concurring in part; dissenting in part.
The issue common to the three cases consolidated on appeal is whether each search warrant satisfies statutory or constitutional particularity requirements in its designation of the persons to be searched. There are essentially two questions in this inquiry: first, whether the warrant description is sufficient for the executing police officer to identify the persons whom the magistrate intended to be searched; and, second, whether there is probable cause to search the persons whom the magistrate described in the warrants.
*403In testing whether a warrant is sufficiently particular, the first issue is whether it is adequate from the standpoint of the officer executing it. In essence, the question is whether the warrant is a sufficient “road map” to direct the officer to the place or person that the magistrate intended to be searched. The road map is sufficient, at least in a constitutional sense, if the description is such that the officer can with reasonable effort ascertain the person or place to be searched. If the warrant is so ambiguous that the person to be searched cannot be identified with reasonable certainty, it may not be executed, and any evidence obtained will not be lawfully seized. State v. Blackburn/Barber, 266 Or 28, 511 P2d 381 (1973). That is so, even if the issuing magistrate found probable cause to search the person or place that was actually searched. The vice of a warrant that is not a good road map is the risk that the officer, in resolving the ambiguous directions, may invade privacy interests not intended by the magistrate to be invaded or not dictated by probable cause to be invaded.
The constitutional requirement of definiteness in a warrant’s description is the product of the historical fear of general warrants. See State v. Blackburn/Barber, supra. However, an adequate road map is only one method of quelling the fear of general warrants; the principal method is the requirement for an affidavit showing probable cause to believe that evidence will be found in the places described. The definiteness of the directions to the executing officer is only tangentially related to the magistrate’s job of issuing a constitutional warrant and the analysis is different.
For example, if a warrant commanded the search of all students present at South Salem High School on a certain day, the warrant is sufficiently particular. The officer would have directions to be able to locate the persons to be searched. The status of being a student and the presence at a designated place on a particular day become the descriptive facts that satisfy the requirements of particularity. The officer is not left to his own devices in finding the persons to be searched. There is probably no inherent defect in the warrant just because it describes a large class of persons.
If the warrant is a sufficient directive to the officer, it may nevertheless be defective because the magistrate has not followed statutory or constitutional directives. In the context *404of my example, the issue is whether there was probable cause to believe that a search of any student selected would disclose evidence of a crime described in the warrant application. In all probability, it would not be possible to establish that all students would be involved in the criminal activity being investigated and that every student searched would probably have evidence on his person. We could then say that, as a matter of law, the warrant is too broad or, in constitutional parlance, is not or cannot be made sufficiently particular.
Beyond the obvious cases, whether the warrant is too broad from the magistrate’s perspective depends on the facts presented in the application for the warrant. As the location and the population to be searched becomes more limited, the likelihood that every person present is a party to the offense and probably is secreting evidence becomes more plausible. It then becomes a matter of determining if the submission establishes probable cause to believe that the police will find evidence on the persons designated.
In short, a warrant commanding the search of all persons in a specific place is not lacking in particularity in the sense that the executing officer will be unable readily to determine to whom the warrant applies. Rather, the question is whether there is particularity in the probable cause sense; that is, whether the facts support a conclusion that it is probable that everyone in the described location at a particular time is involved in the criminal activity in such a way as to have evidence on his person.
Applying this analysis to a challenge of a warrant depends, in large measure, on the particulars of the challenge. If a defendant does not challenge the sufficiency of the affidavit to support the warrant, but only the facial particularity, we will be limited to deciding if the warrant is sufficient road map on its face, unless no factual predicate could be laid for the warrant, as a matter of law.
In each of the cases on review, the defendant, in addition to the constitutional challenge, has argued that the warrant does not comply with ORS 133.565:
“(2) The warrant shall state, or describe with particularity:
<<* * * * *
*405“(b) The name of the person to be searched, or the location and designation of the premises or places to be searched.”
I agree with the majority that the statute defines the authority of an officer to search and implements a constitutional right and, thus, that a statutory violation requires suppression of the evidence. I also agree with the constitutional analysis that a warrant directing the search of an unnamed person or a class of persons is not defective on its face. However, I do not agree that the state and federal constitutional requirements of particularity are identical to those expressed in ORS 133.565.
However flexible the state and federal constitutions may be in terms of probable cause and particularity, the statute need not be, and is not, as flexible. We cannot, on the one hand, hold that the statute guarantees a constitutional right and, on the other hand, ignore the statute’s words. Although there is some room for doubt as to what the legislature meant, there is scant room for creative construction of the requirement that the warrant “shall state, or describe with particularity: * * * the name of the person to be searched.” Those words are more precise and limiting than the comparable phrases of Article I, section 9, and the Fourth Amendment. I interpret the statute to require that the name of the individual be included or that the individual be described with sufficient particularity that the executing officer can locate that individual. Unlike the constitution, the statute requires that the warrant relate to a particular individual. It does not allow a description, however precise, that is of a class of individuals only determinable by facts which exist at the time the warrant is executed. For example, a warrant ordering the search of all persons present in the described residence would be constitutionally sufficient but would not meet the statutory requirement, because no particular person is named or described.
