This is a direct appeal from the denial of a motion to dismiss appellee’s filing of a foreign judgment under the Uniform Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Law, OCGA § 9-12-130 et seq. That law applies only to foreign judgments of other states that have adopted *706the uniform act in substantially the same form as Georgia. OCGA § 9-12-138. When it applies, however, “[a]ny litigation ensuing is limited to that which is afforded any other Georgia judgment. OCGA § 9-12-132.” Eastlawn Corp. v. Bankers Equip. Leasing Co., 211 Ga. App. 551, 555 (1) (439 SE2d 753) (1993) (Beasley, P. J., dissenting).
OCGA § 9-12-132 provides: “A copy of any foreign judgment authenticated in accordance with an act of Congress or statutes of this state may be filed in the office of the clerk of any court of competent jurisdiction of this state. The clerk shall treat the foreign judgment in the same manner as a judgment of the court in which the foreign judgment is filed. A filed foreign judgment has the same effect and is subject to the same procedures, defenses, and proceedings for reopening, vacating, staying, enforcing, or satisfying as a judgment of the court in which it is filed and may be enforced or satisfied in like manner.”
It is therefore clear that the denial of a motion to set aside a judgment filed under OCGA § 9-12-130 et seq. should be treated no differently for appeal purposes than any other judgment. See generally Eastlawn Corp., supra; Agency Mgmt. Svcs. v. Escape Travel/Tour Svcs., 199 Ga. App. 882, 883 (1) (406 SE2d 285) (1991).
In substance, this is an appeal from the denial of Okekpe’s motion for relief from a foreign judgment rendered in Virginia based on that state’s lack of personal jurisdiction, OCGA § 9-11-60 (d) (1); it is therefore subject to the discretionary appeal statute, OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) (8). See generally Rebich v. Miles, 264 Ga. 467, 468 (448 SE2d 192) (1994) (“ ‘underlying subject matter’ ” is dispositive under OCGA § 5-6-35 (a) even when a particular judgment or order “is procedurally subject to a direct appeal under OCGA § 5-6-34 (a)”). Any rule to the contrary that may have been implied in the following cases is expressly disapproved. Kaylor v. Turner, 210 Ga. App. 2 (435 SE2d 233) (1993); Arnold v. Brundidge Banking Co., 209 Ga. App. 278 (433 SE2d 388) (1993); O’Quinn v. Southeast Radio Corp., 190 Ga. App. 608 (380 SE2d 487) (1989); Sanders v. S. D. Leasing, 189 Ga. App. 409 (376 SE2d 420) (1988).
When the discretionary appeal statute is applicable to the subject matter of the case, only a notice of appeal properly filed under OCGA § 5-6-35 (g) is sufficient “to secure a review of the issues” presented. Id. Since no proper notice of appeal has been filed in accordance with the mandatory procedure for discretionary review of the subject matter of this case, it must be dismissed.
Appeal dismissed.
McMurray, P. J., Birdsong, P. J., Pope, P. J., Andrews, Johnson, Blackburn and Ruffin, JJ., concur. Beasley, C. J., concurs specially.