(Concurring in Result ONLY in a Separate Opinion):
I concur in result ONLY. I disagree with the reasoning and analysis of the majority.
Williamsburg Rural Water and Sewer Company, Inc. (Williamsburg Water) commenced this action against Williamsburg County, Williamsburg County Water and Sewer Authority, and the Town of Kingstree (collectively, the County),1 seeking: (1) a determination of Williamsburg Water’s right to provide water and sewer service within designated unincorporated areas in Williamsburg County; (2) damages in tort based on the County’s actions; and (3) injunctive relief. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the County finding that Williamsburg Water did not have the exclusive right to provide service to the designated areas, and that Williamsburg Water’s cause of action in tort was barred by the South Carolina Tort Claims Act and the statute of limitations. Williamsburg Water appeals.
FACTS/PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
The facts of the case are largely undisputed and are gathered from a timeline of events to which the parties stipulated. On January 16,1995, W.N. Kellahan, an organizer of Williams-burg Water, sent a letter to Elwood Gerald, the County’s *268director of rural and community development, notifying the County of Williamsburg Water’s intention to provide service to certain unincorporated areas of Williamsburg County pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 33-35-90 (1990).2 Section 33-35-90 articulates a statutory mechanism for a non-profit corporation to furnish water and sewer services within the geographical areas designated in its articles of incorporation, subject to certain conditions relating to notice and consent.
In March and again in April of 1995, Kellahan appeared before the Williamsburg County Council on behalf of Williams-burg Water to reiterate Williamsburg Water’s intent to provide services to the designated areas. Kellahan sent a copy of Williamsburg Water’s master plan to the council and to Gerald. In May of 1995, Williamsburg Water filed its articles of incorporation with .the Secretary of State. Shortly thereafter, Williamsburg Water initiated applications for loans and federal grants to fund its operation.
During this same time period, the county council began considering enacting an ordinance that would allow the County to expand its own water and sewer system to the same unincorporated areas that Williamsburg Water intended to service. The proposed ordinance allowed the County to grant franchises to organizations that submitted applications to the County seeking permission to provide service to unincorporated areas within the County.
On August 7, 1995, the County adopted the proposed franchise ordinance. In May of 1998, the County applied for federal funding to construct a rural water system. On November 3, 1998, the County opened bids for water and sewer services to the Industrial Park located within the same service area designated in Williamsburg Water’s articles of incorporation. The County awarded the bid to Tom Brigman Contractors, Inc., of Newberry, South Carolina, on November 9, 1998.
In response, Williamsburg Water filed an action against the County on December 4, 1998, claiming that Williamsburg Water had the exclusive right to provide services to the specified unincorporated areas of Williamsburg County, in-*269eluding the area where the Industrial Park was located. Williamsburg Water further averred the County intentionally interfered with and/or threatened to interfere with Williams-burg Water’s ability to obtain federal funding and to provide service within the designated areas. The complaint alleged that as a result of the County’s grossly negligent actions, Williamsburg Water suffered injury and damages. Finally, Williamsburg Water sought a declaration that it was a bona fide water system and, therefore, exempt from the County’s franchise ordinance and that it had an exclusive right to service the unincorporated areas of the County.
Williamsburg Water and the County filed cross motions for summary judgment. The circuit court granted summary judgment to the County on Williamsburg Water’s first cause of action, ruling that Williamsburg Water did not have the exclusive right to provide water and sewer service to the designated areas. The court granted summary judgment to the County on Williamsburg Water’s tort cause of action, finding the County was immune from liability under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act and that the statute of limitations had run. However, the circuit court found there was a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Williamsburg Water was a bona fide water system exempt from the County’s franchise ordinance.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
“Summary judgment is appropriate only when ‘the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.’ ” Trivelas v. South Carolina Dep’t of Transp., 348 S.C. 125, 130, 558 S.E.2d 271, 273 (Ct.App.2001) (quoting Rule 56(c), SCRCP); see also Sauner v. Public Serv. Auth., 354 S.C. 397, 581 S.E.2d 161 (2003) (summary judgment is appropriate when there is no genuine issue of material fact such that the moving party must prevail as a matter of law). Summary judgment is hot appropriate where further inquiry into the facts of the case is desirable to clarify the application of the law. Lanham v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 349 S.C. 356, 563 S.E.2d 331 (2002); Hall v. Fedor, 349 S.C. 169, 561 S.E.2d 654 (Ct.App.2002). In *270determining whether any triable issues of fact exist for summary judgment purposes, the evidence and all inferences which can be reasonably drawn from the evidence must be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Cunningham v. Helping Hands, Inc., 352 S.C. 485, 575 S.E.2d 549 (2003); Glasscock, Inc. v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 348 S.C. 76, 557 S.E.2d 689 (Ct.App.2001).