It could be that there is implicit in ORS 133.565(2) a limitation that a warrant to search persons cannot be issued unless the magistrate can describe a particular individual that there is probable cause to believe will have evidence on his person. That effectively prevents issuance of warrants to search unknown persons. I can agree with the implicit conclusion of the majority that reading the statute as I do would unnecessarily limit otherwise constitutional searches. In many instances, there is probable cause to believe that a group *406or class of persons are secreting evidence on their persons, but whose identity is unknown when the warrant is issued. The legislature is free to limit warrants more narrowly than the state or federal constitutions do.
I will now apply the above principles to each of the consolidated cases to illustrate their operation.
In State v. Ingram, the warrant commanded a search of a described residence and
“[a]ll individuals and occupants found to be frequenting said premises and all vehicles determined to be associated with the occupants of said premises.”
Defendant argues that the search of his person exceeded the scope of the warrant, because he was not a person or occupant who was frequenting the premises. The trial court found that there was no basis for the officer to believe that defendant was a person frequenting the place, but that the officer reasonably believed that defendant was an occupant of the premises. The majority concludes that defendant was properly searched, because he could have been-charged with frequenting a place where drugs are used in violation of ORS 167.222(1). Consequently, he fitted the description in the warrant. Both interpretations of the warrant’s descriptions are reasonable, and the facts known to the officer at the time of the search supported a search of defendant as a person described.
Defendant’s next challenge to the warrant appears to be twofold: first, because he was not named in the warrant it violated ORS 133.565(2)(b); and, second, aside from the statute, there was not specificity sufficient to satisfy the particularity requirement of the state or federal constitutions. The warrant was sufficient to satisfy the constitutions. It was a specific road map for the officer, and the affidavit established probable cause to believe that all occupants or persons frequenting the premises would be involved in the extensive narcotics trade being conducted there. However, the warrant does not comply with the statute. It does not name defendant or even purport to describe a particular individual person to be searched. In that light, the warrant was invalid, insofar as it commanded the search of persons or occupants.
The narcotics that were the basis of the charge were *407seized from defendant’s pickup that was parked near the residence. The drugs found on his person were not offered as evidence. The trial court found:
“The executing officers could not reasonably have concluded that defendant’s vehicle was associated with the defendant if they had not first conducted the search of the defendant and discovered the key to the vehicle, which led to their inquiry whether the key was to defendant’s vehicle and their assertion of authority to search vehicles.”
Defendant does not make any argument about the search of his vehicle and does not explicitly contend that an unlawful search of his person makes the search of his pickup unlawful. In the light of the trial court’s analysis, and viewing defendant’s brief charitably, a possible argument is that the police exploited the illegally obtained information — defendant’s vehicle keys and his statement — to search the pickup, and so the drugs found should be suppressed. The warrant gave authority for the officer to search the vehicle independently of the authority to search persons. However, in order to determine if the vehicle was described in the warrant, the officer had to determine that it was associated with an occupant of the premises. As the trial court found, that information was obtained from the search of defendant. The trial court concluded that that search of defendant was lawful and, consequently, that the evidence from the pickup was legally seized.
We are not assisted by the state’s brief because it does not mention the search of the vehicle or discuss a basis for upholding that search if the search of defendant is deemed unlawful. For example, the state does not argue that the search of defendant was authorized as incident to his arrest or on some basis apart from the warrant. I would conclude that the search of defendant’s vehicle was unlawful and that the court erred by denying the motion to suppress.
In State v. Devereaux, the warrant commanded the officers to search a particularly described residence and “its occupants.” The trial court allowed defendant’s motion to suppress, on the ground, inter alia, that defendant, who was searched, was not named in the warrant as required by ORS 133.565(2)(b). The majority concludes that the warrant is deficient, because “ ‘[ojccupants’ is not a particular description of defendant, in the light of the fact that he was named in *408the affidavit and, as a result, the warrant violates ORS 133.565(2)(b) and Article I, section 9.” 104 Or App at 401. The essence of that conclusion is that the warrant must be as descriptive as is made possible by the information available to the magistrate. If the name of the person is known, it must be included. Conversely, if the name is not known or if a particular individual is not contemplated, then the statute allows a less particular description or a description of unknown persons. As I have indicated, I do not agree with that interpretation. The search of defendant’s person pursuant to the warrant was unlawful, because the warrant did not purport to describe a particular person. I agree, for that reason, that the evidence seized from his person was properly suppressed. I also agree that the trial court erred by suppressing evidence seized from the residence. The parts of the warrant are separable, and the fact that the command to search the person is defective does not invalidate the other commands of the warrant.
In State v. Gardner, the warrant directed the officers to search defendant’s residence and “all persons found on the premises.” It suffers from the same statutory vice as the warrants in Ingram and Devereaux: It does not relate to a particular person, as ORS 133.565(2)(b) requires. The majority is correct that, if the evidence that the state offered was obtained from the residence and not from defendant’s person, then the conviction should be affirmed. On the other hand, any evidence obtained by a search of defendant’s person pursuant to the warrant would have to be suppressed, because the warrant is unlawful under ORS 133.565(2)(b).
Joseph, Chief Judge, and Buttler and Newman, JJ., join in this opinion.