unfair for him or her to retain those benefits without compensating the benefactor. Collins v. Davis, 68 N.C. App. 588, 591, 315 S.E.2d 759, 761, aff’d, 312 N.C. 324, 321 S.E.2d 892 (1984). This principle, however, is inapplicable when the benefit is bestowed gratuitously or is in discharge of some obligation. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. Co. v. State Highway Comm’n, 268 N.C. 92, 96, 150 S.E.2d 70, 73 (1966) (railroad company not allowed to recover for widening railroad tracks under a theory of unjust enrichment where it was required to so act pursuant to statute). Each spouse has a duty to support the other during the course of the marriage, and, therefore, the wife in the instant case cannot now seek to be reimbursed for such support under a theory of unjust enrichment.
I note that the law has not abandoned spouses who find themselves in the situation of the plaintiff. The legislature has enacted the equitable distribution statute, pursuant to which support such as the plaintiff has rendered in the present case is a distributional factor supporting an unequal distribution of the marital *365property. N.C. Gen. Stat. § 50-20(7). It is unfortunate that the circumstances of the present case are such that the marital estate consists of little property. To make up for this by reaching the result that the dissenting opinion urges, however, would result in unwarranted litigation in those situations where a supporting spouse claims recovery under a theory of unjust enrichment in an amount in excess of the value of the marital property. The ramifications of the dissent’s view cannot be ignored, as they would clearly result in an alteration of the laws relating to divorce, alimony, and property division that is best left to the legislature.