Appellants are engaged in ranching and farming operations about seven miles east of Greybull. Appellees1 were involved in drilling, plugging and abandoning of an oil and gas well located about one mile from appellants' properties. The well was drilled over 2,900 feet into the Madison Formation where it encountered pressurized water. Contending that failure to properly plug and abandon the well resulted in salty seepage water damaging their lands, appellants filed this action with claims of negligence, trespass and nuisance, fraud, intentional infliction of emotional distress, loss of enjoyment of life and punitive damages.
Appellees were granted a directed verdict on all claims except those for negligence and trespass. The claims for negligence and trespass were submitted to the jury on special verdict interrogatories.
Appellants word the issues on appeal as follows:
“Issue I
“Whether the trial court erred in submitting the special verdict form, Interrogatory Number 1 to the jury over the objection of the appellants.
“Issue II
“Whether the trial court erred in excluding appellants’ evidence, made known to it by an offer of proof, which was proper rebuttal evidence.
“Issue III
“Whether the trial court erred by reversing itself and permitting the appellee to list four additional expert witnesses on the eve of the trial 3 of whom testified at the trial.
“Issue IV
“Whether the trial court erred in granting appellee-defendants a directed verdict on appellants-plaintiffs’ cause of action for the intentional infliction of emotional distress.
“Issue V
“Whether the trial court erred in granting appellee-defendants a directed verdict on appellants-plaintiffs’ cause of action for fraud.”
Finding no error, we affirm as to all parties except appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc., action as to it being for the bankruptcy court and not for this court.
ISSUE I — SPECIAL VERDICT INTERROGATORY
The jury was instructed that it need not consider additional interrogatories if the answer to the first interrogatory was in the negative. The jury answered the first interrogatory in the negative, resulting in a judgment for appellees. Appellants here object to the wording of the first interrogatory. It read:
*843“Have plaintiffs proven by a preponderance of the evidence that ineffective plugging and abandonment of the Her-rén Gulch # 2 well caused Madison water to flow on to any of their ranches?”
Appellants’ contention for error in this respect fails for either of two reasons: First, if there was error, it was not preserved with a proper objection, and second, there was no error in the wording of the interrogatory.
In forming this issue, appellants contend that the trial court erred in submitting the interrogatory to the jury “over the objection of the appellants.” The instructions and the verdict form were considered at length by the court and counsel at conference. Numerous objections were made by the parties to various potential instructions, but there was no objection to this interrogatory, nor was there an objection to it at any time before the jury retired to consider its verdict as required by W.R.C.P. 51, which reads in pertinent part:
“Before the argument of the case to the jury is begun, the court shall give to the jury such instructions on the law as may be necessary and same shall be in writing, numbered and signed by the judge, and shall be taken by the jury when it retires. No party may assign as error the giving or the failure to give an instruction unless he objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection.” (Emphasis added.)
The purpose of the rule is to inform the court of the nature and specific grounds of contended error in the instruction or verdict form so that the judge may reconsider the same and correct or modify it, if necessary, to avoid error. Oeland v. Neuman Transit Co., 367 P.2d 967 (Wyo.1962); Edwards v. Harris, 397 P.2d 87 (Wyo.1964); Bentley v. State, 502 P.2d 203 (Wyo.1972); Texas Gulf Sulphur Co. v. Robles, 511 P.2d 963 (Wyo.1973); Reeder v. State, 515 P.2d 969 (Wyo.1973); Runnion v. Kitts, 531 P.2d 1307 (Wyo.1975); Haley v. Dreesen, 532 P.2d 399 (Wyo.1975); Goggins v. Harwood, 704 P.2d 1282 (Wyo.1985).
Appellants argue that an objection was unnecessary to preserve error under the provisions of W.R.C.P. 61 relative to harmless error. W.R.C.P. 61 states:
“No error in either the admission or the exclusion of evidence and no error or defect in any ruling or order or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any of the parties is ground for granting a new trial or for setting aside a verdict or for vacating, modifying or otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.”
