This case comes before us on a writ of certio-rari from a decision of the superior court declaring the 1 year durational voting residency requirement of Const, art. 6, § 1 and RCW 29.07.070 and 29.07.080 to be in violation of the fourteenth amendment to the United States Constitution, and enjoining election officials from enforcing it. Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 31 L. Ed. 2d 274, 92 S. Ct. 995 (1972), is controlling authority; consequently, we affirm the decision of the superior court.
This matter was presented in the Superior Court for King County upon an agreed statement of facts which reveals that all plaintiffs had moved to Washington from out of state and had established residence in Seattle.1 All plaintiffs contacted the appropriate Seattle election officials and attempted to register to vote. They were told that they were ineligible to register to vote until they had lived in the state of Washington for 11 months. As a result, plaintiffs were unable to vote in the general election of November 2, 1971. They brought this action (a) seeking a declaratory judgment that Const, art. 6, § 1, is violative of the United States Constitution, and (b) also asking that the Seattle election officials be permanently enjoined from enforcing the 1 year durational voting residency requirement of Const, art. 6, § 1 and RCW 29.07.070 and 29.07.080. The superior court, as mentioned above, held the foregoing provisions of state law were in violation of the United States Constitution and enjoined the defendants from enforcing them.
The issues presented in this case were recently decided by the United States Supreme Court in Dunn v. Blumstein, supra. In holding Tennessee’s durational residency require*757ments of (a) 1 year in the state and (b) 3 months in the county prior to voting registration, unconstitutional, the court stated:
Fixing a constitutionally acceptable period is surely a matter of degree. It is sufficient to note here that 30 days appears to be an ample period of time for the State to complete whatever administrative tasks are necessary to prevent fraud — and a year, or three months, too much.
405 U.S. at 348. The court held further that durational voting residency requirements are unconstitutional unless the state can demonstrate that such laws are necessary to promote a compelling state interest.
Nothing distinguishes this case factually from Blumstein. The State of Washington has failed to demonstrate any compelling state interest that would justify its requirements of a 90-day county and a 1-year state residency prior to voting. Accordingly, the 90-day and the 1-year durational residency requirements specified by Const, art. 6, § 1 and RCW 29.07.070 and 29.07.080 are, per Blumstein, violative of the United States Constitution. Additionally, we observe in passing that durational residency requirements of more than 30 days cannot be constitutionally sustained unless it can be clearly demonstrated that they are required by a compelling state interest.
At this point in history, it seems to us it should be undebatable that our United States Constitution and the decisions of the United States Supreme Court interpreting the constitution are the supreme law of the land. Furthermore, despite contentious thinking, views, and actions to the contrary in the past and today in some expected and unexpected quarters, nothing is more basic to our system of government, its continuation, viability, and vitality, than this long-recognized, accepted and well-established principle. The alternative — purely and simply — would be anarchy with every man a law unto himself, with no one secure in person or effects from the personal peccadillos and the either rational or irrational idiosyncrasies and motivations of others.
*758As emphasized above, the instant case cannot be distinguished either factually or legally from the Blumstein case. The only problem in the instant case, if there is one, is whether we should be swayed by and should follow individual personal views and values (no matter how strongly held, and whether or not history should prove them to be meritorious or merely personal idiosyncrasies), or whether we should follow and give effect to the law of the land. Unless we deliberately and voluntarily choose to violate our own oaths of office and the supreme law of the land, there is no choice in the instant case. On the basis of the controlling authority of Blumstein, the judgment of the trial court must be affirmed. It is so ordered.
Hamilton, C.J., Rosellini, Hunter, Neill, Stafford, Wright, and Utter, JJ., concur.
Plaintiffs Moen moved to Seattle on December 1, 1970; plaintiffs Goodman, on July 22,1971; and plaintiffs Czeisler, on August 1,1971.