Under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, the party seeking summary judgment has the initial burden of demonstrating the absence of a genuine issue of material fact. Regions Bank v. Schmauch, 354 S.C. 648, 582 S.E.2d 432 (Ct.App.2003); Carolina Alliance for Fair Employment v. South Carolina Dep’t of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation, 337 S.C. 476, 523 S.E.2d 795 (Ct.App.1999). Once the party moving for summary judgment meets the initial burden of showing an absence of evidentiary support for the opponent’s case, the opponent cannot simply rest on mere allegations or denials contained in the pleadings. Baughman v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 306 S.C. 101, 410 S.E.2d 537 (1991); Peterson v. West American Ins. Co., 336 S.C. 89, 518 S.E.2d 608 (Ct.App.1999). Rather, the nonmoving party must come forward with specific facts showing there is a genuine issue for trial. SSI Med. Servs., Inc. v. Cox, 301 S.C. 493, 392 S.E.2d 789 (1990); Boone v. Sunbelt Newspapers, Inc., 347 S.C. 571, 556 S.E.2d 732 (Ct.App.2001).
When reviewing the grant of a summary judgment motion, the appellate court applies the same standard which governs the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP: summary judgment is proper when there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fleming v. Rose, 350 S.C. 488, 567 S.E.2d 857 (2002); Redwend Ltd. P’ship v. Edwards, 354 S.C. 459, 581 S.E.2d 496 (Ct.App.2003). On appeal from an order granting summary judgment, this court will review all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising in and from the evidence in a light most favorable to the nonmoving party below. Osborne v. Adams, 346 S.C. 4, 550 S.E.2d 319 (2001); see also Young v. South Carolina Dep’t of Corrections, 333 S.C. 714, 511 S.E.2d 413 (Ct.App.1999) (all ambiguities, conclusions, and inferences arising from the evidence must be construed most strongly against the moving party). The judgment may be affirmed *271only if there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Estate of Cantrell v. Green, 302 S.C. 557, 397 S.E.2d 777 (Ct.App.1990).
LAW/ANALYSIS
I. MANDATED NOTICE UNDER § 33-35-90
South Carolina Code §. 33-35-90 (1990) states in pertinent part:
[Pjrior to providing any of the services authorized in this section, nonprofit corporations or groups intending to organize such corporations shall first notify the governing body, of the county or municipality in which the services are to be provided, of their intentions and the nature of such services. The governing body shall, from the date of such notification, have a period of ninety days in which to approve the request to provide such services or inform the persons requesting permission to provide such services that the governing body intends to provide for such matters as a public function of government. Any such notification of intent by the governing body shall include a detailed description of the area to be served, the services to be provided and the time schedule under which such services will be available from the county or municipality.
S.C.Code Ann. § 33-35-90 (1990). In his order, the circuit judge found:
[Williamsburg Water] specifically gave notice, as required by § 33-35-90 of the S.C.Code Ann., 1976, as amended, that it desired to provide water service in its designated area to the Williamsburg County Council on January 16, 1995, and again on March 6, 1995, of its intention to provide such service.
... I further find that the notices to Williamsburg County provided on January 16, 1995, and again on March 6, 1995, were both proper and adequate to comply with Section 33-35-90 of the Code of Laws of South Carolina, 1976, as amended.
*272The County did not appeal the finding by the circuit judge that the notice given by Williamsburg Water under § 33-35-90 was adequate and proper. An unappealed ruling is the law of the case. Bakala v. Bakala, 352 S.C. 612, 576 S.E.2d 156 (2003); Charleston Lumber Co. v. Miller Housing Corp., 338 S.C. 171, 525 S.E.2d 869 (2000); ML-Lee Acquisition Fund, L.P. v. Deloitte & Touche, 327 S.C. 238, 489 S.E.2d 470 (1997); Sandy Springs Water Co. v. Department of Health and Envtl. Control, 324 S.C. 177, 478 S.E.2d 60 (1996); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Eagle Lake & Golf Condos, 310 S.C. 473, 427 S.E.2d 646 (1993); Larimore v. Carolina Power & Light, 340 S.C. 438, 531 S.E.2d 535 (Ct.App.2000); see also Brading v. County of Georgetown, 327 S.C. 107, 490 S.E.2d 4 (1997) (clarifying that where decision is based on more than one ground, appellate court will affirm unless the appellant appeals all grounds because the unappealed ground will become the law of the case); In re Morrison, 321 S.C. 370, 468 S.E.2d 651 (1996) (recognizing court’s ruling is the law of the case where it is not contested on appeal); Buckner v. Preferred Mut. Ins. Co., 255 S.C. 159, 161, 177 S.E.2d 544, 544 (1970) (stating an unchallenged ruling, “right or wrong, is the law of the case and requires affirmance”); Priester v. Brabham, 230 S.C. 201, 95 S.E.2d 167 (1956) (holding that, because there was no exception to the ruling of the court below, that ruling, right or wrong, was the law of the case); Unisun Ins. v. Hawkins, 342 S.C. 537, 537 S.E.2d 559 (Ct.App.2000) (noting an unappealed ruling is the law of the case which the appellate court must assume was correct); Hall v. Clarendon Outdoor Adver., Inc., 311 S.C. 185, 428 S.E.2d 1 (Ct.App.1993) (emphasizing that failure to argue against basis for trial court’s ruling renders it the law of the case). Concomitantly, the ruling by the circuit judge is the law of the case.
