concurring in part and dissenting in part.
The majority opinion reverses a jury award for emotional distress damages to LaVearn Thomas for insufficient evidence, despite competent evidence to the contrary. I believe the decision misreads our standard of review and this Court’s precedent. Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
A. Standard of Review
Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50, in diversity actions “this Court applies the standard of review used by the courts of the state whose law governs the action.” Kusens v. Pascal, Co., 448 F.3d 349, 360 (6th Cir.2006). Rather than using the term “judgment as a matter of law,” Michigan state courts use the terms “directed verdict” and “judgment notwithstanding the verdict” (“JNOV”). Brocklehurst v. PPG Indus. Inc., 123 F.3d 890, 894 n. 3 (6th Cir.1997). Michigan courts review de novo a trial court’s ruling for a directed verdict or JNOV. Elezovic v. Ford Motor Co., 472 Mich. 408, 697 N.W.2d 851, 857 (2005). When conducting such review, “the evidence and all legitimate inferences [are viewed] in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Sniecinski v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 469 Mich. 124, 666 N.W.2d 186, 192 (2003) (citations omitted). “A motion for directed verdict or JNOV should be granted only if the evidence viewed in this light fails to establish a claim as a matter of law.” Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
B. Evidence of Emotional Distress
Determining damages for mental and emotional distress is essentially subjective, though “an award of damages must be supported by competent evidence.” Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 264 n. 20, 98 S.Ct. 1042, 55 L.Ed.2d 252 (1978). “Michigan law allows recovery for mental anguish based on the plaintiffs own testimony; however, there must be specific and definite evidence of [a plaintiffs] mental anguish, anxiety or distress.” Moody v. Pepsi-Cola Metro. Bottling Co., Inc., 915 F.2d 201, 210 (6th Cir.1990) (citations and internal quotations omitted). We have held that “a plaintiffs own testimony, along with the circumstances of a particular case, can suffice to sustain the plaintiffs burden” of proving that an employer’s unlawful actions caused her emotional distress. Turic v. Holland Hosp., Inc., 85 F.3d 1211, 1215 (6th Cir.1996) (citing Meyers v. City of Cincinnati, 14 F.3d 1115, 1119 (6th Cir.1994)). Here, Thomas testified that, before she left the warehouse, she was “upset” and “disappointed,” and that the racism she encountered from the warehouse manager, Phil Sullivan, was a “smack in the face.” (Joint Appendix (“JA”) 600.) She alleged that Sullivan’s discriminatory behavior made her decide to transfer positions in the store. She also stated that the work environment was so toxic she felt like she was “walking on egg shells” when Sullivan was at the warehouse. (JA 597.)
C.Our Precedent
The majority states that two decisions instruct our resolution of this dispute: Erebia v. Chrysler Plastic Products Corp., 772 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir.1985) (vacating emotional damages) and Moore v. KUKA Welding Systems & Robot Corp., 171 F.3d 1073 (6th Cir.1999) (affirming emotional damages). The majority determines that Thomas’s evidence of emotional distress more closely resembles the evidence provided in Erebia, such that an award of emotional damages is inappropriate as a matter of law. (Majority Op. 473.) I believe that the majority’s reliance on Erebia and its decision to vacate Thomas’s emotional damage award are in error. Erebia is distinguishable in two ways. First, Ere-*477bia dealt with the “weakest of all” hostile work environment claims, id. at 1260-61 (J. Kennedy, dissenting), namely, emotional distress stemming from racial comments made by a subordinate. The dissent properly recognized that a subordinate’s racial remarks are not comparable to racial remarks made by a supervisor, as “a supervisor can dominate the workplace with respect to his subordinate.” Id. In this case, Sullivan was the warehouse manager and Thomas’s superior, and therefore Sullivan was in a position that granted him greater power to affect the entire workplace with his racial animus.
Second, the plaintiff in Erebia testified on his own behalf and was his only witness. Here, multiple witnesses testified that Sullivan made racially offensive remarks that impacted all black employees. Five of Thomas’s black colleagues testified to racially offensive comments made, or actions taken, by Sullivan. The jury found that racial hostility poisoned the work environment for three black employees. Thus, the evidence demonstrates that Sullivan’s racial hostility permeated the entire Costco warehouse in a way that the comments in Erebia did not.
The majority opinion notes the fact that Sullivan was a manager and the testimony of “several witnesses” does not establish Thomas suffered emotional distress. (Majority Op. 473-74.) This is true. It is also true that the absence of such evidence would not prevent a plaintiff from establishing distress. However, these “circumstances of a particular case” bolster Thomas’s testimony that the atmosphere at Warehouse 390 was racially charged, and caused her emotional distress. See Turic, 85 F.3d at 1215.
I believe that this case more closely resembles our decision in Moore, where we upheld a jury award of $70,000 to compensate a black plaintiff for emotional distress caused by a hostile work environment. Moore, 171 F.3d at 1082-83. There, the plaintiff testified that “he was ‘angry’ and ‘upset’ about the jokes and slurs and that he ‘just couldn’t take it any more’” Id. Based on this, we concluded that, “[accepting plaintiffs narration of the facts as true, [the] evidence sufficiently demonstrates the requisite injury to support compensatory damages.” Id. at 1082. Similarly, the plaintiff testified that, like Thomas, his superior was aware of the harassment.
The majority also notes that the racial comments in Moore were made with greater regularity and that the plaintiff felt he was isolated as a result of his filing of an Equal Employment Opportunity Commission claim. (Majority Op. 472-73.) This, in effect, concedes that the surrounding “circumstances of a particular case” are relevant to a showing of distress. But a plaintiff need only show that she suffered emotional distress. The frequency of racial harassment and the various ways in which it impacts a plaintiff may affect the size of an award, but such factors should not preclude an award. In Moore, the plaintiff may arguably have faced more pervasive harassment. Thus, plaintiff was awarded $70,000 in compensatory damages. Here, Thomas was awarded only $10,000 for her emotional distress. No matter the amount of the award, the evidence is unmistakably clear that Thomas was upset by the racial discrimination in her workplace, especially given that we view the evidence and all inferences in a light most favorable to her, as we must do. Sniecinski, 666 N.W.2d at 192.
D. Emotional Distress
Much of my disagreement with the majority opinion comes from a fundamental difference over what constitutes evidence of mental or emotional distress. As this *478Court found in Moore, evidence of mental anguish, anxiety, or distress includes being upset and disappointed with the hostile environment in which one works. Moore, 171 F.3d at 1082-83. And if anything, a specific and definite example of one’s anguish, anxiety, or distress would be Thomas’s decision to change positions at Costco to escape such an environment.
Finally, the majority argues that Thomas’s claims are undermined by her admission that she was not the target of harassment. (Majority Op. 473.) But this is not supported by Michigan hostile-work-environment cases nor does it comport with this Court’s concept of emotional distress. Rather, Michigan law provides for compensation for individuals who have suffered emotional distress from a racially hostile environment regardless of the identity of the harassee. This is so because the victims of racially hostile work environments, as conceded by the majority, are not only the direct targets of harassment but all those employees whose work environment is affected.
E. Conclusion
The testimony in this case satisfies the evidentiary requirements for an the award of emotional distress damages to Thomas. For the reasons set forth above, I dissent from the majority opinion reversing the award of damages for emotional distress to Thomas. I concur with the majority opinion in all other respects.