dissenting.
I, too, must dissent from the opinion of the court in this case. I agree with, and join in, the dissenting opinion of Justice Golden. I find, however, that the majority opinion is more straitened than plenary, as claimed, and I am constrained to suggest some additional reasons that justify this court in affirming the trial court. The Moorcroft police officers had other adequate cause to arrest Van Horn, without relying upon or invoking the municipal bench warrant, and that fact serves to justify his prosecution under § 6-5-204(a), W.S.1977.
There is no question raised in this instance that the arrest of the driver of the vehicle that Van Horn owned, and in which he was riding, was not lawful. Section 31-5-1204(a), W.S.1977 (June 1989 Repl.), provides, in pertinent part:
“(a) The authority of a police officer to make an arrest is the same as upon an arrest for a felony when the officer has reasonable and probable grounds to believe that the person arrested has committed any of the following offenses and the manner of making arrests shall be as in misdemeanor cases:
⅜* * * * * *
“(ii) Driving or being in actual physical control of a vehicle while under the influence of alcohol or any substance as prohibited by W.S. 31-5-233; ⅜ * *.”
Section 7-2-103, W.S.1977 (June 1987 Repl.), sets forth the authority to arrest without a warrant and provides:
“(a) A peace officer may arrest a person without a warrant and detain that person until a legal warrant can be obtained when:
“(i) Any criminal offense is being committed in his presence by the person to be arrested;
“(ii) He has probable cause to believe that a felony has been committed and that the person to be arrested has committed it; * *
The definition of “peace officer” in § 7-2-101(a)(iv), W.S.1977, includes “any duly authorized member of a municipal police force.”
With this authority to arrest established, § 31-5-1202, W.S.1977 (June 1989 Repl.), becomes significant:
“Every person who commits, attempts to commit, conspires to commit, or aids or abets in the commission of, any act declared herein to be a crime, whether individually or in connection with one (1) or more other persons or as a principal, agent or accessory, is guilty of the offense, and every person who falsely, fraudulently, forcibly or willfully induces, causes, coerces, requires, permits or directs another to violate any provision of this act is likewise guilty of the offense.”
There was ample probable cause in this instance for the Moorcroft police officers to arrest Van Horn for aiding and abetting *888the driver in committing the offense of driving while under the influence of alcohol without relying on the bench warrant in any way.
The essence of the majority opinion is that, when an arrest is lawfully made by a peace officer, he still must subject himself to the hazard of resistance or interference if he makes mention of an arrest warrant that he may not have authority to execute at that place. This is not sound public policy and is antithetical to the policy justification for Roberts v. State, 711 P.2d 1131 (Wyo.1985). Neither is it sound or logical jurisprudence. Obstruction, impedance, interference, or resistance of arrest by a peace officer who is engaged in the lawful performance of his duties can hardly ever be justified and, as Roberts correctly suggests, only in the most compelling circumstances. That exception is not satisfied in this case.
One of our rules of appellate jurisprudence is that we can, and will, affirm the trial court on any legal ground appearing in the record. Chapman v. State, 638 P.2d 1280 (Wyo.1982); Jones v. State, 602 P.2d 378 (Wyo.1979). I am in accord with Justice Golden’s thesis that the controlling authority for this case is Roberts. The application of Roberts depends upon whether there was a lawful arrest, and it should not be read in a stilted fashion so as to limit its scope to only those situations in which a warrant is relied upon. It follows that if, as in this case, there is a lawful arrest, the prosecution of the arrested person, or anyone else, for a violation of § 6-5-204(a), W.S.1977, should not be denied. The fact that the arresting officers also presented a municipal warrant does not justify the conduct of Van Horn in interfering with a police officer.
For the foregoing reasons, and for the reasons articulated by Justice Golden in his dissenting opinion, I would affirm Van Horn’s conviction.