II. EXCLUSIVITY
Williamsburg Water argues the trial court erred in failing to find that it had the exclusive right to provide service within the areas listed in its articles of incorporation. I disagree.
There is nothing in § 33-35-90 that gives exclusivity to the “nonprofit corporations or groups intending to organize such corporations.” See S.C.Code Ann. § 33-35-90 (1990). Moreover, § 33-35-90 contains language which indicates that its *273service would NOT be exclusive. Section 33-35-90 states in relevant part:
[S]uch corporations are specifically authorized to borrow funds and contract with municipalities, counties and other political subdivisions for the provision of such services in accordance with this chapter and the Rural Development Act of 1972, and counties, municipalities and other political subdivisions are authorized to so contract with such nonprofit corporations.
Section 33-35-90 does not confer upon Williamsburg Water any specific right, nor does it impose upon the County a duty owed Williamsburg Water in this case.
Furthermore, section 33-35-170 limits the application of § 33-35-90. See S.C.Code Ann. § 33-35-170 (1990).3 Pursuant to § 33-35-170, “[t]he powers and authorities conferred by this chapter shall be in addition to and supplemental to any other general, special or local law. This chapter is complete in itself and shall not repeal by implication or otherwise any other general, special or local law.” This section does not grant any special powers by the provisions of this chapter or § 33-35-90. It makes these provisions supplemental to and does not repeal any other general, special or local law.
The provisions of the South Carolina Constitution place restrictions on what the General Assembly may do through statutes. See Knight v. Salisbury, 262 S.C. 565, 206 S.E.2d 875 (1974). Article VIII, Section 15 of the South Carolina Constitution provides:
No law shall be passed by the General Assembly granting the right to construct and operate in a public street or on public property a street or other railway, telegraph, telephone or electric plant, or to erect water, sewer or gas works for public use, or to lay mains for any purpose, or to use the streets for any other such facility, without first obtaining the consent of the governing body of the municipality in control of the streets or public places proposed to be occupied for any such or like purpose; nor shall any law be passed by the General Assembly granting the right to construct and operate in a public street or on public property a street or other railway, or to erect waterworks *274for public use, or to lay water or sewer mains for any purpose, or to use the streets for any facility other than telephone, telegraph, gas and electric, without ñrst obtaining the consent of the governing body of the county or the consolidated political subdivision in control of the streets or public places proposed to be occupied for any such or like purpose.
S.C. Const, art. VIII, § 15 (emphasis added). Article VIII, Section 16 reads: “Any incorporated municipality may, upon a majority vote of the electors of such political subdivision who shall vote on the question, acquire by initial construction or purchase and may operate gas, water, sewer, electric, transportation or other public utility systems and plants.” S.C. Const, art. VIII, § 16.
Article VIII, § 15 prohibits the legislature from passing any law granting a right to construct or operate a water or sewer system without the consent of the county’s governing body. City of Aiken v. Aiken Elec. Coop., Inc., 305 S.C. 466, 409 S.E.2d 403 (1991). No statute passed by the legislature can limit or undermine the constitutional requirement of the county’s consent. See Blue Ridge Elec. Coop., Inc. v. City of Seneca, 297 S.C. 283, 376 S.E.2d 514 (1989).
