dissenting.
I respectfully dissent.
The district court should have held an evidentiary hearing to determine if the parties entered into an enforceable settlement agreement. Failure to do so was an abuse of discretion.
The majority opinion ignores our Circuit’s rule that “an evidentiary hearing should be held when there is a substantial factual dispute over the existence or terms of a settlement.” Stewart v. M.D.F., Inc., 83 F.3d 247, 251 (8th Cir.1996); Sheng v. Starkey Laboratories, Inc., 53 F.3d 192, 194 (8th Cir.1995) (“As a general rule, when the parties dispute the existence or terms of a settlement agreement, the parties must be allowed an evidentiary hearing.”) (emphasis added). This is exactly the case here.
The majority claims that there was no substantial factual dispute sufficient to warrant a hearing. I disagree. The majority’s contention is belied by the record. The affidavits and briefs, submitted to the district court in response to Franchisees’ motion to enforce the settlement, clearly established that during the settlement negotiations certain terms were discussed— terms which the Franchisors claim Franchisees’ counsel agreed to. While they *564were not the “salient” terms entered on the record on February 22, 2007, there was a substantial dispute over whether those terms were “material” to the parties’ agreement. In short, there was a clear disagreement as to the essential issue of whether there was a meeting of the minds, in the sense that the parties had reached a complete agreement.
The district court therefore abused its discretion in enforcing the settlement agreement when there was a substantial factual dispute over the terms of the agreement. I would reverse and remand with instructions that the district court hold an evidentiary hearing.9
. The majority has refused to consider the Franchisors’ supplemental appendix. The material therein discloses that the Franchisors' claim of no complete agreement is supported by statements in a proposed agreement submitted by Franchisees' original counsel. This information should have been disclosed by plaintiffs’ counsel in response to the order to show cause issued by District Judge Richard E. Dorr.
Judge Dorr is an able and careful judge. If the information disclosed to this court in the supplemental appendix had been submitted to the district court, its ruling may well have been different. I believe on remand that important information should be brought before Judge Dorr in appropriate proceedings.