dissenting. With due deference to the opinion of the majority under the record as I view it, I am compelled to dissent. Under the trust agreement set up inter vivos by Mr. Orkin, the designated trustees were authorized in the event of Mr. Orkin’s incapacity for any reason “to pay and/or use so much of the net income as they deem necessary for his care, support, comfort and welfare” with the right to encroach upon the corpus of the trust “in such amounts and at such times as they deem proper for donor’s care, support, comfort and welfare.” It is well settled that where the instrument creating the trust confers upon the trustees a broad discretionary power to be exercised according to their judgment, a court of equity will not interfere to control the trustees acting bona fide in the reasonable exercise of their discretion. Semmes v. Mayor &c. of Columbus, 19 Ga. 471, 489; Turner v. Trust Co. of Ga., 214 Ga. 339 (105 SE2d 22). The evidence in the record does not authorize a finding that the trustees’ acts in administering the trust were in bad faith.
I am of the further opinion that the trust fund can not be used to pay counsel for Mrs. Orkin in representing her in criminal cases growing out of her acts as guardian for her husband, nor is the trust fund liable for the expenses of bringing the present action. Neither of these acts of her counsel sought for its purpose to preserve or conserve the trust estate. The case of Ewing v. First Nat. Bank of Atlanta, 209 Ga. 932 (76 SE2d 791) does not support the appellees’ claim. In that case the beneficiary of the trust estate was contesting an effort on the part of the trustees and others to violate the terms of the testator’s will. It was -held that the beneficiary’s efforts being to protect, conserve and preserve the trust estate, she was entitled to be heard on her claim for counsel fees.
Chief Justice Duckworth and Justice Grice concur in this dissent.