W.R.C.P. 61 cannot be interpreted to nullify the specific requirements and provisions of other rules of civil procedure, including the provision of W.R.C.P. 51 requiring the necessity for an objection to the failure to give or to the giving of an instruction, and including the provisions of W.R.C.P. 49(a) requiring a demand to include submission of a desired issue of fact in a special verdict to prevent waiver of its consideration by the jury. W.R.C.P. 49(a) reads:
“Special verdicts. The court may require a jury to return only a special verdict in the form of a special written finding upon each issue of fact. In that event the court may submit to the jury written questions susceptible of categorical or other brief answer or may submit written forms of the several special findings which might properly be made under the pleadings and evidence; or it may use such other method of submitting the issues and requiring the written findings thereon as it deems most appropriate. The court shall give to the jury such explanation and instruction concerning the matter thus submitted as may be necessary to enable the jury to make its findings upon each issue. If in so doing the court omits any issue of fact raised by the pleadings or by the evidence, each party waives his right to a trial by *844jury of the issue so omitted unless before the jury retires he demands its submission to the jury. As to an issue omitted without such demand the court may make a finding; or, if it fails to do so, it shall be deemed to have made a finding in accord with the judgment on the special verdict.” (Emphasis added.)
If W.R.C.P. 61 were interpreted as argued by appellants, an attorney would never object to the giving of the other party’s requested instructions or to the failure to give his own requested instructions, thereby “sandbagging” the court and establishing a basis for appeal in the event of a verdict for the other party.. Such interpretation would have the effect of inviting error. W.R.C.P. 51 must be taken to mean what it says. A failure to make a timely objection to the giving, or to the refusing to give, an instruction “stating distinctly the matter to which he objects and the grounds of his objection” is a waiver of any error thereon.
“The matter of waiver is grounded, among other things, on the proposition that jury trials are time-consuming and costly proceedings and while a litigant is entitled to a fair trial, certain it is that he has responsibilities to assist the trial court in bringing about such a result. It will not do to permit a litigant to remain mute and speculate on the outcome of a jury trial on the record made with knowledge of irregularities or improprieties therein that might readily and easily have been corrected during the trial and then, when misfortune comes his way, to attempt to set the invited result aside by way of a new trial because of such matters. It is not fitting for the trial court or this court knowingly to reward or condone such conduct.”
Dewitty v. Decker, 383 P.2d 734, 736 (Wyo.1963).
Second, there was no error in the wording of the interrogatory as contended by appellants. They argue that the use of the 'words “on to” therein prevented the jury from considering damage caused to their lands by the raising of the water table under their lands due to seepage water from the well. They argue further that the use of the word “Madison” in the interrogatory prevented the jury from considering damage caused to their lands by water from other than the Madison formation but which was included in, or activated by, seepage from the well.
With reference to the words “on to” in this instance, the meaning is not restricted to water moving on the surface of the ranch lands as argued by appellants. Appellants’ ownership of the lands extends under the surface to the center of the earth. Such was recognized during the trial through appellants’ evidence that most, if not all, of the damage from salty water or excess water was to appellants’ subsurface lands, i.e., to the roots of the vegetation growing on the lands. The thrust of the evidence presented to the jury concerned damage from subsurface water. The jury was not misled by the interrogatory. The trial took six weeks. The testimony was primarily from opinions of expert witnesses. On the one side, the opinions included, for example, (1) that the pressurized water from the Madison formation was improperly blocked in the well allowing the water to enter other porous formations and migrate underground to appellants’ lands and causing the water table to rise and prevent normal drainage; and (2) that improperly blocked water migrated underground to appellants’ lands by virtue of a fault causing the rise in the water table. On the other side, the opinions included, for example, (1) that the salt and excess water migi'ating underground to appellants’ lands came from leakage of the Porter Canal; (2) that it resulted from the Muddy Shell Creek aquifer discharge; (3) that it resulted because of a retention dam for open pit bentonite mines lying north of appellants’ lands; and (4) that the water table was changing pursuant to a ten-year precipitation cycle. The negative answer to the interrogatory was the jury’s determination that the subsurface water causing damage to appellants’ lands was not caused by the plugging and abandoning of the well.