Article VIII, section 15 requires consent of the county at the time a water or sewer system is first constructed or when it is expanded. See City of Cayce v. AT & T Communications, 326 S.C. 237, 486 S.E.2d 92 (1997); City of Abbeville v. Aiken Elec. Coop., Inc., 287 S.C. 361, 338 S.E.2d 831 (1985). The consent requirement of Article VIII, section 15 permits counties to impose conditions on the grant of their consent to allow utilities to build and operate water and electric systems. City of Cayce, 326 S.C. at 241-42, 486 S.E.2d at 94. Counties have the right to grant public utility franchises and to determine who may or may not serve county residents. South Carolina Elec. & Gas Co. v. Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 306 S.C. 228, 411 S.E.2d 218 (1991); City of Cayce, 326 S.C. at 241-42, 486 S.E.2d at 94. The County’s constitutional authority includes the power to grant or deny franchises, as well as the power to deny expansion of existing franchisees or utility providers. City of Aiken, 305 S.C. at 468, 409 S.E.2d at 404.
*275In Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc. v. South Carolina Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 304 S.C. 15, 402 S.E.2d 674 (1991), our Supreme Court explained:
We reject Co-op’s claim that, while a municipality may, itself, provide electric service within corporate limits, it may not designate a supplier through a franchise agreement. Our holdings in City of Abbeville v. Aiken Elec. Co-op., Inc. and Blue Ridge Elec. Co-op v. City of Seneca are dispositive of this issue.
In Abbeville, we rejected a municipality’s claim that it had the right to oust an existing electric supplier upon annexation. We stated:
[A] franchisee possessing a valid PSC territorial assignment to serve an area which is subsequently annexed:
1. Is permitted to continue service in that area to those premises being served at the time of annexation;
2. Is prohibited, without prior consent of the municipality, from extending or expanding service in that area by the use of any streets, alleys, public property or ways after the date of annexation.
287 S.C. at 370-371, 338 S.E.2d at 836.
In Blue Ridge, we addressed an assigned supplier’s challenge to a municipal utility which provided electricity in a newly annexed area. There, we held that “a municipality may either consent to expanded service by the assigned supplier or itself serve new premises and customers within the assigned, annexed area.” 297 S.C. at 289, 376 S.E.2d at 517.
The basic premise upon which Abbeville and Blue Ridge rest is a municipality’s right of consent under S.C. Const. Art. VIII, § 15. In Blue Ridge, we declined to interpret the Territorial Assignments Act, as amended by Act 431 of 1984, in a way violative of this right. We stated:
Absent the option of municipal service to new premises and customers in assigned, annexed areas, the assigned supplier would possess, for all practical purposes, an exclusive territorial service right. Municipalities could not realistically deny consent to expanded service by these assigned suppliers; denying consent would be tan*276tamount to denying property owners in the annexed area any electric service at all.
297 S.C. at 289, 876 S.E.2d at 517-518.
Here, Co-op’s contention that a municipally-franchised utility should be distinguished from a municipally-owned utility effectually denies Summerville’s right of consent, leaving Summerville with the sole alternative of permitting Co-op to provide the service. This would clearly violate Abbeville and Blue Ridge, supra.
Summerville has granted SCE & G its consent to serve the annexed area by virtue of the franchise agreement. Accordingly, Circuit Court correctly held that SCE & G may continue providing electric service to Hardee’s.
Berkeley Elec. Coop., Inc., 304 S.C. at 18-20, 402 S.E.2d at 676-77 (footnotes and emphasis omitted).
The Court addressed the efficacy of Article VIII, section 15 of the South Carolina Constitution in City of Aiken v. Aiken Elec. Coop., Inc., 305 S.C. 466, 409 S.E.2d 403 (1991):
Article VIII, Section 15, of the South Carolina Constitution prohibits the General Assembly from enacting laws which grant the right to construct or operate upon the streets or property of a municipality without first obtaining the consent of such municipality.
This Court has affirmed the right of municipalities to authorize expansion of existing service or to provide alternative service. See Berkeley Elec. Co-Op v. S.C. Public Service Comm’n, [304 S.C. 15,] 402 S.E.2d 674 (S.C.Sup.Ct. 1991) (citing Blue Ridge Elec. Co-Op v. City of Seneca, 297 S.C. 283, 376 S.E.2d 514 (1989)); City of Abbeville v. Aiken Elec. Co-Op, 287 S.C. 361, 338 S.E.2d 831 (1985). When service to a new area is not provided by the municipality, the municipally assigned supplier possesses exclusive rights. Our holding in Berkeley makes no distinction between a municipally owned supplier and a municipally franchised supplier. Hence, service by a franchised supplier is considered municipal service.
We find that the City was within its constitutional authority to designate an electric service supplier for new custom*277ers in the annexed area and to enact ordinances affecting other suppliers of electricity. S.C. Const. Art. VIII, § 15.
City of Aiken, 305 S.C. at 468, 409 S.E.2d at 404.
