(concurring in result):
I agree that the class judgment awarded to the Division of Consumer Protection (Division), and later assigned to Workman, is void, but on different grounds. While the majority rests its decision upon a procedural defect, with which I do not necessarily disagree, I believe that under the Utah Consumer Sales Practices Act (the Act), no class action may be maintained in the present case. Any class judgment would therefore be void, even if procedurally correct under section 13-11-20 of the Act.
It is clear from the pleadings that the only cause of action alleged against defen*755dant is for a violation of the Act.13 Section 13-11-23 of the Act provides that “a class action relating to a transaction governed by this act may be brought only as ’prescribed, by this act.” (Emphasis added.) Section 13-ll-17(2)(a) of the Act permits a class action suit only after publication of a rule or entry of a final judgment declaring an alleged act or practice to be a violation of the Act.13 The Division points to no rule or final judgment issued prior to the occurrence of the alleged acts.
Simply stated, the Division did not have any statutory authority to bring a class action suit against the defendant. The preconditions identified in the Act, by which the Division could be authorized to bring a class action, were not satisfied. Since the Division did not have any statutory authority to bring a class action, and the Division was not a member of the purported class, the Division clearly lacked standing to pursue the present case as a class action. Inasmuch as no class action could have been maintained proeedurally, no class judgment could have been awarded. An award to a class was therefore outside the jurisdiction of the trial court. See Woodworth v. Utah National Guard, 793 P.2d 383 (Utah 1990) (failure to follow, statutorily mandated procedure rendered claim outside of court’s jurisdiction). The judgment awarded to the purported class was therefore null and void. See Hiltsley v. Ryder, 738 P.2d 1024, 1025 (Utah Ct.App.1987) (“A trial court may not render judgment in favor of a nonparty.”).
I concur in the majority’s conclusion in note 12 that the setting aside of the judgment as void should not be interpreted as a dismissal of plaintiff’s cause of action. The Division does have authority pursuant to section 13-ll-17(l)(c) to act on behalf of complainants in seeking compensation for actual damages incurred as a result of a violation of the Act. See State ex rel. Div. of Consumer Protection v. GAF Corp., 760 P.2d 310 (Utah 1988). I take exception, however, to the dicta in notes 5 and 12 suggesting that this matter should be pursued by a class representative rather than the Division. The dicta ignored the clear authority given by the legislature to the Division to handle matters such as these. Section 13-ll-17(l)(c). Furthermore, a class member, like the Division, would be prohibited from bringing a class action suit in this matter until after the publication of a rule or entry of a final judgment declaring the alleged activities of the defendant to be a violation of the Act. See section 13-11-19(4)(a).
. The enforcing authority [the Division] may bring a class action on behalf of consumers for the actual damages caused by an act or practice specified as violating this chapter in a rule adopted by the enforcing authority ... before the consumer transaction on which the action is based, or declared to violate [this chapter] by final judgment of courts of general jurisdiction and appellate courts of this state that was either reported officially or made available for public dissemination ... by the enforcing authority ten days before the consumer transactions on which the action is based, or, with respect to a supplier who agreed to it, was prohibited specifically by the terms of a consent judgment that became final before the consumer transactions on which the action is based.
Utah Code Ann. § 13-11-17(2)(a) (1986) (emphasis added).