*845With reference to the use of the word “Madison” in the interrogatory, the jury was likewise not misled. The testimony related to whether or not water from the Madison formation caused the damage to the appellants’ lands. The contention that the well was improperly plugged was with reference to plugging of the Madison formation. Some of the experts testified to tests made by them to determine if the damage-causing water was from the Madison formation. Water from the Madison formation as the cause of damage was the central issue. Appellants argue that the reference in the interrogatory to Madison water precluded the jury from determining that Madison water from the well migrated to their lands and caused a rise in the water table with the damage being a result of the presence of water table water other than Madison water. The argument disregards the common sense of the jury. If Madison water actually migrated into other water in the water table, it would not retain its separate substance. The fluid nature of both waters would cause them to mix and combine. Accordingly, if the jury believed any of the Madison water had migrated into the raised ground water, it would have answered the interrogatory in the affirmative.
There was no error in the wording of the interrogatory. It addressed the fact which was basic to the premise upon which appellants founded their case.
ISSUE II — EXCLUSION OF REBUTTAL EVIDENCE
Appellants contend that the district court erred in refusing to admit evidence in rebuttal consisting of a video tape and ten still photographs depicting seeps in the vicinity of the well. Appellants argue that the exhibits rebutted the testimony of ap-pellees’ witness Huntoon to the effect that the area was drying pursuant to a ten-year cycle. The trial court allowed testimony concerning the seeps but refused admission of the exhibits. Such was within the court’s discretion.
“A court does not abuse its discretion unless it acts in a manner which exceeds the bounds of reason under the circumstances. In determining whether there has been an abuse of discretion, the ultimate issue is whether or not the court could reasonably conclude as it did. An abuse of discretion has been said to mean an error of law committed by the court under the circumstances. Eager v. Derowitsch, 68 Wyo. 251, 232 P.2d 713 (1951); Anderson v. Englehart, 18 Wyo. 409, 108 P. 977 (1910); DiPalma v. Wiesen, 163 Conn. 293, 303 A.2d 709 (1972); In re Estate of Horman, 265 Cal.App.2d 796, 71 Cal.Rptr. 780 (1968).”
Martinez v. State, 611 P.2d 831, 838 (Wyo.1980).
“Judicial discretion is a composite of many things, among which are conclusions drawn from objective criteria; it means a sound judgment exercised with regard to what is right under the circumstances and without doing so arbitrarily or capriciously. Byerly v. Madsen, 41 Wash.App. 495, 704 P.2d 1236 (1985).”
Martin v. State, 720 P.2d 894, 897 (Wyo.1986).
W.S. l-ll-205(a)(iv) provides that after a defendant has presented his evidence “the parties will then be confined to rebutting evidence unless the court permits them to offer evidence in their original case.” The general rule here applicable is stated in 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trials §§ 150 and 151 (1962):
Ҥ 150. Rebuttal.
“One cannot, except in the discretion of the trial court, introduce as a part of his rebuttal testimony relative to new and independent facts competent as a part of his testimony in chief. What is rebuttal evidence rests largely within the discretion of the trial court. ⅜ * *
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“The general principle that in order to warrant a reversal the error must have been prejudicial to some substantial right of the appellant or plaintiff in error applies to rulings of the trial court on matters relating to examination on rebuttal. “§ 151. — Evidence in chief on rebuttal.
*846“As a general rule, the party upon whom the affirmative of an issue devolves is bound to give all his evidence in support of the issue in the first instance, and will not be permitted to hold back part of his evidence confirmatory of his case and then offer it on rebuttal. Rebuttal testimony offered by the plaintiff should rebut the testimony brought out by the defendant and should consist of nothing which could have been offered in chief. And unless the court in its discretion dispenses with the requirement, the defendant, as well as the plaintiff, should introduce all his evidence in chief in support of his main case. But the trial court may, in its discretion, permit the introduction of such evidence on rebuttal, and an appellate court will not interfere except in cases of clear abuse of discretion. Nor, as a general rule, will the court on appeal interfere with the discretion of the trial court in refusing to permit evidence in chief to be introduced in rebuttal. However, where evidence is real rebuttal evidence, the fact that it could have been offered in chief does not preclude its admission in rebuttal.”
