dissenting.
I respectfully dissent in these cases. Defendants’ joint answer admitted the allegations contained in paragraph 7 of the complaint, to wit: “On May 1, 1993, Plaintiff was on the roadway leading into Defendant’s apartment complex, Marsh Cove Plantation as the invited guest of Brian Lineback.” Brian Lineback’s parents live in Marsh Cove Plantation. Maurice Collins, acting as the agent for and employee of defendant Merry Land & Investment Company, Inc., inquired of Dee Adams, the property manager, whether she had allowed plaintiff back on the property but failed to inquire of Brian Lineback whether plaintiff was still his guest. Rather, as plaintiff was walking up the street to the office with Brian Lineback two to three yards behind, defendant Maurice Collins stepped out of the office, “advised [plaintiff] that he was under arrest for criminal trespass [, . . . and] placed the handcuffs on him.” In spite of knowing that plaintiff was the invited guest of Brian Lineback, Maurice Collins believed he had witnessed the misdemeanor of criminal trespass simply because he had advised plaintiff “not to come back on the property, and he did come back.”
In light of this admission, it is my view that the majority has misapplied the controlling case of Ellis v. Knowles, 90 Ga. App. 40, 42 (2) (81 SE2d 884). In Ellis, this Court affirmed the overruling of the defendant landlords’ general demurrer and held that “[i]t was not necessary for the plaintiff to allege that the defendants actually knew that the plaintiff had been invited on the premises by the tenants. If the defendants sought to eject the plaintiff or to prosecute him for trespass without inquiring as to the plaintiff’s right to be on the premises, they did so at their own risk.” (Emphasis supplied.) Id. Where a reasonable man would investigate further before instigating a prosecution or making an arrest, he may be liable for failure to do so. McGonagil v. Treadwell, 216 Ga. App. 850, 853 (2), 854 (456 SE2d 260). In the cases sub judice, the admitted circumstances surrounding Maurice Collins’ intentional acts are themselves sufficient to rebut any prima facie case of probable cause established by the act of the recorder in binding plaintiff over on the charge of misdemeanor trespass. The jury should determine whether it was reasonable for Maurice Collins to act on the information of Dee Adams that she had not readmitted plaintiff to the property (as contended by plaintiff) without also inquiring of Brian Lineback whether the teenager was still the guest of the tenant’s son. As the majority would affirm the grant of summary judgment, I respectfully dissent.
I am authorized to state that Presiding Judge Pope and Judge Ruffin join in this dissent.
*68Decided November 9, 1995 Harris O’Dell, Jr., for appellant. Karsman, Brooks & Callaway, Stanley Karsman, Trade G. Smith, for appellees.