dissenting.
The dissenting opinion in the Court of Appeals and the majority opinion here are correct in concluding that the Commission made a finding, supported by evidence in the record, which in turn supports the conclusion that the dual purpose doctrine does not apply to the *716facts presented. They are incorrect, however, in holding that the inquiry ends there.
The Commission made its finding after excluding evidence which was admissible under N.C.G.S. § 8C-1, Rule 803(3); was relevant to the question at issue; and was directly supportive of a finding that at the time of the accident, plaintiffs decedent had concurrent business and personal purposes. Indeed, Lillian Murray’s proffered testimony that a business appointment was “the reason for going” would have supported a finding that business was the sole, or at least the primary, purpose for the trip. In treating this proffered evidence as irrelevant to its decision, the Commission was operating under a misapprehension of the applicable law. “It is still the rule that ‘[f]acts found under misapprehension of the law will be set aside on the theory that the evidence should be considered in its true legal right.’ ” Helms v. Rea, 282 N.C. 610, 620, 194 S.E.2d 1, 8 (1973) (quoting McGill v. Lumberton, 215 N.C. 752, 754, 3 S.E.2d 324, 326 (1939)). The Court of Appeals majority thus properly vacated the Commission’s opinion and award and remanded the case for reconsideration of the evidence in its true legal light.
I find the reasoning and result of the majority opinion for the Court of Appeals entirely correct, and I therefore dissent.