The court has discretion in admitting evidence admissible during a party’s case in chief when offered in rebuttal. Gies v. Boehm, 78 Wyo. 449, 329 P.2d 807 (1958); Hunt v. City of Laramie, 26 Wyo. 160, 181 P. 137 (1919).
In this case, appellants had taken the deposition of witness Huntoon prior to trial. At that time they had the opportunity to determine the nature of his testimony, and they did so. Their argument that they were surprised by such testimony is not sustainable. The presence of seeps, bogs and surface water was testified to at length by appellants’ witnesses in their case in chief. The exhibits were in the nature of cumulative evidence presented in rebuttal.
Of pertinence is the fact that the exhibits were presented on the last day of appellants’ rebuttal, yet they were prepared and were available for presentation before appellants rested their ease in chief. Additionally, the parties were earlier advised by the court concerning the offering of exhibits as a surprise to the other side. The following was said previously when appellants offered to introduce another exhibit not first made known to appellees:
“THE COURT: Before we have the objection, I am going to announce to you guys, exchange these exhibits. Even if it’s an overlay, exchange them before we get into Court. We are getting the jury in and out and if you don’t—
“MR. MEYER: I’m sorry—
“THE COURT: That is * * * all right. If you don’t advise each other, I’m not going to admit them after today.”
This court indicated its concern over the necessity for prior disclosure of contemplated evidence in Barber v. State Highway Commission, 80 Wyo. 340, 342 P.2d 723, 726-27 (1959).
“[I]f there be no trickery, material evidence should not be rejected merely because it is in improper order. However, under the Wyoming Rules of Civil Procedure, the bar and bench of this State are dedicated to a full and fair disclosure of all the facts in a case at or prior to the time of trial, with no withholding of certain matters to be used as secret weapons. It is our view that rebuttal testimony should ordinarily be limited to that which will relieve a litigant who, having been free from deception in the pleadings and pretrial stages, has at the trial been surprised and placed at an unfair disadvantage. To effectuate this, the trial court must have considerable latitude in demarcating rebuttal testimony.”
The trial court was also aware of the potential for surrebuttal if the exhibits were allowed in evidence. Appellees would require time to examine any seeps near the well including those testified to by witness Huntoon to determine their cause — whether or not they resulted from rain, from another outside source, etc.
Under the circumstances of this case, it cannot be said that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing testimony concerning that reflected in the exhibits but denying the introduction into evidence of the exhibits themselves. The action did not *847exceed the bounds of reason. The court could reasonably conclude as it did.
ISSUE III — ALLOWANCE OF ADDITIONAL EXPERT WITNESSES
Appellants contend that the trial court erred in allowing an exception to its pretrial order by granting appellees Vanderbilt, Adobe and Grayrock an amendment to their list of witnesses to include expert witnesses Gene George, Don Cearly and Reginald Lee.2 George’s expertise was as a geologist, Cearly’s expertise was as a “mud” expert, and Lee’s expertise was as a geophysicist. Consolidated Oil and Gas had previously been denied a request to add George to its list of witnesses. The trial court expressed his reasoning in allowing the listing of the additional witnesses as follows:
“I did let those people in at a late hour and I appreciate the fact that that was late in the game, but I did that to be fair to these people because Cam Walker c[a]me into this case late and didn’t have an opportunity to list experts at the time we were all talking about them early on in the case and I thought he deserved the opportunity — and he did — to list some experts of his own for your theory.”
Following is the chronology pertinent to the court’s reasoning.
March 3, 1987 John Davis v. Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc. and Loy E. Harris3 was filed. Docket 14978.
August 12, 1987 Wayne Barnett, Fred Barnett, Clair Cheatham and Vida Cheatham v. Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., Loy E. Harris & Halliburton Company 4 was filed. Docket 15092.
