(concurring in part, dissenting in part). I concur with the majority that the trial court properly dismissed the contract count. However, I dissent from the majority’s conclusion that the following remarks by Dr. Griz’s counsel were not so prejucicial as to deprive plaintiff of a fair trial:
"First of all we started out as a professional malpractice case and it has turned into a conspiracy to commit murder and cover it up.
"Now, if you believe what Mr. Lopatin has told you, you’d better not only bring in a verdict for the plaintiff, but you’d better convict him of murder.
"Because of the negligence in the care for this patient, and ignored him, in getting some kind of a ring, that was his word. Dr. Quiloz a member of the ring, along with Dr. Griz, and if they covered up this man’s death, they are guilty of the worst kind of felony.
"Dr. Griz should not be allowed to practice medicine, in fact, he ought to be in Jackson Prison. Now, that’s what you have to believe if you take plaintiff’s story, and the way it has been presented to you.
* * *
"All right, Dr. Griz stands before you accused of the worst that I told you, what the felon is I don’t know * * * ’9
Defendants attempt to justify these improper remarks by calling them a reply to argument *150made by plaintiff’s counsel.1 Mason v Lovins, 24 Mich App 101, 116-117; 180 NW2d 73 (1970), Agee v Williams, 17 Mich App 417, 424; 169 NW2d 676 (1969). However, in his first argument plaintiff’s counsel merely argued from the evidence that the defendants or their agents had sought to cover up the cause of decedent’s death. This was a counter to defendants’ claim that decedent’s cause of death was a complete and unexplainable mystery.2 Plaintiff’s counsel did not inject the issues of murder, conspiracy to commit murder, Dr. Griz being a felon, or sending Dr. Griz to Jackson prison into the case.
When improper remarks are intentionally injected into a case counsel runs the risk that he will thereby create reversible error. Cachola v The Kroger Co, 32 Mich App 577, 559; 189 NW2d 112 (1971). In this case defense counsel sought to play on the passions of the jurors by injecting innuendos of what could happen to his client if the jury held against his client. Layton v Cregan & Mallory Co, Inc, 269 Mich 574, 580-581; 257 NW 888 (1934), Morrison v Skeels, 16 Mich App 727, 736; 168 NW2d 644 (1969). Even if this type of argument is a mere reply to opposing counsel’s argument, it can invite reversal since it serves to help deprive all parties of a fair trial. Sauve v Carling Brewing Co, 374 Mich 487, 491; 132 NW2d 655 (1965). But see People v Szczytko, 390 Mich 278, 293; 212 NW2d 211 (1973).
*151Furthermore, these remarks could not have been cured even if a curative instruction had been requested. Clark v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 367 Mich 396, 401; 116 NW2d 914 (1962), Steudle v Yellow & Checker Cab & Transfer Co, 287 Mich 1, 12; 282 NW 879 (1938), Hatten v Bain, 16 Mich App 10, 14; 167 NW2d 466 (1969). In this case an objection was made but it was overruled by the trial court stating it was "very liberal with argument”. See Riste v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 368 Mich 32, 37; 117 NW2d 161 (1962). Defense counsel then used this as a license to continue his remarks in this vein. This argument served to deprive plaintiff of a fair trial.
I would reverse the judgment of the trial court and remand for a new trial on the negligence count.
There can be no doubt that these remarks were improper. Sauve v Carling Brewing Co, 374 Mich 487, 489-490; 132 NW2d 655 (1965), Clark v Grand Trunk Western R Co, 367 Mich 396, 398-399; 116 NW2d 914 (1962), Layton v Cregan & Mallory Co, Inc, 269 Mich 574, 580-581; 257 NW 888 (1934), Lapasinskas v Quick, 17 Mich App 733, 736; 170 NW2d 318 (1969), Morrison v Skeels, 16 Mich App 727, 729-730; 168 NW2d 644 (1969).
Cf. Hand v Park Community Hospital, 14 Mich App 371; 165 NW2d 673 (1968), Ybarra v Spangard, 25 Cal 2d 486; 154 P2d 687; 162 ALR 1258 (1944).