Article VIII, section 15 was further discussed in City of Rock Hill v. Public Serv. Comm’n, 308 S.C. 175, 417 S.E.2d 562 (1992):
Article VIII, § 15 of the South Carolina Constitution provides:
No law shall be passed by the General Assembly granting the right to construct and operate in a public street or on public property a street or other railway, telegraph, telephone or electric plant, or to erect water, sewer or gas works for public use, or to lay mains for any purpose, or to use the streets for any other such facility, without first obtaining the consent of the governing body of the municipality in control of the streets or public places proposed to be occupied for any such or like purpose.
We have interpreted this provision in several cases. In City of Abbeville v. Aiken Elec. Co-op., Inc., 287 S.C. 361, 338 S.E.2d 831 (1985), we held that a municipality did not have the right to oust an existing electric supplier when the assigned area was subsequently annexed. However, we also determined that expansion by the use of any city street or public property by the supplier within the annexed area without the municipality’s consent was prohibited. Id. In Blue Ridge Electric v. City of Seneca, 297 S.C. 283, 376 S.E.2d 514 (1989), the issue presented was whether a municipality could service new customers in an area assigned to another electrical supplier once the area was annexed into the city. We held that denying the municipalities the right to serve in the annexed areas would be tantamount to leaving the assigned supplier with an exclusive territorial right since the municipality would be faced with the choice of denying the property owners power or consenting to the assigned supplier’s use of the streets and public ways for expansion of their service. As this would create an irreconcilable conflict between the Act 431 and municipality’s rights under Article VIII § 15, we determined a municipality could not be enjoined from serving new customers within the annexed property.
*278In subsequent cases, this Court held the city’s right to consent included the power to designate another supplier other than the municipal utility or the assigned supplier. Berkeley Electric Co-op. v. South Carolina Public Service Commission, 804 S.C. 15, 402 S.E.2d 674 (1991); City of Aiken v. Aiken Elec. Co-op., 305 S.C. 466, 409 S.E.2d 403 (1991); South Carolina Electric & Gas v. Berkeley Electric Cooperative, Inc., 306 S.C. 228, 411 S.E.2d 218 (1991). In these cases, we have implicitly acknowledged that without the ability to provide service or authorize another utility to provide service, the constitutional right to grant or withhold consent would be meaningless.
City of Rock Hill, 308 S.C. at 177-78, 417 S.E.2d at 563-64.
Section 4-9-30(11) of the South Carolina Code authorizes counties “to grant franchises and make charges in areas outside the corporate limits of municipalities within the county in the manner provided by law for municipalities and subject to the same limitations, to provide for the orderly control of services and utilities affected with the public interest.” S.C.Code Ann. § 4-9-30(11) (Supp.2002). The Williamsburg County Council passed a franchise ordinance regulating the water franchises to 'various entities in Williamsburg County which became effective on August 7,1995. In Glendale Water Corp. v. City of Florence, 274 S.C. 472, 265 S.E.2d 41 (1980), our Supreme Court approved of cities extending their water lines if they had a valid franchise from the County.
The issue of exclusivity of a franchise is vested in the governmental entity pursuant to Article VIII, sections 15 and 16 of the South Carolina Constitution. The General Assembly may enact legislation placing responsibility upon a governmental entity to act upon a request by a non-governmental entity to provide water and sewer services by denying or granting such a request under certain conditions and time parameters. Section 33-35-90 is the paradigm of a legislative act involving procedural responses mandated by a governmental entity to either provide water and sewer services or to allow a nongovernmental entity to engage in these activities. This section was efficacious at the time of the filing of the application by Williamsburg Water. Because the County is bound by the “law of the case” doctrine in regard to the issue of consent, my analysis is limited to the facts of this case.
*279 CONCLUSION
I find that the issue of governmental consent by the County is controlled by the ruling of the circuit judge. His conclusion that Williamsburg Water gave proper and adequate notice under § 33-35-90 became the law of the case.
Based on the constitutional provisions and the evolving precedent extant in this field, I hold that Williamsburg Water is entitled to a non-exclusive right to provide water and sewer service to the areas designated in its proposal made pursuant to S.C.Code Ann. § 33-35-90. I rule the County has a non-exclusive right to provide water and sewer service in the areas designated in the proposal.
Accordingly, I VOTE to AFFIRM the order of the circuit court.
. Williamsburg Water named the Town of Hemingway and Barrineau Water Company, Inc. as defendants in the case, but these defendants were later dismissed as parties.
. In October of 2000, § 33-35-90 was repealed and replaced with § 33-36-270.
. In October of 2000, § 33-35-170 was repealed.