November 3, 1987 A scheduling order was issued requiring notification of witnesses by January 2, 1988.
November 12, 1987 John Davis, Wayne Barnett, Fred Barnett, Clair Cheatham and Vida Cheatham v. Vanderbilt Resources Corp., Vanderbilt Energy Corp.,5 Adobe Resources Corp., the Grayrock Corp. and Loy E. Harris was filed. Docket 15153.
March 4, 1988 The three cases were consolidated.
May 5, 1988 Appearance was entered by Walker for Vanderbilt Corp., Adobe Resources Corp. and Grayrock Corp., previous counsel having had to withdraw because of a conflict of interest.
May 16, 1988 Walker, for his three clients, gave notice of supplemental witnesses George, Cearly, Lee and Lindley.
May 20, 1988 Appellants filed motion in limine to exclude testimony of the supplemental witnesses.
June 21, 1988 Trial commenced.
July 29, 1988 Verdict returned.
The court also ruled that it would allow appellants to list an additional rebuttal witness since appellees were allowed to list the four expert witnesses.
W.R.E. 103(a) provides in pertinent part: “Effect of erroneous ruling. — Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected.”
The “substantial right” which appellants contended to have been affected by the court’s ruling was a right to additional time in which to depose the newly listed experts and to react to the anticipated testimony. Appellants described such right in their affidavit in support of a motion to reconsider. Appellants stated they would suffer the following prejudices:
“1. Insufficient time in which to properly and adequately prepare to depose each expert;
“2. Insufficient time to actually depose each witness;
“3. No literature search or search relating to each witness’ testimony can be accomplished in the time period allowed;
*848“4. Typing of transcripts will take additional time and thereby allow insufficient time to prepare deposition summaries for purposes of impeachment;
“5. Insufficient time once the transcripts are received to permit Plaintiffs’ experts to thoroughly review each prior to trial resulting in insufficient time for Plaintiffs to list the one (1) additional expert rebuttal witness the Court indicated it would permit;
“6. The additional work required of Plaintiffs’ counsel because the Court allowed in Defendants’ experts late in the game further prejudiced Plaintiffs’ case by decreasing their time for trial preparation.”
However, appellants took lengthy depositions of George, Lee and Cearly on June 10, 11 and 12, 1988. Thereafter, they did not avail themselves of the opportunity to list the authorized rebuttal witness. They did not ask for a continuance on the basis of that contained in the depositions — for the purpose of obtaining transcripts of the depositions to locate a rebuttal witness or to otherwise react to the information resulting from the depositions. The three witnesses were subject to extensive cross-examination at the trial.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case. If it had refused the attorney who had recently made an appearance for Adobe Resources Corporation, Grayrock Corporation and Vanderbilt Corporation the ability to present his evidence, the potential for an abuse of discretion may have been greater than it would if the ruling was as here made.6 The trial court’s ruling did not exceed the bounds of reason. The court could reasonably conclude as it did. There was no abuse of discretion.
ISSUE IV — DIRECTED VERDICT ON INTENTIONAL INFLICTION OF EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
On September 2, 1974, the United States Geological Survey sent a form to appellees containing conditions necessary for approval of a well abandonment, should an abandonment become necessary.7 It required, among other things, the injection of concrete into the bottom of the hole sufficient to fill it above the Madison formation.
The well was plugged on September 25 and 26, 1974. One-hundred-fifty sacks of cement were injected into the Madison formation at the bottom of the hole. Normally, 75 sacks would be sufficient to fill the hole above the Madison formation. However, due to the cavernous nature of the formation at the well site, the 150 sacks of cement did not fill the hole above the Madison formation. “Heavy mud,” a commonly used plugging material, was used to finish plugging the Madison formation.
The reports made by appellee Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., to the government were inaccurate in reporting the well plug to have been made as required. However, attached to the first report was a well history which accurately set forth the method in which the well was plugged. On August 13, 1979, the government approved the abandonment of the well.
