dissenting.
I respectfully dissent. Standard 45 (f) prohibits an attorney from settling a legal proceeding or claim without first obtaining proper authorization from his client. The contract executed between Uselton and Lewis granted the latter “full power and authority to settle, compromise, or take such action as he might deem proper for the best interest of [Uselton],” including “full power to execute any and all instruments and documents . . . necessary to settle or make other disposition of [Uselton’s grievance].” Accordingly, Lewis complied with the plain language of Standard 45 (f) by obtaining Uselton’s authorization to settle her claims prior to reaching the settlement agreement with the county.
For the first time, the majority interprets Standard 45 (f) in a manner which precluded Lewis from settling Uselton’s claim without consulting with her about the particular settlement offer and obtaining her consent to accept it, despite the prior agreement reached between Uselton and Lewis. The majority rules that a client who enters a contingency agreement may not also grant his attorney blanket authority to arrange a settlement. From a public policy perspective, I do not disagree with this new interpretation of Standard 45 (f). However, because Standard 45 (f) has never before been interpreted in this manner, and because Lewis’s settlement of the claim complied with the plain language of Standard 45 (f), Lewis was not afforded prior notice that his actions violated his fiduciary obligations.8 Therefore, I would not apply this new interpretation retroactively, and would impose no discipline.
*64Decided November 13, 1995 — Reconsideration denied December 14, 1995. William P. Smith III, General Counsel State Bar, Paula J. Frederick, Deputy General Counsel State Bar, for State Bar of Georgia. E. Christopher Harvey, Jr., for Lewis.See, e.g., Carsello v. State, 220 Ga. 90, 92 (137 SE2d 305) (1964).