dissenting: I respectfully dissent from the majority’s determination that an extension of time for the period to obtain service of process under K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-206(b)(2) must be sought and granted prior to the expiration of the original 90-day period provided by K.S.A. 60-203(a). The majority fails to consider the whole statute and the words and phrases of K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-206(b)(2), and its opinion renders the clear language of that section of the statute meaningless.
K.S.A. 60-203(a) provides:
“A civil action is commenced at the time of: (1) filing a petition with the clerk of the court, if service of process is obtained or the first publication is made for service by publication within 90 days after the petition is filed, except that the court may extend that time an additional 30 days upon a showing of good cause by the plaintiff; or (2) service of process or first publication, if service of process or first publication is not made within the time specified by provision (1).”
The maximum time , to obtain service under 60-203 is 120 days.
K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-206(b) states:
“Enlargement. When by this chapter or by a notice given thereunder or by order of court an act is required or allowed to be done at or within a specified time, the judge for cause shown may at any time in the judge’s discretion (1) with or without motion or notice order the period enlarged *565if request therefor is made before the expiration of the period originally prescribed or as extended by a previous order or (2) upon motion made after the expiration of the specified period permit the act to he done where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time for taking any action under subsection (c) of K.S.A. 60-250, subsection (b) of K.S.A. 60-252, subsections (b), (e) and (f) of K.S.A. 60-259 and subsection (b) of K.S.A. 60-260, and amendments thereto, except to the extent and under the conditions stated in them.” (Emphasis added.)
K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-206(b) expressly provides that the court, in its discretion, may order an extension even after the expiration of a specified time period, but only for “cause shown” and if the failure to act in a timely fashion was the result of excusable neglect. Excusable neglect requires a demonstration of good faith on the part of the parties seeking an enlargement and some reasonable basis for noncompliance within the time specified in the statute. There are specific statutory prohibitions against the granting of an enlargement of time under 60-206(b). The listed exceptions to enlargement are: K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-250 (motion for directed verdicts); K.S.A. 60-252(b) (motion to amend findings); K.S.A. 60-259(b), (d), and (e) (motion for a new trial, affidavit supporting or opposing motion for a new trial, new trial on the court’s own initiative); and K.S.A. 60-260(b) (motion for relief from judgment). K.S.A. 60-203 is not included as one of the specific prohibitions against an enlargement of time.
I agree with the majority that under K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-206(b)(1) the court may enlarge the time set out in K.S.A. 60-203 if the request is made prior to the expiration of the period prescribed in 60-203. But I cannot agree with the majority’s interpretation of K.S.A. 1989 Supp. 60-206(b)(2). That section of the statute clearly provides for an enlargement of time by motion made after expiration of the specific period where the failure to act was the result of excusable neglect. Request for extension under 60-206(b)(2) can be obtained after the expiration of the 90-day limitation of 60-203(a) but not after that statute’s 120-day maximum period for extension of the limitation has expired.
The majority’s decision renders K.S.A. 60-206(b)(2) meaningless and mere surplusage.
Allegrucci, J., joins in the foregoing dissenting opinion.