dissenting.
The appellant was convicted at his second trial for murder after his first trial for the same offense had resulted in the declaration of a mistrial by the trial judge for failure of the jurors sitting on the case to reach a verdict of guilty or not guilty. My position on double jeopardy following mistrials in hung-jury criminal cases, where the defendant does not consent to the mistrial, has been made quite clear. See my dissenting opinions in Cameron v. Caldwell, 232 Ga. 611 (208 SE2d 441) (1974); Wood v. State, 234 Ga. 758 (218 SE2d 47) (1975); and Orvis v. State, 237 Ga. 6.
Also, under the circumstances shown in this case, I think the incriminating statement made by the appellant at a time when he was unrepresented by counsel should have been suppressed.
My assessment of and decision on the effective assistance of counsel issue as raised in this appeal is not in agreement with the conclusion reached by the court.
I respectfully dissent.