Appellants, including appellant Davis, and their agents were inaccurately told by employees of appellee Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., in 1982, 1983 and 1984 that the well was plugged according to the government directions. Appellants argue that such misrepresentations caused appellant Davis to suffer emotional distress and mental anguish. They argue that “because of the salt on the ranch and the failure of his crops,” Davis took many medications, had a portion of his stomach removed and became chronically depressed. This was the basis of appellants’ claim for relief for intentional infliction of emotional distress.
Appellants correctly note the standard upon which we review an appeal of a directed verdict, and they correctly note the fact that the tort of intentional *849infliction of emotional distress is recognized in Wyoming:
“In reviewing the district court’s decision to grant a directed verdict for appel-lee (defendant) at the close of appellant’s (plaintiff’s) case in chief, we will consider all of the evidence favorable to the party against whom the motion is directed (appellant) together with all reasonable and legitimate inferences which may be drawn therefrom. Carey v. Jackson, [603 P.2d 868 (Wyo.1979)]; Town of Jackson v. Shaw, Wyo., 569 P.2d 1246 (1977). When determining the question of sufficiency of the evidence on a motion for a directed verdict, we must, without weighing the credibility of the witnesses or otherwise considering the weight of the evidence, determine whether there can be but one conclusion as to the verdict that reasonable jurors could have reached. Carey v. Jackson, supra; Town of Jackson v. Shaw, supra; Barnes v. Fernandez, Wyo., 526 P.2d 983 (1974). Credibility of the witnesses and the weight given their testimony are for the jury to determine. Kahler v. Martin, Wyo., 570 P.2d 720 (1977); Cimoli v. Greyhound Corp., Wyo., 372 P.2d 170 (1962). Whether or not appellant’s evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to her, is sufficient to create an issue for the jury to consider is solely a question of law to be answered by the trial court. Town of Jackson v. Shaw, supra.”
Vassos v. Roussalis, 658 P.2d 1284, 1286-87 (Wyo.1983).
Appellants referred to Leithead v. American Colloid Co., 721 P.2d 1059 (Wyo.1986) to note that the tort of intentional infliction of emotional distress was a valid cause of action in Wyoming. In that case, we commented on and quoted in part as follows from Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 46 (1965):
“Outrageous Conduct Causing Severe Emotional Distress
“ ‘(1) One who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklessly causes severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress, and if bodily harm to the other results from it, for such bodily harm.’
“Outrageous conduct is defined in comment ‘d’ of the Restatement as conduct which goes beyond all possible bounds of decency, is regarded as atrocious, and is utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Severe emotional distress is defined in comment ‘j’ as distress which is so severe that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.
“ * * * Qomment ¾’ ⅛ § 4g 0f ⅛6 Restatement, Second, Torts, (1965) states:
“ ‘Court and jury. It is for the court to determine, in the first instance, whether the defendant’s conduct may reasonably be regarded as so extreme and outrageous as to permit recovery, or whether it is necessarily so. Where reasonable men may differ, it is for the jury, subject to the control of the court, to determine whether, in the particular case, the conduct has been sufficiently extreme and outrageous to result in liability.’
⅛ y y * ■ * *
“ * * * Comment ‘j’ of § 46 of the Restatement, Second, Torts states:
“ ‘Severe emotional distress. The rule stated in this Section applies only where the emotional distress has in fact resulted, and when it is severe.
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“ ‘It is for the court to determine whether on the evidence severe emotional distress can be found; it is for the jury to determine whether, on the evidence, it has in fact existed.’ ”
Leithead, 721 P.2d at 1065-67.
Without considering whether or not the necessary element of “outrageousness” for the tort claim is here present, conclusive in this instance that the directed verdict was proper is the lack of causation. The basic element for the tort is “causing” emotional distress. If appellees’ statements did not “cause” the distress, there could not be *850grounds upon which to found the tort claim.
The manner in which the well was actually plugged was known to appellant Davis and his attorney- since 1982 when they were supplied with a copy of the well history. As noted supra, appellants acknowledge in their argument that appellant Davis’ distress was “because of the salt on the ranch and the failure of his crops.” A reasonable jury could not conclude other than whatever emotional distress suffered by appellant Davis was caused by the condition of his lands and its effect on his crops and not by any statements, true or untrue, made to him concerning the well. The directed verdict on the issue was proper.
ISSUE V — DIRECTED VERDICT ON FRAUD
Appellants again refer to the inaccurate statements made in 1982, 1983 and 1984 by employees of appellee Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., to appellants and their agents that the well was plugged according to the government directions as the basis for their claim of fraud.
To constitute fraud, there must be a false or fraudulent statement or misrepresentation or concealment of a material fact, made by the defendant to induce action or inaction, which was reasonably and justifiably believed to be true by the plaintiff, and relied upon by the plaintiff to his damage. Johnson v. Soulis, 542 P.2d 867 (Wyo.1975) and Davis v. Schiess, 417 P.2d 19 (Wyo.1966).
The standard set forth supra upon which we review an appeal of a directed verdict is here applicable. A reasonable jury could not find all of the elements of fraud in this case.
The following reflect that appellants could not “reasonably and justifiably believe the statements were true,” and that appellants “relied upon” such statements. The manner in which the well was actually plugged was known to appellant Davis and his attorney since 1982 when they received a copy of the well history. Appellant Davis employed Geomax, a geological firm, to determine the cause of the groundwater. It reported in May of 1983 that the groundwater came from other than the well. At Davis’ request, the Bureau of Land Management investigated the condition of the Davis ranch. It concluded:
“Conclusions:
“Based on analyses within this report, the following conclusions regarding the Davis Ranch seepage problem are forwarded:
“1. The seepage problem on Mr. Davis’ property appears to be the result of a complex combination of two groundwater systems merging within the problem area. One system is comprised of waters associated with the Shell Creek floodplain and alluvium. The other system is associated with one or both of the following: 1) a discrete groundwater discharge point which is part of a larger geological system discernable throughout the area, or 2) subterranean movement down the Porter Gulch alluvium which is merging with and is being diluted by Shell Creek floodplain water.
“2. Chemical analyses of the problem-causing seeps and water within the Davis drain do not conform to expected Madison water characteristics in this area. The Madison should produce a very fresh calcium bicarbonate or calcium sulfate type water. Water observed within the Davis Ranch problem area is very saline sodium sulfate water. This water is more typical of discharges from shale areas which overlie most of the area north of the Davis Ranch.
“3. Based on conclusions 1 and 2, it is highly unlikely that the Davis problem is related to leakage from Consolidated Oil and Gas Well No. 2. The problem is more likely a manifestation of a long occurring natural groundwater discharge area.”
On May 25, 1982, in response to appellant Davis’ inquiry, the potential that the well plugs did not hold was made known to *851appellant Davis by Professor Heasler, Geology Department, University of Wyoming.
Not only did appellants not “reasonably and justifiably” believe the statements to be true, they “disbelieved” them. The investigative activities of appellants belie any reliance on the statements or the existence of any belief in their truth.
The directed verdict on this issue was proper.
Finding no error, we affirm as to all parties except appellee Consolidated Oil and Gas, Inc., action as to it being for the bankruptcy court and not for this court.
URBIGKIT, J., files a dissenting opinion.
. Appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. was a defendant in this matter during the proceedings in the district court, and it was made an appel-lee in this appeal which was filed February 17, 1989. On March 7, 1989, it filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy, thus staying this appeal insofar as it is concerned. Accordingly, that said and decided herein has no pertinency insofar as appellee Consolidated Oil & Gas, Inc. is concerned.
. The amendment also included expert witness Lindley, but he did not testify.
. The case against Harris was dismissed before trial.
. Halliburton settled out of the case.
. Vanderbilt Resources Corp. and Vanderbilt Energy Corp. merged in 1986.
. Adherence to a pretrial order is a matter within the discretion of the trial court. Oukrop v. Wasserburger, 755 P.2d 233 (Wyo.1988).
. Such is the usual procedure when a well is being drilled on land leased from the federal government.